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THE    PRESENTATION 
OF    REALITY 


CAMBRIDGE   UNIVERSITY  PRESS, 

Hontron:   FETTER  LANE,   B.C. 

C.   F.   CLAY,   MANAGER. 


100,  PRINCES  STREET. 

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ILetpjig:  F.  A.  BROCKHAUS. 

$efo  gorfe:    G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS. 

Bombag  atrti  Calcutta :   MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  LTD. 


All  rights  reserved 


THE    PRESENTATION 
OF    REALITY 


BY 


HELEN    WODEHOUSE,    D.PHIL. 

Author  of  The  Logic  of  Will-,    Lecturer  in  Philosophy 
in  the  University  of  Birmingham 


Cambridge : 

at  the  University  Press 

1910 


NA/fc 


(Eambrtoge : 

PKINTED    BY   JOHN    CLAY,    M.A. 
AT   THE    UNIVERSITY   PRESS. 


NOTE 


SCATTERED  passages  in  this  Essay  have  appeared 
^-^  in  an  article  called  "  Knowledge  as  Presentation," 
in  Mind  for  July,  1909.  The  appendix  to  Chapter  VII, 
"Professor  James  on  Conception,"  was  published  in  The 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Method 
in  September,  1909.  My  thanks  are  due  to  the  editors  of 
these  Journals  for  permission  to  republish. 

H.  W. 

August,  1910. 


215994 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGE 

INTRODUCTION ix 

PART  I.     KNOWLEDGE 

I.  KNOWLEDGE  AS  PRESENTATION 3 

II.  CONTENT  AND  OBJECT 13 

III.  THE  FIELDS  OF  PRESENTATION.     I  .        .        .26 

IV.  THE  FIELDS  OF  PRESENTATION.     II    .        .        .        .31 

V.  THE  FIELDS  OF  PRESENTATION.    Ill  ....      52 

VI.  DEFENCE  OF  THE  PRESENTATION  OF  REALITY  IN  SENSE      57 

VII.  DEFENCE    OF    THE    PRESENTATION    OF    REALITY    IN 

THOUGHT 68 

VIII.  ILLUSTRATIVE  AND  ADDITIONAL  :  THE  APPREHENSION 

OF  FEELING .      86 

PART   II.     ERROR 

IX.  Is  ANY  KNOWLEDGE  INFALLIBLE?       ....     105 

X.  ERROR  AND  THE  REAL 113 

PART  III.     THE  MANY-MANSIONED 
UNIVERSE 

XI.  THE  VARIOUSNESS  OF  REALITY 123 

XII.  ASSUMPTIONS 132 

XIII.  THE  MUTUAL  RELATIONS  OF  JUDGMENT,  APPREHEN- 

SION, ASSUMPTION,  AND  DOUBT        .        .        .        .146 

PART  IV.    CONCLUSION 

XIV.  THE  PRESENTATION  OF  REALITY 157 

INDEX   .  161 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  theory  of  knowledge  may  be  fairly  considered, 
from  one  point  of  view,  as  a  psychological  preface  to 
metaphysics.  It  is  common  to  urge  that  there  are  great 
difficulties  and  dangers  in  the  method  of  approaching  the 
latter  through  psychology  instead  of  through  logic,  and 
it  is  true  enough  that  such  difficulties  exist,  yet  their 
existence  seems  hardly  to  excuse  us  from  endeavouring  to 
open  both  roads.  Complete  philosophy  after  all  is  bound 
to  the  task  of  connecting  and  reconciling  all  our  beliefs. 
It  should  therefore  have  nothing  to  fear  from  a  sound 
psychology,  and  psychology  itself  has  much  to  gain 
by  becoming  and  remaining,  in  some  part  at  least, 
philosophical. 

The  following  essay  is  therefore  intended  for  a  descrip- 
tion of  knowledge  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  philosophical 
psychology.  The  first  part,  and  the  longest,  will  deal  with 
knowledge  in  the  narrower  sense,  where  we  have  true 
judgments  about  the  actual  world;  the  second  part  (a  very 
short  one)  will  deal  with  Error,  the  third  with  Imagination. 
I  desire  to  maintain  and  to  illustrate  the  doctrine  that  in 
all  cognitive  experience  we  come  into  immediate  contact 
with  objective  reality,  of  the  existence  of  which  we  have 
in  experience  an  irrefutable  witness;  and  that  on  all 


X  INTRODUCTION 

levels  of  cognition,  sensuous  or  intellectual,  this  happens 
in  the  same  way,  namely,  by  the  presentation  of  an  object 
to  a  subject1.  I  write  on  psychology  in  order  to  make 
from  it  a  preface  to  metaphysics,  and  desire  to  keep  as 
clear  as  I  can  from  writing  on  metaphysics  itself.  That 
is,  I  shall  try  to  describe  the  process  of  knowing  reality, 
but  shall  always  endeavour  to  put  aside  if  possible  the 
question  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  reality. 

Whatever  his  opinions,  a  student  of  the  theory  of 
knowledge  can  have  but  one  sentiment  at  present  towards 
those  who  are  leading  the  work  in  this  field.  I  should 
wish  this  essay  to  express  some  of  the  gratitude  and 
admiration  which  all  of  us  must  feel  for  the  work  of  so 
brilliant  a  group  of  scholars  from  all  nations.  My  personal 
gratitude  is  due  in  two  directions  in  particular : — firstly  to 
the  extraordinarily  suggestive  works  of  Professor  Alexius 
Meinong;  secondly,  and  from  first  to  last,  to  everything 
that  English-speaking  students  connect  with  the  honoured 
name  of  Dr  G.  F.  Stout. 

1  With  regard  to  this  matter,  as  to  all  the  rest  of  psychology,  I  am 
indebted  for  more  than  I  can  ever  state  to  the  teaching  of  Dr  James  Ward. 


w. 

IV 


PART  I 

KNOWLEDGE 


CHAPTEE  I 

KNOWLEDGE  AS   PRESENTATION 

SPEAKING  generally,  one  may  say  that  psychologists 
of  all  schools  are  agreed  on  the  doctrine  that  cognition 
is  an  indispensable  and  fundamental  element  in  mental 
life,  which  means,  in  non-technical  language,  that  every 
conscious  being  in  every  instant  of  consciousness  is  partly 
engaged  in  knowing.  So  much  we  may  take  to  be  non- 
controversial,  but  the  next  step  unfortunately  takes  us 
across  the  border  in  a  moment.  The  present  writer 
desires  to  take  the  side  of  those  who  maintain  that  in 
every  instant  of  consciousness  the  conscious  being  knows 
something.  We  maintain,  that  is  (to  return  to  the 
technical  form),  that  the  fundamental  relation  of  life 
involves  the  presentation  of  an  object  to  a  subject. 

Expanding  this  doctrine,  we  maintain  that  even  from 
the  vaguest  beginnings  the  process  of  consciousness  has 
two  sides.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  reception — some- 
thing comes  to  me.  On  the  other  hand  I  am  active  in 
reception,  and  I  respond  in  feeling  and  striving  to  that 
which  I  receive.  Naturally  it  is  long  before  I  learn  to 

1—2 


4  KNOWLEDGE   AS  PRESENTATION 

describe  ray  life  in  any  such  terms:  nevertheless  from 
the  beginning  I  find  something  present  with  me,  "  some- 
thing there  " ;  and  I  try  to  get  more  of  it  or  to  get  rid  of 
it.  At  every  moment  I  receive  and  respond,  I  desire  and 
am  answered  or  resisted,  I  seek  and  find. 

What  I  find  is  the  only  thing  that  is  capable  of  being 
found,  namely  the  real  world.  My  finding  of  it,  my 
coming  upon  it  and  against  it,  is  the  event  of  the  pre- 
sentation of  reality,  and  this  is  all  that  the  phrase  need 
mean.  What  meets  us  is  the  real,  and  this  meeting,  this 
having  it  before  us  in  our  conscious  life,  this  finding  it 
under  our  eyes,  is  presentation,  or  cognition,  or  knowledge. 
It  has  been  said  by  an  ingenious  writer  that  to  have  a 
presentation  cannot  be  to  know  an  object,  since  the 
presentation  itself  is  an  additional  reality  requiring  to  be 
known1.  With  our  sense  of  the  term  this  objection  does 
not  hold,  since  "  to  have  a  presentation,"  for  us,  means 
simply  to  have  something  presented,  to  find  something, 
to  come  up  consciously  against  the  real  world — to  know 
reality. 

There  would  seem  to  be  something  curiously  artificial 
in  accounts  of  experience  which  leave  out  this  aspect  of 
direct  meeting  with  something  real.  Professor  James2,  in 
an  early  essay,  describes  cognition  as  a  feeling  which  is 
taken  to  be  in  some  way  self- transcendent.  We  suppose, 
he  says,  that  there  must  be  a  reality  outside  to  resemble 
the  feeling's  quality,  and  we  deny  the  function  of  know- 
ledge to  any  feeling  whose  quality  or  content  we  do  not 
believe  to  exist  outside  of  that  feeling  as  well  as  in  it. 

1  H.  A.  Prichard,  "  The  Psychologists'  Treatment  of  Knowledge,"  in 
Mind,  1907,  p.  50. 

2  "  On  the  Function  of  Cognition  "  (Mind,  O.S.  x.). 


KNOWLEDGE   AS   PKESENTATION  5 

Now  the  feeling  itself  cannot  discover  whether  or  not  such 
a  reality  exists.  Its  own  quality  is  the  only  quality  it 
grasps,  and  its  own  nature  is  not  a  particle  altered  by 
having  the  self-transcendent  function  of  cognition  either 
added  to  it  or  taken  away.  The  function  is  "  accidental  "  ; 
it  falls  outside  and  not  inside  its  being. 

It  is  scarcely  fair  to  criticise  this  passage  at  present 
because  its  form  of  statement  has  so  evidently  been 
determined  by  remembrance  of  the  existence  of  error, 
and  of  that  we  shall  have  later  on  to  give  our  own 
account.  But  we  are  justified  even  here  in  observing  how 
artificial  the  description  appears  at  first  sight  to  be.  Had 
it  not  been  for  the  consideration  of  error,  it  is  likely  that 
no  one  would  ever  have  thought  of  separating  an  event  of 
knowing  from  what  is  known,  or  of  saying  that  to  see  a 
thing  is  an  accidental  function  of  seeing1.  Professor 
James's  expressions  would  have  been  thought  to  be  at 
least  dangerous  and  misleading.  Our  own  account  has  at 
least  the  merit  of  simplicity — that  knowledge  is  that  side 
of  experience  on  which  we  meet  with  reality. 


One-sided  and  Double-sided  Terms. 

Since  every  mental  process  in  the  concrete  has  the 
two  sides  of  action  and  reception,  of  the  subject  putting 
itself  forth  and  the  object  coming  in  upon  it,  it  is  natural 
that  psychology  should  bestow  its  names  sometimes  upon 

1  Cf.  Mr  A.  Hoernle,  "Image,  Idea,  and  Meaning,"  in  Mind,  1907; 
"'To  mean  something'  is  after  all  a  conscious  act,  and  the  self- 
transcension  of  consciousness  inherent  in  all  objective  reference  is 
something  experienced  by  us.  The  fundamental  fact... is  that  in 
experience  we  are  conscious  of  reality." 


6  KNOWLEDGE   AS   PKESENTATION 

the  sides  taken  separately  and  sometimes  upon  the  two 
taken  as  a  whole.  It  follows  that  some  common  terms 
refer  only  to  the  subject  side  or  only  to  the  object  side  of 
consciousness,  whilst  other  terms,  or  the  same  terms  in 
other  contexts,  stand  for  concrete  processes  including  both 
aspects,  and  from  this  fact  some  confusion  may  occasionally 
arise.  "Feeling"  for  instance  in  the  technical  psycho- 
logical sense  is  subjective  only,  whilst  "  emotion  "  usually 
includes  some  presentation  as  well  \  "  Discovery  "  applies 
both  to  the  object  found  and  to  the  activity  of  finding  it. 
"  Decision  "  may  stand  for  the  act  of  deciding  or  for  the 
thing  decided  on  or  for  both  together.  "Assumption" 
covers  both  the  deliberate  creation  of  an  object  and  the 
presentation  of  it  as  it  is  created  ;  as  well  as  standing 
for  the  created  object  itself.  "Knowledge"  is  sometimes 
abstract  or  "  one-sided,"  but  is  often  a  double-sided  term, 
and  in  that  case  the  names  of  the  two  aspects  it  includes 
are  "  presentation  "  and  its  correlative  "  apprehension." 

The  two  Sides  of  Knowledge. 

Let  us  for  our  present  purpose  take  "  knowledge  "  to  be 
concrete,  containing  in  itself  the  two  aspects  of  conscious- 
ness, and  let  us  attend  for  a  moment  to  each  of  them  in 
turn. 

1.  "  The  content  of  knowledge "  as  opposed  to 
"  knowing,"  we  may  fairly  use  to  represent  one  side  of 
the  process.  Knowledge  in  this  sense  belongs  to  the  side 
of  the  object,  and  consists  in  the  presentation  of  reality  in 
consciousness. 

1  The  popular  use  of  these  two  terms  is  usually  just  the  reverse 
of  this. 


KNOWLEDGE  AS   PRESENTATION  7 

A  certain  reluctance  to  allow  these  contents  of  know- 
ledge to  fall  to  the  object  side  comes  sometimes  from  a 
confusion  of  the  psychological  with  the  physiological  use 
of  "subjective."  The  physiologist  is  naturally  apt  to 
class  as  subjective  everything  that  is  "in  the  mind,"  and 
certainly  whatever  is  known  must  be  presented  in  the 
mind.  It  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purpose  if  we  point 
out  that  this  classification  would  be  useless  to  the  psycho- 
logist ;  for  his  region  of  interest  begins  only  after  the 
threshold  of  consciousness  has  been  passed,  and  therefore 
his  distinction  of  subjective  and  objective  must  fall  not 
between  mind  and  body  but  within  "  the  mind "  itself. 
The  world  comes  to  me  in  the  fields  of  sensation  and 
thought  as  an  object  known,  and  I  in  feeling  and  striving 
react  upon  it.  This  reaction  is  subjective,  but  the  contents 
of  knowledge  are  objective  for  the  psychologist,  for  they 
constitute  the  shape  in  which  the  object  comes  to  me. 

2.  The  subjective  element  in  knowing  is  apprehension, 
the  word  being  used  in  its  ordinary  meaning  as  the  cor- 
relative of  presentation,  and  not  in  its  etymological  sense. 
It  is  activity,  but  of  a  special  and  peculiar  kind,  being 
the  activity  of  reception  only.  In  apprehending  I  do 
nothing  to  my  object.  I  simply  keep  my  eyes  open 
and  see. 

We  guard  ourselves  by  this  description  against  more 
than  one  mode  of  expression  which  seems  to  be  dangerous. 
One  such  mode  is  found  in  the  statement  of  many  idealists 
that  in  knowledge  we  construct  reality.  This  is  a  brief 
formulation  of  what  for  idealist  metaphysics  is  of  course  a 
truth,  but  in  the  theory  of  knowledge  it  would  seem  to 
need  expansion  and  qualification  if  it  is  not  to  be  mis- 
interpreted. Even  if  the  whole  world  grows  by  means  of 


8  KNOWLEDGE   AS   PRESENTATION 

our  interest,  of  our  questioning  and  seeking  and  demand- 
ing :  even  if  nothing  can  exist  except  on  condition  that  it 
is  known  :  even  then  our  knowing  is  not  in  any  ordinary 
sense  an  act  of  construction  or  creation.  Even  in  deliberate 
fiction  or  assumption,  where  we  do  wilfully  create  the 
objects  that  we  apprehend,  the  creation  is  not  the  appre- 
hension. Whatever  our  metaphysics  may  be  it  is  most 
important  to  keep  this  psychological  distinction  clear. 
Whatever  creates  the  reality  that  we  find  it  is  not  the 
finding  as  such  that  creates  it,  and  it  is  this  finding  that 
constitutes  knowledge. 

In  the  same  way  we  must  object  to  those  forms  of 
speech  which  seem  to  take  certain  events  of  knowing, 
judgment  for  instance,  to  be  something  more  than  the 
reception  of  presentation.  It  may  be  wise  to  distinguish 
judgment  from  some  other  kinds  of  apprehension,  as 
occurring  only  after  doubt  has  supervened,  or  as  being 
concerned  with  a  special  kind  or  level  of  object,  or  with 
connections  between  objects,  or  what  not.  But  if  it  is  an 
element  in  knowing  as  such,  then  it  must  still  be  itself  a 
kind  of  apprehension,  a  case  of  "finding  something  there." 
We  must  be  suspicious,  therefore,  of  descriptions  of  judg- 
ment which  make  it  an  "assertion,"  or  an  "assent,"  or 
a  response  to  an  imperative1;  because  these  accounts  seem 
likely  to  bring  into  judgment  something  more  than 
pure  knowledge.  This  would  not  matter,  of  course, 
except  that  we  are  so  likely  to  slip  back  afterwards  into 
thinking  of  the  event  so  named  as  if  it  were  still  pure 
knowledge. 

Still  more  must  we  object  to  those  accounts  which  take 

1  E.g.  Kickert,  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntniss,  66,  and  Lipps,  Fiihlen, 
Wollen,  und  Denken,  187. 


KNOWLEDGE    AS    PRESENTATION  9 

judgment  (still  not  distinguished  from  knowing)  to  be  a 
kind  of  appreciation  or  an  acceptance  or  rejection.  Our 
knowledge  of  an  object  may  of  course  be  a  result  of 
appreciation,  in  that  we  wanted  to  know ;  and  appreciation 
must  of  course  have  cognition  as  a  ground.  But,  if  there 
is  any  meaning  or  use  in  distinguishing  right  from  left  or 
front  from  back  or  coming  from  going,  then  to  know  is 
not  the  same  as  to  appreciate.  The  matter  is  confused 
by  the  fact  that  a  prepositional  form  of  words  may  express 
much  more  than  a  judgment.  "That  won't  do"  covers 
the  ordinary  judgment  "that  doesn't  fit,"  "  that  is  unlike  "  ; 
and  the  introspective  judgment  "  that  is  not  what  I  want "; 
and  the  imperative  "take  it  away;  let  it  go";  and  the 
suggestion  "let  us  look  for  something  else."  To  compound 
all  these  meanings  and  to  call  the  total  a  judgment,  in 
the  sense  in  which  judgment  is  an  element  of  knowledge, 
would  seem  to  be  a  mere  blurring  of  all  the  distinctions 
which  it  has  taken  psychology  so  long  to  make.  One 
becomes  suspicious  of  even  so  respectable  a  phrase  as 
"knowledge  in  the  concrete,"  because  it  turns  out  so  often 
to  mean  something  more  concrete  than  knowledge.  Cog- 
nition is  no  more  an  independent  mental  process  than 
conation  is;  they  are  two  elements  in  every  possible 
mental  process ;  and  it  is  darkening  of  counsel  to  call 
them  by  each  other's  names. 

Act  and  Object  of  Apprehension. 

It  is  useless  to  deny  that  throughout  this  essay  we 
shall  be  on  controversial  ground.  From  its  very  beginning 
our  description  of  knowledge  has  committed  us  to  dis- 
tinguishing on  every  level  of  knowledge,  even  the  lowest, 


10  KNOWLEDGE  AS   PRESENTATION 

between  our  act  of  apprehension  or  recipience  and  that 
which  we  receive.  The  acceptance  or  rejection  of  this 
distinction  is  so  fundamental  a  point  in  any  theory  of  con- 
sciousness that  it  is  not  easy  to  argue  about  it ;  I  can 
only  say  that  without  such  a  distinction  I  do  not  see 
how  to  describe  our  experience  of  reality.  If  cognition  is 
not  the  apprehension  of  an  object,  how  can  we  know 
the  world  ? 

It  may  be  that  there  is  a  reasonable  answer  to  this 
question  which  I  have  been  unable  to  find,  and  that  the 
psychologists  of  a  different  school  are  in  the  right.  I 
urge  only  that  in  any  case  they  have  no  right  to  treat 
the  question  as  irrelevant.  If  I  have  not  misunderstood 
them,  certain  writers l  tend  to  claim  a  curiously  isolated 
position  for  their  psychology,  and  an  exemption  from  the 
duty  of  answering  any  question  which  may  be  supposed 
to  be  put  to  them  by  philosophers,  even  by  common- 
sense  philosophers.  They  hold  fast  to  the  doctrine  that 
psychology  is  a  natural  science  concerned  with  nothing 
but  its  own  object  of  study ;  that  this  object  of  study 
consists  in  a  series  of  conscious  processes  or  states  of 
consciousness,  into  which  no  distinction  of  subject  and 
object  need  enter;  and  that  it  is  not  their  business  but 
the  business  of  philosophy  to  get  from  such  states  to  a 
person  and  a  universe. 

Now  this  would  be  very  well  if  such  writers  would 
confine  themselves  to  so  purely  scientific  a  position  as 
that  which  is  taken,  for  instance,  by  the  geometry  of  non- 
Euclidean  space.  As  I  understand  it,  the  student  of  such 
a  geometry  may  be  quite  indifferent  to  the  question 

1  Professor  Titchener  for  instance  ?    See  his  Experimental  Psychology 
of  the  Thought-Processes. 


KNOWLEDGE   AS   PRESENTATION  11 

whether  such  space  is  or  is  not  in  any  way  actually 
existent.  That  question  is  really  left  to  the  philosopher, 
and  the  philosopher  is  left  with  a  free  hand  to  answer  it 
in  the  way  he  finds  best.  But  the  psychologists  of  whom 
I  speak  leave  the  philosopher  no  such  freedom.  They 
claim  without  any  doubt  to  be  writing  of  what  is  actual. 
We  need  not  take  the  non-Euclidean  parallels  and  found 
upon  them  our  actual  experience  of  space,  but  we  have 
to  take  the  self-contained  streams  of  consciousness,  with 
no  relation  of  subject  and  object  within  them,  and  to 
transform  them  somehow  into  a  society  of  real  people 
living  in  a  real  world ;  knowing  it,  loving  or  hating  it, 
and  seeking  their  own  ends  within  it. 

If  a  science  dictates  to  philosophy  in  this  way,  the 
philosopher  must  make  a  counter-claim  to  some  super- 
vision of  the  science ;  and  his  first  request  will  naturally 
be  that  the  object  should  be  examined  with  which  the 
science  professes  to  start.  The  question  will  be  whether 
these  streams  of  self-contained  feelings  are  actual  at  all, 
and  the  burden  of  proof  will  be  on  those  who  assume 
them.  What  is  undoubtedly  actual  is  the  living  being 
who  knows  things  and  seeks  ends,  even  if  they  are  no 
higher  than  the  ends  of  a  jelly-fish.  Can  a  science,  which 
claims  to  deal  with  the  actual,  venture  to  start  with  any 
description  of  its  object  which  omits  all  reference  to  what 
is  sought  and  what  is  known  ?  My  own  opinion  is  that  it 
must  not;  that,  as  the  thinnest  tablet  must  have  two 
sides,  so  the  most  elementary  consciousness  must  still  be 
made  up  of  recipience  and  response.  This  may  be  a 
mistaken  opinion,  but  I  insist  that  the  burden  of  proof  is 
not  on  its  supporters  but  on  their  opponents.  Unless 
reason  is  shown  to  the  contrary,  knowing  cannot  be  taken 


12  KNOWLEDGE   AS   PRESENTATION 

as  a  self-contained  feeling  which  somehow  "claims"  to  be 
transcendent.  Failing  reason  to  the  contrary,  it  must  be 
taken  in  the  ordinary  and  familiar  way  as  knowledge  of 
something. 

Certain  other  writers,  who  have  no  difficulty  in  accept- 
ing this  position  so  far  as  concerns  intellectual  cognition, 
find  a  difficulty  when  they  come  to  sensation.  In  a 
sensation,  they  hold,  no  distinction  can  be  made  between 
subject  and  object,  between  sensing  and  sensatum,  recep- 
tion and  what  is  received.  All  exists  in  an  "  immediate 
unity."  This  opinion  is  so  well  established  that  a  special 
chapter  must  presently  be  devoted  to  it.  I  will  only  say 
here  that  just  the  same  arguments  seem  to  me  to  apply 
to  sensation  as  apply  on  higher  levels ;  and  that  therefore 
even  sensation,  elementary  as  it  is,  must  on  my  view  be 
still  considered  as  knowledge  of  an  object  by  a  subject, 
and  must  involve  on  the  one  hand  the  sensing  and  on  the 
other  hand  the  sensatum.  At  present  at  any  rate  I  shall 
assume  that  even  on  the  level  of  sensation  the  distinction 
exists. 

Summary. 

Let  us  conclude  this  chapter  by  returning  to  the  text 
with  which  it  began.  Every  moment's  experience  has 
two  elements  within  it :  I  meet  with  some  reality,  and  in 
that  meeting  I  feel,  I  bear,  and  I  act.  To  meet  with 
reality  is  knowledge.  In  knowledge  is  involved  on  the 
one  hand  that  kind  of  recipient  activity  which  we  call 
apprehension:  on  the  other  hand  there  is  involved  an 
object  known.  To  the  consideration  of  this  object  we 
must  now  turn. 


CHAPTER  II 

CONTENT  AND   OBJECT 

The  Distinction. 

EVERY  name  that  we  pronounce,  says  Twardowski1, 
has  three  functions ;  it  is  the  sign  of  an  act  of  apprehen- 
sion in  the  speaker ;  it  names  a  thing ;  and  it  produces  a 
certain  content  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer.  Meinong2  says 
that  speech  refers  to3  our  object  and  expresses  our  content. 
The  distinction  between  act  or  event  of  presentation  and 
object  presented  has  already  been  dealt  with.  We  have 
now  to  examine  the  distinction  between  object  and  content. 

The  basis  of  the  distinction  is  the  fact  that  the  object, 
in  appearing  to  us,  seems  never  to  have  come  to  the  end 
of  its  powers.  No  matter  how  much  we  know  of  it  there 
is  always  more  to  be  known.  There  is  no  end  to  the 
questions  which  we  may  ask  of  it  or  to  the  answers  that  it 
may  give.  There  is  always  some  further  way  in  which  it 
may  exhibit  itself;  always  some  more  of  its  character  yet 
to  be  shown.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  that  the  whole 
object  should  ever  be  exhaustively  contained  in  our  con- 

1  Zur  Lehre  vom  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand,  p.  12. 

2  Ueber  Gegenstdnde  hoherer  Ordnung,  p.  189. 

3  Bedeutet. 


14  CONTENT  AND   OBJECT 

sciousness.  Such  of  it  as  is  so  contained  may  conveniently 
be  spoken  of  as  the  content  of  our  apprehension. 

Object  might  be  said  to  differ  from  content  as  the 
"  subject "  of  a  treatise  differs  from  its  "  subject-matter." 
The  content  is  as  much  as  gets  into  the  consciousness  ;  it 
is  all  that  we  are  knowing  of  the  object  that  we  know1. 
The  content  is  the  present  appearance  of  reality  in  our 
consciousness.  We  have  no  reason  to  assume  that  the 
appearance  must  be  purely  sensuous2,  and  therefore  the 
content  must  by  no  means  be  identified  with  the  sense- 
image  as  such.  Such  images  generally,  perhaps  always, 
constitute  part  of  the  object's  means  of  appearing,  and  thus 
form  part  of  the  content ;  but  the  imagery  will  seldom  be 
the  whole  of  what  we  are  apprehending  in  the  object. 

The  content  is  all  of  the  object  that  at  present  appears: 
it  is  the  present  expression  of  the  object's  character.  As 
to  the  relation  of  the  object  to  the  whole  of  its  possible 
contents,  and  the  question  whether  it  should  be  called 
their  sum  or  their  law  or  the  link  between  them  or  the 
essence  behind  them,  this  is  the  immense  and  ordinary 
problem  of  the  nature  of  substantial  reality,  and  cannot  be 
dealt  with  here.  We  shall  follow  the  ordinary  custom  of 
using  different  expressions  at  different  times ;  and  shall 
know  that  none  of  them  can  express  the  whole  truth. 

We  must  insist  that  the  difficulty  in  this  matter  is 
absolutely  nothing  else  than  the  universal  difficulty  of 
conceiving  substance  or  character  or  idea,  or  the  general 
relation  of  universal  to  particular.  The  relation  of  object 
to  content  is  not  even  a  special  case  of  the  difficulty ;  it  is 

1  In  just  the  same  sense  Dr  Stout  contrasts  an  object  with  what  he 
calls  a  "presentation"  (Manual,  pp.  58,  59). 

2  See  below,  section  on  "Imagery." 


CONTENT   AND   OBJECT  15 

the  ordinary  case ;  one  might  almost  say  the  whole  case. 
The  relation  of  content  to  object  is  the  same  as  the  relation 
that  "  what  I  see  "  in  a  misty  landscape  bears  to  the  land- 
scape as  such.  One  might  wish  to  say,  and  for  many 
purposes  one  might  conveniently  say,  that  this  landscape 
was  the  sum-total  of  all  that  could  ever  be  seen  in  it.  Yet 
even  this  is  circular.  And  it  is  not  exhaustive ;  for  the 
landscape  is  more  than  can  ever  be  seen ;  it  is,  for  instance, 
a  result  and  exhibition  of  geological  forces,  and  it  plays  a 
part  in  history,  and  it  is  a  factor  in  the  minds  of  men  who 
build  houses  in  the  neighbourhood.  Therefore  we  presently 
hesitate  to  say  that  it  is  the  sum  of  its  visual  appearances, 
and  we  say  instead  that  it  appears  or  expresses  itself  in 
the  visual  appearances.  And  then  come  further  problems. 
Yet  this  relation,  of  a  thing  to  what  I  see  of  it,  is  the  most 
ordinary  of  relations.  Arid  the  relation  of  object  to  content 
is  nothing  more  recondite  than  this. 

Hence  there  is  danger  in  all  accounts  of  the  relation 
which  do  make  it  appear  more  recondite;  in  those,  for 
instance,  which  take  the  content  to  be  a  copy  or  a  symbol 
of  the  object.  Twardowski  says  that  it  is  like  a  painted 
landscape,  which  is  not  a  landscape  at  all  but  a  picture. 
This  seems  to  open  the  door  to  a  whole  army  of  difficulties, 
and  to  artificial  and  unnecessary  difficulties ;  for  to  have 
a  presentation  is  a  much  simpler  thing  than  to  make  a 
copy ;  it  is  to  see.  There  is  danger  even  in  speaking  of 
one  special  kind  of  presentation,  namely  sense-imagery,  as 
a  copy,  because  the  word  inevitably  suggests  a  reproduction 
in  a  different  material.  When  I  remember  an  object  and 
its  image  comes  up,  this  in  a  sense  is  a  reproduction,  but 
there  is  no  "  material "  to  change.  It  is  a  reappearance  ; 
the  object  presents  itself  in  its  habit  as  it  lived. 


16  CONTENT  AND   OBJECT 

Any  suggestion  of  a  symbolising  relation1  seems  still 
more  artificial  and  unmanageable.  How  can  the  one 
possibly  be  a  symbol  of  the  other,  and  if  it  were  how 
should  we  ever  find  it  out  ?  Unless  "  cognition "  is 
apprehension  of  objects,  the  conception  is  useless  for 
philosophy. 

Distinctions  of  Detail. 

The  detailed  distinctions  between  the  characteristics  of 
object  and  content  which  are  given  by  Twardowski  and 
even  by  Meinong  are  often  not  very  acceptable  for  our 
account  of  the  matter.  Twardowski2  asserts,  for  instance, 
that  an  object  of  knowledge  need  not  actually  exist, 
but  that  the  corresponding  content  of  knowledge  must 
evidently  do  so.  For  our  view,  I  actually  exist,  and  my 
act  of  apprehension  actually  happens — I  do  actually  see. 
As  for  the  content,  it  and  the  whole  object  must  exist 
in  some  sense  that  makes  it  possible  for  me  to  see  them, 
but  this  need  not  be  "actual"  existence;  for  I  can  see  into 
non-actual  worlds.  Now  beyond  this  we  do  not  go.  If 
there  were  something  in  my  consciousness  additional  to 
the  object  it  would  presumably  be  an  actually  existent 

1  As  made,  e.g.  by  Lipps,  Bewusstsein  und  Gegenstdnde,  p.  33,  "  we 
might  say  that  the  content  is  a  symbol  of  the  object ;  is  a  sign  of  it  or 
represents  it."     Contrast  Mr  A.  Hoernle,  Mind,  1907,  p.  86.     "I  hold 
it  to  be  manifestly  absurd  to  say  that  the  individual  mind,  with  which 
psychology  is  supposed  to  deal,  is  conscious  of  signs  only  and  not  of 
their  meaning.     On  the  contrary  I  regard  the  consciousness  of  meaning 
as  primary  and  fundamental,  and  the  distinction  of  sign  and  meaning 
as  a  product  of  reflection."     For  "consciousness  of  meaning"  I  should 
substitute    "  consciousness   of  objects,"  as  being  for  my  purpose  less 
ambiguous. 

2  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand,  p.  30. 


CONTENT   AND   OBJECT  17 

something,  but  I  see  no  reason  for  holding  that  anything 
is  there.  So  long  as  I  am  actually  seeing  an  object  there 
would  seem  to  be  enough  to  keep  consciousness  going. 
What  I  see  is  not  a  piece  of  consciousness,  and  it  need 
not  be  existent  in  order  that  consciousness  may  exist. 
Consciousness  is  the  process  of  seeing,  and  it  exists  so  long 
as  I  actually  see. 

Secondly,  according  to  Twardowski1,  the  object  and 
content  have  different  sorts  of  qualities.  A  mountain,  for 
instance,  is  extended  even  if  it  is  not  an  actual  mountain ; 
but  the  corresponding  content  is  not  extended.  Witasek2 
says  similarly  that  a  stone  is  hard,  cold  and  grey,  but  that 
my  idea  of  a  stone  is  not. 

I  am  not  sure  what  these  authors  would  say  about 
perception,  which  of  course  for  me  has  content  and  object 
like  other  knowledge  (as  in  the  example  of  the  landscape 
above).  Is  the  percept  of  a  mountain  extended  ?  or  is  the 
percept  of  a  stone  grey  ?  The  "  spirit  of  language  "  would 
probably  hesitate  a  little,  but  would  have  not  the  least 
objection  to  saying  that  we  see  the  one  object  as  grey 
and  the  other  as  extended.  Therefore  the  content  of 
our  consciousness,  which  means  the  object  in  so  far  as  it 
enters  our  consciousness,  is  certainly  extended  and  grey. 
It  would  appear  that  the  whole  difficulty  comes  from  a  sort 
of  "  introjection3,"  from  thinking  that  the  contents  of  con- 
sciousness at  any  rate,  if  not  the  objects  of  consciousness, 
must  be  things  that  people  carry  about  in  their  heads.  It 

1  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand,  p.  30.  2  Psychologie,  p.  3. 

3  Avenarius,  in  Viertelj.f.  wiss.  Ph.  18,  p.  123,  quoted  by  Munsterberg, 
Grundziige  der  Psychologie,  p.  22 — Psychology  is  apt  to  suppose  that  the 
tree  which  a  man  sees  is  somehow  in  him,  perhaps  in  his  brain,  "Diese 
Hineinverlegung  des  '  Gesehenen '  u.s.w.  in  den  Menschen  ist  es,  welche 
als  Intro jektion  bezeichnet  wird." 

w.  2 


18  CONTENT   AND   OBJECT 

is  so  hard  to  be  content  with  their  having  eyes  in  their 
heads.  The  spirit  of  ordinary  language  feels  it  unlikely 
that  a  percept  is  a  thing  outside  my  body  in  the  ordinary 
world,  and  is  quite  sure  that  an  idea  is  not.  Hence,  it 
feels,  these  must  be  things  "in  my  mind"  as  opposed  to  "in 
the  world,"  and  hence  they  cannot  be  extended  or  grey.  It 
would  perhaps  be  the  easiest  remedy  to  say  bluntly  that 
my  percept  is  in  the  middle  of  the  plain  five  miles  off,  and 
that  there  are  no  such  things  as  ideas.  Contents  and 
objects  alike  exist  outside  my  body.  All  that  happens  is 
that  /  see  things. 

The  same  difficulties,  I  think,  occasion  and  are  occa- 
sioned by  Meinong's  claim1  that  a  content,  unlike  an 
object,  must  be  present  and  must  be  psychical.  I  am  not 
quite  sure  of  the  meaning  of  "  psychical,"  but  fear  that  it  is 
meant  to  rule  out  "physical";  which  of  course  in  my  account 
must  not  be  ruled  out.  On  the  other  hand,  the  statement 
of  both  Meinong  and  Twardowski  that  various  contents 
may  correspond  to  one  object  and  (in  the  case  of  uni- 
versals)  various  objects  to  one  content,  is  perfectly  sound. 

I  am  embarrassed,  but  I  think  not  rightly  embarrassed, 
by  the  reflection  that  the  distinction  between  content  and 
object  has  been  originated  and  worked  out  chiefly  by  the 
writers  I  have  been  criticising,  and  that  they  might  claim  to 
be  allowed  to  use  their  own  terms  in  their  own  way.  They 
might;  yet  I  only  criticise  because  in  so  far  as  they  agree 
with  me  the  distinction  seems  to  me  so  good  and  valuable. 
"  Contents  "  may  be  admirable  tools  if  we  can  keep  them 
free  from  the  taint  of  the  old  "  ideas,"  and  can  remember 
that  the  things  which  enter  the  mind,  and  which  therefore 
are  partly  contained  in  our  mind,  are  the  same  things  that 
exist  outside  our  body  in  the  ordinary  physical  world. 
1  Gegenstdnde  hoherer  Ordnung,  p.  185. 


CONTENT   AND   OBJECT  19 


The  Object  of  Attention. 

Should  we  say  that  it  is  the  object  or  the  content 
that  is  presented  or  apprehended  ?  Twardowski1  answers 
the  question  by  saying  that  we  have  a  double  use  of 
words,  comparable  to  the  way  in  which  we  speak  some- 
times of  a  painted  landscape  and  sometimes  of  a  painted 
picture.  I  also  should  say  that  the  answer  depends  on  our 
use  of  words,  but  my  comparison  would  be  very  different. 
For  me  the  question  is  the  same  as  if  we  should  ask 
whether  we  were  more  properly  said  to  see  a  landscape  or 
to  see  as  much  as  we  did  see  of  the  landscape. 

A  similar  question,  "  Is  it  the  object  or  the  content  to 
which  we  attend  ? "  is  interesting  because  the  inquiry 
brings  out  an  ambiguity  in  the  ordinary  conception  of 
attending  "to"  anything.  Mr  Prichard2  says  that  we 
attend  not  to  a  mental  "  presentation "  but  to  a  physical 
thing;  which  is  perfectly  true  but  does  not  answer  my 
particular  question,  since  for  me  the  content  is  only  the 
physical  thing  with  the  limits  of  my  consciousness  im- 
posed. The  stream  of  my  endeavour,  set  towards  that 
thing,  is  gradually  widening  those  limits  of  consciousness, 
and  making  the  content  more  adequate  to  the  object. 
Shall  we  say  that  I  "attend''  to  what  I  see  within  the 
limits  or  to  the  seen  object  which  is  not  bounded  by  them  ? 
The  usage  is  not  fixed,  but  if  a  choice  is  to  be  made  it 
seems  preferable  to  take  the  second  alternative.  We  are 
usually  interested  not  so  much  in  what  we  can  see  as  in 
what  we  cannot  yet  quite  see. 

1  Op.  dt.  pp.  14,  15. 

2  "The  Psychologists'  Treatment  of  Knowledge,"  Mind,  1907,  p.  42. 

2—2 


20  CONTENT  AND   OBJECT 

Content  and  Object  of  Introspection. 

It  may  be  urged  that  at  least  in  introspection  and  for 
the  general  purposes  of  psychology  we  attend  to  the 
contents  of  our  apprehension,  as  such.  In  a  sense  this  is 
true,  for  we  make  the  content  of  a  given  act  of  apprehen- 
sion into  the  object  of  another  act.  Interest  and  attention 
are  engaged  with  the  question — not  "  What  was  the  fact  ? 
what  was  there  ? "  but—"  What  did  I  apprehend  ?  "  WTe 
deliberately  stereotype  the  former  limits  in  order  to  find 
what  we  can  within  them,  since  our  interest  lies  in  finding 
out  what  exactly  managed  to  get  in.  This  account  accords 
with  Dr  Ward's  statement  that  psychology  has  for  its 
object  the  whole  universe,  but  the  universe  as  presented  to 
the  individual1;  and  it  meets,  I  think,  the  objection  brought 
by  Mr  Prichard  that  "as  presented"  must  mean  "as  known," 
and  that  no  science  can  treat  of  things  in  any  other  way2. 
Generally  speaking,  psychology  is  the  only  science  which, 
instead  of  expanding  the  content  of  a  piece  of  knowledge, 
stereotypes  its  limits  because  it  is  interested  in  their  shape. 

Introspection  has  for  its  object  the  content  of  another 
apprehension,  but  we  have  no  reason  at  all  to  say  that  its 
own  content  and  object  coincide3.  The  untruth  of  this  is 

1  Article  on  "Psychology,"  Ency.  Brit. 

2  Op.  cit.t  Mind,  1907,  p.  36. 

3  Witasek  seems  to  assert  this :  "  Nur  dass  bei  den  Wahrnehmungsvor- 
stellungen  von  Psychischem  der  Inhalt  mit  dem  Gegenstande  zusammen- 
fallt"    ("Zur  psychologischen  Analyse  der  asthetischen  Einfiihlung," 
Z.  f.  Psych.,  1901).     Of  course  if  content  and  object  are  distinguished 
only  because  one  is  supposed  to  be  in  the  knower  and  the  other  outside 
him,  it  is  fairly  natural  to  expect  that  an  "inner"  object  will  coincide 
with  its  content.     Yet  how  can  even  such  an  object  remain  within  me 
when  its  moment  has  passed  ?    Will  it  not  pass  out  into  the  world  of  my 
past  history  ?  and  so  be  as  much  divided  from  its  content  as  ever.     I  do 
not  mean  to  accuse  Witasek  of  these  confusions. 


CONTENT  AND   OBJECT  21 

seen  at  once  if  we  reflect  that  introspection,  like  any  other 
investigation,  is  usually  a  process  of  gradual  discovery. 
Only  after  careful  examination  can  we  discover  all  the 
overtones  in  the  sound  heard  a  moment  ago,  or  all  the 
links  in  the  chain  of  association  which  has  led  us  to  an 
unexpected  subject  of  thought.  Only  gradually,  that  is, 
does  the  content  become  more  adequate  to  the  object, 
which  implies  that  at  first  at  any  rate  the  two  were  far 
from  coinciding.  However  we  fix  oar  limits,  what  is 
within  them  can  develop  internally. 


The  Limits  of  Objects. 

We  can  no  more  divide  the  known  world  into  separate 
objects,  except  with  the  help  of  convention  in  places,  than 
we  can  divide  the  physical  world  into  separate  things.  In 
one  sense  the  whole  universe  is  the  object  in  every  piece 
of  knowledge ;  this  is  the  case  at  least  wherever  it  is  true 
that  to  know  a  bit  of  the  world  thoroughly  would  be  to 
know  the  whole.  We  endeavour  to  expand  the  content  of 
our  cognition  until  it  includes  the  whole  of  the  object  that 
we  wish  to  know.  If  this  is  anything  short  of  the  whole 
universe  it  will  be  only  because  our  special  interest  sets 
narrower  limits  to  it.  We  may  say  that  the  object  is 
determined  by  the  question  we  ask,  and  that  the  content 
consists  of  the  answer  so  far  as  we  know  it.  If,  as  is 
common,  we  are  not  quite  sure  what  we  want  to  find  out, 
or  if  a  presentation  has  come  to  us  apart  from  any 
question  asked,  the  limits  of  the  object  will  so  far  be 
undetermined. 


22  CONTENT   AND   OBJECT 


The  Parallel  Case  of  Feeling. 

At  no  moment,  we  said,  do  we  find  in  the  presentation- 
continuum  all  that  might  be  there.  When  attention  is 
turned  in  the  direction  of  any  content,  that  content  is 
ready  at  once  to  grow  and  to  set  itself  out  in  more  various 
detail  and  to  deepen  its  relations  to  everything  around. 
The  content  expands  and  becomes  more  adequate  to  the 
object. 

Now  as  it  is  with  the  presentation-continuum,  so  is  it 
with  the  continuum  of  desire.  The  disposition,  or  tendency, 
or  want,  or  need,  which  speaks  in  a  desire,  has  never  in  that 
desire  said  all  that  it  has  to  say.  No  sooner  does  it  gain 
control  over  our  behaviour  than  it  proceeds  to  widen  and 
deepen  its  expression  and  to  write  itself  out  in  detail. 
(This,  and  not  a  growth  in  mere  vividness  or  intensity,  is 
the  great  change  that  supervenes  when  a  presentation 
gains  attention  or  a  disposition  gains  control.)  The  process 
may  be  hindered  by  the  resistance  of  our  materials  or  of 
our  general  environment,  just  as  the  development  of 
knowledge  may  be  hindered  by  the  stiffness  and  narrow- 
ness of  our  own  intelligence ;  but  otherwise  this  part  of 
our  self  expands  itself  in  our  life  and  works  itself  out  to 
adequate  expression  and  fulfilment. 

As  for  the  conception  of  a  disposition  and  its  relation 
to  desires,  it  is  exactly  as  difficult  as  that  of  the  relation  of 
an  object  to  its  appearances,  and  no  more  so.  The  dis- 
position, like  the  object,  is  a  substance  which  appears,  or 
a  character  which  expresses  itself.  In  one,  as  in  the  other, 
the  substance  is  inexhaustible.  On  the  one  side,  even 
when  the  object  of  our  apprehension  is  a  thing  so  limited 


CONTENT   AND   OBJECT  23 

and  definite  as  is  a  past  content  of  knowledge,  even  then 
our  content  never  really  becomes  adequate  to  its  object, 
since  there  is  always  more  that  might  be  found  out  about 
it.  On  the  other  side,  even  when  the  disposition  in  action 
is  so  simple  as  is  that  which  persists  in  carrying  out  a  past 
resolution,  even  then  no  actual  conation  can  ever  express 
that  disposition  completely,  for  as  its  materials  change  it 
can  take  an  infinite  number  of  different  forms.  In  know- 
ledge we  can  never  come  to  an  end  of  the  smallest  part  of 
the  universe  ;  in  feeling  and  endeavour  we  can  never  come 
to  the  end  of  even  the  smallest  part  of  ourselves. 

The  Place  of  Truth  and  of  Belief. 

It  only  remains  to  add  that  just  as  the  sphere  of 
conation  is  the  home  both  of  resolution  and  irresolution 
and  of  right  and  wrong,  so  the  sphere  of  contents  is  the 
home  both  of  belief  and  of  truth. 

The  second  claim  will  probably  be  readily  admitted, 
for  if  anything  is  to  be  true  or  false  it  must  surely  be  the 
contents  of  our  apprehension.  Our  powers  of  apprehension 
are  strong  or  weak,  our  acts  of  apprehension  are  intelligent 
or  unintelligent,  our  objects  are  real  or  unreal,  in  one 
sense  or  another  of  those  words,  and  our  contents  are 
false  or  true. 

The  claim  that  belief  also  is  a  matter  of  content  seems 
at  first  sight  much  more  difficult  to  grant,  and  nearly 
every  realist  writer  has  in  fact  ignored  it,  asserting  that 
belief  and  the  strength  of  belief  are  qualities  not  of  the 
content  known  but  of  the  act  by  which  we  know1.  Idealist 

1  E.g.  Meinong,  and  perhaps  Stout,  though  he  speaks  of  "attitude" 
instead  of  "  act."     See  The  Groundwork  of  Psychology,  p.  3. 


24  CONTENT   AND   OBJECT 

writers  have  usually  granted  that  the  modality  of  a 
judgment  is  a  matter  of  content,  but  have  held  that  the 
psychological  variation  in  degree  of  belief,  the  flickering 
of  belief  as  it  were,  is  a  variation  not  in  content  but  in 
act.  Nevertheless  it  would  seem  that  in  both  cases  the 
difference  lies  primarily  in  the  content.  In  the  first  case 
that  content  is  more  or  less  limited,  in  the  second  it  is 
more  or  less  unsteady :  and  in  neither  case  have  we  any 
choice  in  the  matter:  the  content  presents  itself  and 
we  apprehend.  Consider  the  following  pairs  of  contrasts, 
which  include  both  kinds  of  variation  (modality  and 
"  flickering  ") : — "  Your  opinion  of  his  character  is  clear 
and  firm  ;  mine  is  obscure  and  wavering."  "  You  believe 
that  he  is  certainly  innocent,  but  I  am  not  yet  fully 
persuaded ;  I  can  see  only  that  he  may  possibly  be  so." 
"  You  believe  his  story,  but  I  cannot  be  sure  myself  that 
it  is  not  a  feat  of  imagination."  "  That  explanation  which 
for  you  is  a  certainty  seems  doubtful  to  me."  "  So  far  as 
one  can  see,  he  has  behaved  well ; — in  that  I  agree  with 
you ;  but  I  urge  that  we  cannot  yet  see  all."  These 
appear  to  be  typical  instances  of  belief  and  doubt,  and 
I  cannot  but  consider  that  in  each  case  the  contents 
are  contrasted.  In  the  first  example  the  difference  of 
clearness  would  certainly  be  admitted  to  lie  in  the  con- 
tents, and  there  seems  no  sufficient  reason  for  putting  the 
difference  of  steadiness  elsewhere.  In  the  second  example, 
one  witness  apprehends  "  that  the  man  is  innocent,"  the 
other  only  "  that  he  may  be  innocent."  In  the  third  and 
fourth,  the  doubter  sees  a  narrative  clearly  before  him,  but 
cannot  yet  see  whether  its  connections  unite  it  to  the 
world  of  fact  or  to  that  of  imagination ;  in  this  respect  his 
content  of  apprehension  is  as  yet  undetermined.  In  the 


CONTENT   AND   OBJECT  25 

fifth  example,  the  evidence  which  to  one  man  appears  to 
be  a  proof  seems  to  the  other  to  be  less  than  a  proof. 
"  The  appearance  is  different "  ; — what  is  this  but  saying 
that  the  content  is  different? 

Acts  of  apprehension  with  different  contents  are  in  so 
far  unquestionably  different  acts,  therefore  I  do  not  mean 
to  urge  that  in  doubt  and  belief  the  acts  are  not  different. 
I  urge  only  that  the  difference  lies  primarily  in  the 
contents.  The  activity  of  every  apprehension  is  (as  I  hold) 
identical  in  its  peculiar  nature  as  being  an  activity  of 
reception  only,  and  just  this  peculiar  nature  seems  to 
exclude  that  variation  in  degree  which  is  supposed  to 
belong  to  belief.  We  cannot  more  or  less  receive  except 
in  the  sense  that  we  can  receive  more  or  less ;  and  we 
cannot  apprehend  differently  except  so  far  as  what  we 
apprehend  is  different.  Thus,  it  seems  to  me,  the  differ- 
ence between  doubt  and  belief  can  involve  a  difference  in 
act  only  if  it  rests  on  a  difference  of  content. 

We  shall  return  to  this  subject  again,  and  shall  be 
occupied  with  it  at  intervals  until  almost  the  end  of  the 
book. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  FIELDS  OF  PRESENTATION.    I 

THERE  are  apparently  at  least  three  ways  in  which  an 
object  can  be  apprehended.  It  can  be  sensed,  or  imaged, 
or,  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  it  can  be  thought. 
The  relation  which  these  methods  bear  to  one  another  is 
by  no  means  a  simple  one. 

There  seems  no  doubt,  to  begin  with,  that  in  all  these 
departments  the  object  may  be  the  same.  Some  objects, 
it  is  true,  can  be  presented  only  in  thought  and  not  in 
sense,  but  if  an  object  can  be  presented  in  sense  it  can 
always  be  presented  in  thought  and  can  often  be  imaged. 

Secondly,  it  seems  that  in  these  different  fields  the 
object  is  differently  presented, — that  the  content  differs. 
It  differs  considerably  if  we  compare  sense  with  the  most 
advanced  thought.  As  regards  sense  and  sense-imagery, 
there  is  always,  in  the  normal  case,  a  difference  between 
the  contexts  of  their  contents,  and  usually  some  internal 
difference  as  well.  Few  people  have  visual  images  as  full 
or  as  steady  as  their  visual  sensations,  and  in  nearly  all 
cases  there  is  a  difference  in  their  position  and  intercon- 
nection1. Mr  Hoernle  indeed  says2  that  the  difference 

1  I  neglect  for  simplicity's  sake  the  important  point  that  most  images 
correspond  not  to  mere  sensations  but  to  percepts. 

2  "  Image,  Idea,  and  Meaning,"  in  Mind,  1907,  p.  92. 


THE    FIELDS   OF    PRESENTATION.      I  27 

between  sensation  and  image  is  "  a  difference  of  mode, 
not  a  difference  of  content,"  but  I  think  he  only 
means  to  deny  that  the  object  (in  my  language)  is 
different. 

Thirdly,  it  is  usual  to  say  that  the  act  is  different 
in  these  different  cases.  Mr  Prichard1  for  instance  says, 
"  The  act  of  perceiving  is  one  thing  and  the  act  of  con- 
ceiving is  another";  and  Witasek2  even  declares  that 
images  and  sensations  differ  not  in  content  but  in  act. 
This  position  is  very  difficult  to  maintain.  It  is  usually 
supposed  that  we  confuse  sensation  and  image  when  their 
contents  become  very  much  alike,  and  this  should  be  im- 
possible if  the  acts  differed  independently  of  the  contents. 

A  serious  objection  to  the  whole  theory  that  sensation 
of  thought  and  imagery  differ  in  act  seems  at  first  sight 
to  arise  from  the  fact  that  conjunction  in  one  field  may 
produce  association  in  another.  It  is  fairly  intelligible  (or 
so  we  are  apt  to  consider)  that  to  think  first  of  A  and  then 
of  B  should  establish  a  habit  of  thought-transition,  and  a 
tendency  to  think  again  of  B  after  we  have  thought  of  A. 
But  if  to  sense  is  one  action  and  to  image  is  another,  then 
why,  when  only  the  sensation  of  A  has  been  followed  by 
the  sensation  of  B,  should  we  have  the  slightest  tendency 
to  image  B  after  imaging  A  ?  And  if  thinking  is  a  third 
kind  of  action  distinct  from  the  others,  why  should  linked 
sensations  leave  behind  them  a  tendency  towards  the 
linking  of  thoughts,  as  seems  to  happen  in  the  case 
where  we  can  reproduce  the  argument  of  a  speech  that 
we  have  heard  although  we  have  forgotten  the  words  that 
were  used  ? 

1  "The  Psychologists'  Treatment  of  Knowledge,"  Mind,  1907,  p.  51. 

2  Psychologic,  p.  75. 


28  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      I 

As  a  matter  of  fact  this  objection  proves  too  much. 
It  must  be  invalid  if  it  proves  that  the  action  involved  is 
identical  whether  we  apprehend  in  sense  or  imagery  or 
thought ;  for  we  have  already  admitted  that  the  contents 
apprehended  are  different  in  these  three  fields,  and  there- 
fore the  acts  of  apprehending  them  must  in  so  far  be 
different  in  character.  What  then  is  the  flaw  in  the 
objection  ?  In  our  present  uncertainty  as  to  the  details 
of  association,  a  believer  in  absolute  differences  between 
the  acts  in  question  might  make  a  very  fair  case  by  simply 
denying  the  alleged  transference  of  connections  from  sensa- 
tion to  imagery  or  from  sensation  to  thought.  It  is  indeed 
difficult  to  produce  any  clear  proof  of  such  transference. 
One  is  naturally  tempted  to  instance  the  reproduction  of 
a  heard  tune  in  auditory  imagery,  but  our  opponent  is 
entitled  to  answer  that  such  reproductions  as  often  as  not 
take  place  in  an  altered  key,  with  every  note  changed, 
so  that  the  habit-tendency  in  force  cannot  possibly  be  one 
which  links  the  apprehensions  of  separate  sounds.  That 
is,  we  have  no  transference  here  of  sensation-links  into 
the  field  of  images.  The  links  which  really  hold  must  be 
those  which  bind  together  our  apprehensions  of  the  shapes 
of  successive  phrases.  Now  apprehension  is  a  matter 
neither  of  sensing  nor  of  imaging,  seeing  that  the  shape 
of  a  phrase  is  neither  a  sensum  nor  an  image,  but  an 
"  object  of  higher  order."  The  act  in  which  we  apprehend 
it  may  easily  remain  identical  even  though  the  individual 
sensations  be  changed  and  even  though  images  be  sub- 
stituted for  sensations.  The  habit-connections  hold,  our 
opponent  may  therefore  urge,  not  first  between  apprehen- 
sions of  sensa  and  then  between  apprehensions  of  images, 
but  between  unaltering  apprehensions  of  objects  of  thought. 


THE    FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      I  29 

Hence,  he  may  say,  there  is  no  evidence  here  for  the  iden- 
tity in  any  respect  of  the  act  of  apprehending  sensa  with 
the  act  of  apprehending  images.  With  our  other  example 
of  reproducing  the  argument  of  a  speech  it  is  easy  for  him 
to  deal  in  the  same  way.  For  we  certainly  could  not  repro- 
duce the  argument  unless  we  understood  it  at  the  time  of 
hearing  the  speech,  and  if  we  admit  that  we  did  understand 
it  we  are  at  once  provided,  as  in  the  case  of  the  tune,  with 
a  series  of  thought-apprehensions  which  need  suffer  no 
change  when  the  individual  sentences  are  altered.  Not  the 
series  of  sensations  but  the  series  of  thoughts  leaves  behind 
it  the  tendency  to  repetition  of  that  series  of  thoughts. 

In  these  cases  our  opponents  explanation  seems  irre- 
futable, yet  I  am  not  convinced  that  a  connection  between 
mere  sensations  cannot  in  any  case  give  rise  to  a  connec- 
tion between  mere  images.  The  most  satisfactory  theory 
in  all  respects  seems  to  me  to  be  the  following :  that 
the  activity  of  apprehension  does  differ  in  sensation  and 
imagery  and  thought,  but  only  because  and  in  so  far  as 
the  content  apprehended  is  different.  If  this  is  true,  then 
a  sense-connection  may  pass  over  into  an  image-connection 
just  in  so  far  as  the  content  (the  quality  of  a  sound  for 
instance)  can  remain  unchanged.  The  bare  sense-connec- 
tion could  hardly  give  rise  to  a  connection  of  thoughts, 
because  it  is  impossible  that  sense  and  thought  should 
have  the  same  content.  This  appears  to  me  to  coincide 
with  the  most  probable  account  of  the  phenomena  of 
association  so  far  as  they  are  at  present  known,  and  to  be 
also  the  simplest  a  priori  view.  Knowledge  will  then 
be  apprehension,  simple  reception,  throughout,  and  will 
vary  only  in  so  far  as  there  is  variation  in  that  which  is 
received. 


30  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      I 

As  a  matter  of  language,  I  prefer  to  speak  in  this 
connection  not  directly  of  a  difference  of  act  as  between 
the  different  ways  of  apprehending,  but  of  a  difference  of 
level  or  field. 


Examination  of  Certain  Levels. 

Taking  our  three  "levels"  without  further  examination 
to  be  those  of  sensation  and  sense-imagery  and  of  what  in 
the  widest  and  vaguest  sense  we  call  thought  (of  course 
this  includes  far  more  than  one  "  level "  if  we  proceed  to 
count  them),  we  will  spend  some  time  in  examining 
various  important  points  in  connection  with  each  of  the 
three. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.    II 
A.    SENSATION. 

ONE  of  the  most  interesting  questions  which  can  be 
raised  with  regard  to  the  sense-level  is  this  :  if  in  sensation 
as  in  other  forms  of  cognition  a  real  object  is  presented  to 
us,  what  is  that  object  here  ? 

The  question  is  subtle  as  well  as  interesting,  and  the 
result  of  considering  it  has  often  been  that  the  existence 
of  any  such  object  has  been  denied.  Sensation  has  been 
removed  from  the  line  of  true  presentation,  in  my  sense 
of  the  word,  and  classed  as  a  mere  modification  of  conscious- 
ness, which  we  might  use  to  help  us  in  obtaining  information 
about  the  real  world,  but  which,  as  it  stood,  supplied  us 
with  no  such  information.  This  opinion  has  been  so 
strongly  supported  and  is  so  attractive  in  many  ways, 
that  a  special  chapter1  must  presently  be  devoted  to  its 
examination ;  at  present  I  shall  refrain  from  controversy, 
and  only  set  forth  my  own  opposite  view  with  as  much 
plausibility  as  I  can. 

We  may  conveniently  divide  our  subject  into  three 
parts.  In  the  first  place,  a  sensation  may  fall  in  the 

1  Chap.  vi. 


32  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

margin  of  our  consciousness  and  remain  there,  forgotten 
as  soon  as  it  ceases,  and  never  used  in  any  purposeful 
exploration  of  reality.  Secondly,  it  may  be  used  in  the 
course  of  such  an  exploration  ;  in  an  examination  of  that 
physical  world  which  contains  our  own  body  and  other 
bodies  outside  it.  Thirdly,  for  certain  special  purposes 
we  investigate  not  so  much  that  physical  world  itself  as 
what  may  be  called  its  ways  of  behaviour  with  regard  to 
sense ;  it  is  these  investigations  which  supply  us  with  the 
geometry  of  notes  and  colours,  and  with  the  science,  of 
music  as  distinct  from  the  physics  of  sound.  Assuming 
that  in  all  these  divisions  a  real  object  is  presented  to  us 
in  the  sensation,  we  have  to  remember  one  warning — that 
there  will  be  no  profit  in  any  attempt  of  theory  to  confine 
that  object  to  what  enters  in  the  content  of  the  sensation. 
In  our  original  distinction  between  content  and  object,  for 
all  presentation  alike,  the  object  was  explicitly  not  limited 
by  that  portion  of  itself  which  at  the  moment  had  entered 
our  consciousness.  In  fact  it  was  said  that  the  content 
could  scarcely  be  conceived  as  ever  being  adequate  to  the 
object,  because  we  could  never  grasp  in  one  act  of  appre- 
hension the  inexhaustible  reality  of  a  real  thing.  In  no 
presentation,  sensational  or  otherwise,  can  an  object  enter 
whole. 

a.     Marginal  Sensations. 

It  is  in  this  first  division  of  the  subject  that  the 
strongest  reasons  seem  to  show  themselves  for  removing 
sensation  from  the  class  of  reality-presentations  altogether. 
That  which  enters  in  a  marginal  sensation  seems  to  be  so 
small  and  unimportant  that  it  is  hard  to  give  it  the  title 


THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  33 

of  a  real  object.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  no  right 
to  regard  the  object  entering  consciousness  as  if  it  were 
limited  by  that  content  which  is  all  that  has  yet  entered. 
An  object  is  not  bound  to  be  small  or  insignificant  because 
these  qualities  characterise  our  knowledge  of  it. 

We  must  remind  ourselves  with  some  care  of  what 
exactly  was  held  to  determine  the  boundaries  of  an 
object  of  knowledge.  We  said,  it  may  be  remembered, 
that  in  one  sense  the  whole  universe  might  be  naturally 
said  to  present  itself  in  every  presentation,  and  that,  if 
the  object's  limits  were  set  anywhere  short  of  this,  the 
fact  must  be  due  to  the  narrow  and  definite  range  of  our 
interest.  My  object  of  study — that  about  which  I  am 
gradually  finding  out — is  said  to  be  King  Arthur's  death 
and  not  the  universe  as  a  whole,  only  because  my  interest 
at  present  is  bounded  by  King  Arthur's  death. 

Now  this  leads  to  a  peculiar  result  in  the  case  where 
the  content  has  aroused  no  interest  at  all.  For  in  this 
case  the  limiting  factor  disappears.  The  object  presenting 
itself  has  no  other  title  than  reality  as  a  whole.  In 
exhaustive  philosophical  inquiry  at  one  extreme,  and  in  a 
marginal  sensation  at  the  other,  this  unlimited  universe  is 
the  object  which  presents  itself.  Width  of  interest  and 
lack  of  interest  will  have  the  same  result1. 

In  marginal  sensation  then,  what  presents  itself  can 
only  be  said  to  be  the  universe  as  a  whole.  The  content 
of  consciousness  is  so  small  and  narrow,  the  speech  made 
is  so  short,  that  the  object  is  scarcely  specified  or  defined 

1  Compare  the  way  in  which  the  perception  of  spatial  volume  may 
be  based  either  on  abundance  and  variety  of  positional  signs  or  on 
their  absence ;  the  latter  being  the  case  with  mist,  or  darkness,  or  a 
snowdrift. 

w.  3 


34  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

at  all.  Reality  has  entered  my  life,  but  has  said  scarcely 
anything.  It  has  not  shown  itself  yet  as  a  quality  or  a 
relation  or  a  thing.  It  has  only  flashed  or  resounded. 
It  has  not  declared  itself  as  the  property  of  blueness,  but 
it  has  been  blue  to  rne,  has  "blued  at  me."  If  I  will  attend 
it  is  ready  to  say  more. 

I  fear  that  this  largeness  of  the  object  in  the  smallest 
of  our  experiences  may  seem  paradoxical  enough,  and 
yet  I  believe  that  the  treatment  is  right.  As  for  the 
paradox,  it  can  be  matched  on  the  conative  side  of 
consciousness.  In  all  desire  and  action  it  is  true  to 
say  that  I  as  a  whole  am  acting,  but  very  often  we 
can  specify  the  universe  in  me  which  is  particularly 
concerned ;  I  desire  one  thing  as  a  member  of  a  college, 
one  as  a  private  person,  I  act  in  a  judicial  capacity  or  a 
business  capacity,  the  teacher  or  the  student  in  me  is 
interested.  Only  at  the  two  extremes  I  cannot  thus 
particularise  myself.  In  a  high  and  complete  act  of  will 
I  "act  with  my  whole  heart,"  I  "realise  myself";  this  is 
above  particularisation.  In  the  mere  throb  of  feeling,  in 
the  indefinite  emotion,  I  am  below  it.  I  may  be  extremely 
unhappy  without  feeling  clearly  what  part  of  me  it  is  that 
has  cause  to  complain.  The  thwarted  disposition  has 
spoken,  but  too  vaguely  to  distinguish  itself  from  the  rest 
of  me.  I  say  that  "I"  am  unhappy.  The  feeling  expresses 
me,  but  defines  no  minor  self  in  me.  And  this  seems  to 
be  the  case  not  only  with  actually  ignorant  feeling  but 
with  all  "  marginal "  feeling.  A  disposition  cannot  define 
itself  in  consciousness  until  it  can  so  get  control  of 
consciousness  as  to  express  itself  in  desire.  Lacking 
attention,  then,  or  lacking  control,  neither  an  object 
nor  a  disposition  can  tell  its  name ;  they  must  appear 


THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  35 

merely  as  reality  or  as  myself.  Yet,  undefined  and 
unnamed,  both  have  entered  consciousness  and  played 
a  part  in  life. 

Marginal  sensation,  we  conclude,  is  of  all  our  presenta- 
tions the  one  which  has  the  smallest  content.  It  is  our 
first  and  briefest  and  obscurest  meeting  with  the  reality 
which  is  not  ourselves.  Yet  though  the  content  is  the 
smallest  possible,  the  object  through  lack  of  determination 
is  the  largest ;  that  which  presents  itself  can  only  be 
described  as  the  universe. 

6.     The  ordinary  use  of  Sensations. 

The  acuteness  of  paradox  is  softened  when  we  turn  to 
those  sensations  which  form  part  of  our  ordinary  focalised 
percepts.  For  here  the  object  is  certainly  smaller,  being 
limited  by  the  definite  interest  of  the  perception ;  and  the 
content  is  possibly  larger ;  at  any  rate  if  it  is  true  that  a 
sensation  becomes  more  vivid  or  intense  on  being  brought 
out  of  the  margin  of  consciousness.  The  additional  per- 
ceptual content  of  course  cannot  be  included  in  the  content 
of  the  sensation  as  such. 

The  object  is  no  longer  merely  the  universe  at  large, 
but  what  then  is  it  ?  As  elsewhere,  it  is  whatever  further 
investigation  shows  it  to  be,and  such  investigation  normally 
reveals  certain  things  in  a  certain  situation  in  the  physical 
world.  Sensation  is  our  first  and  narrowest  apprehension 
of  these.  My  sensations  are  elements  in  the  content 
through  which  a  coloured  signal  lamp,  a  noisy  train,  and  a 
bitter  evening  wind  reveal  themselves  to  me.  These,  I 
might  say,  are  the  objects  which  present  themselves  ;  and 
the  statement  would  be  true  and  would  cover  the  largest 

3—2 


36  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

part  of  the  truth.  Yet  there  is  more  to  be  said.  For* 
though  it  is  these  objects  that  chiefly  interest  me,  yet  by 
themselves  they  cannot  supply  the  content  of  my  sensa- 
tional experience.  Not  the  lamp  and  the  wind  alone  and 
unrelated  express  themselves  in  the  green  radiance  and  the 
freezing  touch,  but  the  lamp  and  the  wind  in  relation  to 
my  human  body,  having  its  nervous  system  in  working 
order. 

We  recognise  readily  this  second  factor  in  the  object 
presented  whenever  our  sensations  are  found  to  differ 
from  those  of  the  companion  who  stands  besides  us.  The 
sensation  of  cold  for  me  is  sharper  than  for  him,  because 
I  have  sat  by  the  waiting-room  fire  whilst  he  has  walked 
briskly  across  the  fields.  The  green  which  I  see  is 
different  from  his  because  of  a  defect  in  my  sight;  the 
local  signature  in  the  sensations,  moreover,  is  obviously 
expressive  as  much  of  my  body's  position  as  of  that  of  the 
lamp.  We  recognise  the  same  fact  wherever  bodily  effort 
is  closely  bound  up  with  the  sensation  ;  what  we  feel  as  we 
struggle  homewards  is  obviously  not  simply  the  wind  but 
the  pressure  of  the  wind  against  our  bodies.  I  am  nearly 
always  interested  in,  and  attentive  to,  the  outward  objects 
alone,  so  that  these  pre-eminently  are  revealed  to  me  ;  yet 
this  is  not  always  so.  If  an  instrument  is  passed  over  my 
skin  I  say  that  I  feel  the  instrument,  but  if  it  presently 
touches  an  open  wound  I  am  likely  to  say  instead  that  I 
feel  the  wound.  What  I  really  feel  throughout  is  of 
course  the  contact  between  the  instrument  and  my  body> 
apprehended  first  through  touch  and  then  through  pain. 
What  is  presented  to  me  in  sensation  is  always  a  section 
of  the  physical  world  in  which  my  body  is  included; 
but  though  the  outward  objects  are  speedily  perceived  as 


THE    FIELDS    OF   PRESENTATION.      II  37 

well  as  sensed,  it  may  be  long  before  my  body  presents 
itself  in  anything  beyond  the  sensation.  It  is  sensed  but 
not  recognised1. 

c.     The  peculiar  use  of  Sensations. 

This  final  case  is  comparatively  easy  to  deal  with. 
Our  interest  is  narrowly  bounded,  and  cuts  off  the 
sensational  expression  from  the  rest  of  the  situation  which 
thus  expresses  itself,  so  that  we  go  on  to  construct  a 
science  of  notes  or  colours  instead  of  a  science  of  musical 
instruments  or  of  physical  optics.  In  this  respect  our 
procedure  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that  of  mathematics, 
which  cuts  off  shapes  and  numbers  from  the  actual  objects 
to  which  they  belong.  The  object  presented  will  now  be 
not  a  physical  situation  but  only  a  note  or  a  colour.  Here 
at  any  rate  the  content  of  sensation  might  be  thought  to 
exhaust  its  object,  yet  of  course  this  does  not  happen  even 
here,  for  sensation  cannot  tell  even  so  much  as  that  the 
tint  it  apprehends  has  a  special  place  in  a  colour-scale. 
However  definitely  we  stereotype  the  limits  of  a  content 
in  order  to  make  that  content  the  object  of  a  new  act 
of  apprehension,  still  under  that  new  apprehension  the 
object  will  develop  internally,  and  we  shall  know  far 
more  of  it  than  we  did.  Paradoxical  though  it  may 
seem,  even  when  an  object  is  bounded  by  a  presented 
content  because  our  interest  is  thus  bounded,  even  then 
there  is  indefinitely  more  in  the  object  than  in  the  content. 
The  content  of  the  sensation,  let  us  say,  was  a  single  note. 

1  That  is,  my  perception  abstracts,  expanding  one  part  only  of  the 
content  of  sense.  The  object  of  perception  usually  excludes  the  relation 
of  the  external  thing  to  my  body,  though  the  object  of  sensation  is  bound 
to  include  it.  Only  part  of  the  sense  object,  therefore,  is  usually  allowed 
to  develop  itself  as  an  object  of  elementary  thought. 


38  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

The  object  also  in  this  case  is  the  same  note,  but  it 
contains  a  hundred  features  that  sense  could  never  detect: 
it  is  the  note  of  a  violin,  it  is  the  note  G,  it  is  the  highest 
note  and  the  climax  of  its  phrase,  it  is  beautifully  pro- 
duced. All  this  belongs  to  the  object  of  sense,  yet  could 
not  enter  the  content  of  sense.  Even  though  a  content 
covers  its  object  it  cannot  exhaust  it. 


B.    IMAGES. 

The  problem  of  images  is  a  curious  and  difficult  one 
for  psychology.  How  comes  it  that  we  can  literally  see 
an  object  that  is  absent,  unhindered  by  the  sight  of  what 
is  present  ?  How  can  I  hear  the  wind  on  a  still  day,  in  a 
manner  that  prevents  it  from  mingling  with  the  sound  of 
the  brook  at  my  feet  ?  This  kind  of  cognition  is  no 
higher  than  sense  with  regard  to  the  contents  that  it  can 
apprehend,  yet  it  is  superior  in  being  able  to  dispense 
with  the  material  presence.  The  connection  with  sense 
is  certainly  very  close,  and  we  speak  of  an  image  without 
hesitation  sometimes  as  the  revival  of  sensation,  yet  the 
connection  is  a  mystery  in  the  end. 

But  the  most  important  question  for  my  present 
purpose  is  that  of  the  relation  of  imagery  not  to  sense 
but  to  thought ;  and  this  question  at  present  is  one  of  the 
most  controversial  in  the  whole  psychological  field.  The 
absence  of  experimental  training  is  a  great  disadvantage 
to  any  one  who  presumes  to  enter  such  a  dispute,  and 
forms  to  some  extent  a  disqualification  of  the  value  of  his 


THE    FIELDS    OF    PRESENTATION.      II  39 

opinion ;  yet  I  am  unable  to  avoid  holding  an  opinion  on 
the  matter,  and  a  strong  one.  If  psychology  is  to  be  con- 
sistent either  with  philosophy  or  with  common  sense,  it  is 
to  my  mind  bound  to  recognise  that  there  is  a  cognition 
which  goes  far  beyond  imagery.  I  can  see  no  way  of 
describing  the  actual  state  of  human  knowledge  unless 
we  admit  that  our  mind  can  apprehend  an  infinite  number 
of  objects  which  could  never  be  contained  in  sensation  and 
which  therefore  could  never  be  contained  in  sense-images. 
I  can  conceive  no  satisfactory  answer  to  Dr  Stout's 
admirable  demonstration  in  Analytic  Psychology^  of  the 
extent  to  which  our  thought  outruns  our  power  of 
imaging,  but  some  recent  experiments  have  added  further 
evidence.  In  those  conducted  by  Dr  Btihler2,  for  instance, 
his  subjects  were  sometimes  asked  to  state  from  memory 
the  number  of  statues  on  a  certain  bridge,  or  the  number 
of  colours  or  figures  in  a  picture.  It  was  found  some- 
times that  the  image  of  the  bridge  or  the  picture  preceded 
and  suggested  the  answer,  and  sometimes  that  it  followed 
the  apprehension  of  what  the  number  was.  The  figures 
seen  in  the  image  were  sometimes  counted,  but  often  the 
number-knowledge  was  quite  independent  of  this.  More 
complicated  questions,  demanding  difficult  thought  on 
psychological  matters,  gave  even  more  striking  results. 
Biihler  asserts  definitely  his  own  conclusion,  that  thought 
goes  beyond  any  images  which  may  be  present,  and  cannot 
be  reduced  to  them  or  to  any  other  lower  form  of  expe- 
rience. We  cannot  even  reduce  it  to  consciousness  of 
ability  to  image,  for  the  subject  usually  knows  what  it  is 
that  he  could  image. 

1  Vol.  i.,  ch.  4. 

2  Arch.f.  ges.  Psych.  9  and  12,  1907-8. 


40  THE  FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

Conclusions  like  enough  to  Buhler's  to  serve  all  my 
purposes  are  drawn  from  their  own  experiments  by 
J.  Orth1  and  by  N.  Ach2.  "  We  find  contents  of  great 
complexity,"  says  Dr  Ach,  "  where  we  are  conscious  of 
the  manifold  inter-relations  amongst  the  parts,  and  where 
yet  these  parts  receive  no  adequate  representation  in 
speech,  and  perhaps  are  not  capable  of  being  thus 
represented.... Sometimes  we  have  a  lightning-like  vision 
of  a  content  which  would  require  several  sentences  to 
express  it,  and  which  therefore  cannot  possibly,  on  account 
of  its  brief  duration,  be  expressed  in  words.  Yet  the  sense 
may  be  given  unambiguously,  and  the  remembrance  may 
be  clear  and  definite,  without  any  sensory  qualities  being 
discernible  in  the  mental  process3." 

The  experiments  of  Herr  Marbe,  earlier  than  any  of 
these,  seem  to  me  to  lead  irresistibly  to  the  same  result, 
though  that  author  does  not  draw  such  a  conclusion 
himself4.  In  the  course  of  making  a  good  many  judg- 
ments and  of  understanding,  or  rejecting  as  meaningless, 
propositions  presented  to  them,  his  subjects  attested  the 
presence  of  images  and  feelings  of  miscellaneous  kinds, 
but  they  found  no  image  or  feeling  whose  presence  dis- 
tinguished understanding  from  non-understanding,  or 
judgment  from  what  was  not  judgment  at  all.  Sometimes 
the  subject  describes  his  state  of  consciousness  as  "  know- 
ledge that  the  given  combination  of  words  was  meaningless 
and  of  the  same  sort  as  the  meaningless  combinations 
which  had  been  given  before,"  and  denies  that  in  all  this 

1  Gefiihl  und  Bewusstseinslage,  1903. 

2  Ueber  die  Willenstdtigkeit  und  das  Denken,  1905. 

3  Op.  cit.  p.  215. 

4  Experimentell-psychologische  Untersuchungen  iiber  das  Urteil,  1901. 


THE    FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  41 

any  image  was  present  except  the  word  "dasselbe"  (p.  86). 
Sometimes  all  images  are  denied:  the  subject  asserts  that 
his  judgment  was  made  "rein  reflektorisch " :  which 
Marbe  reproduces  in  a  very  misleading  way  as  "  rein  asso- 
ciativ  "  (p.  20).  His  own  expressed  conclusion  seems  an  odd 
one  (p.  91).  "  We  understand  a  judgment  when  we  know 
with  what  objects  it  is  meant  to  agree."  "  Knowledge  is 
never  given  in  consciousness.... To  know  anything  means 
to  be  able  to  make  right  judgments  about  it."  "  Hence 
to  understand  a  judgment  means  to  be  capable  of  making 
certain  other  judgments."  If  this  means,  as  it  seems  to 
mean,  that  what  is  in  consciousness  is  the  same  whether 
we  understand  a  proposition  or  do  not  understand  it  (or, 
in  other  experiments,  whether  we  consider  it  to  be  true 
or  to  be  false),  the  assertion  appears  to  me  to  be  absurd. 
What  can  consciousness  be  if  judging  and  understanding 
do  not  come  into  it  ?  The  difficulty  in  Marbe's  mind,  as 
in  that  of  other  writers,  seems  to  be,  How  can  any 
presentation  come  into  consciousness  except  as  an  image  ? 
I  conceive  that  the  answer  is  simply,  This  is  what 
thought  is  for.  Thought  experience,  as  Btihler  main- 
tains, is  a  matter  of  fact,  and  it  cannot  be  reduced  to 
what  is  less  than  thought-experience. 

This  opinion  has  remained  with  me  stubbornly  even 
after  reading  Professor  Titchener's  recent  criticism  of  the 
whole  theory1.  One  feels  exceedingly  diffident  in  the 
presence  of  such  learning  as  Professor  Titchener's,  and  an 
experimental  equipment  so  fine  as  his,  and  yet  I  cannot 
see  how  his  account  of  cognition  can  possibly  work. 
Beyond  images,  he  says.  "I  can  bear  witness  both  to 

1  Experimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought-Processes,  1909. 


42  THE   FIELDS  OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

kinaesthesis  and  to  cortical  set,  but  between  these  extremes 
I  find  nothing  at  all1."  It  may  be  valuable  for  us  to 
remember  the  possibility  of  extra-conscious  factors  such 
as  cortical  arrangements.  Nevertheless  I  cannot  get 
beyond  this  position  : — that  if  nothing  could  enter  a  con- 
sciousness except  sensations  and  images,  the  mind  thus 
conscious  could  be  debarred  from  knowing  any  more  than 
one  thousandth  part  of  what  human  beings  do  know. 

I  am  additionally  hampered  by  what  seems  to  me  an 
ambiguity  in  Professor  Titchener's  own  expressions.  On 
page  15  he  asserts  "  What  is  abstract  and  general  (in  a 
so-called  abstract  idea)  is  not  the  idea,  the  process  in  con- 
sciousness, but  the  logical  meaning  of  which  that  process 
is  the  vehicle."  If  I  understand  this  rightly  I  thoroughly 
agree  with  it,  and  I  should  take  it  to  imply  that  the 
"  logical  meaning  "  not  only  of  an  abstract  idea  but  of  the 
ordinary  idea  was  something  other  than  a  process  in 
consciousness:  certainly  something  other  than  an  image. 
But  on  page  175  he  says,  "An  idea  means  another  idea, 
is  psychologically  the  meaning  of  that  other  idea,  if  it  is 
that  idea's  context.  And  I  understand  by  context  simply 
the  mental  process  or  complex  of  mental  processes  which 
accrues  to  the  original  idea  through  the  situation  in  which 
the  organism  finds  itself."  Psychological  meaning  is  there- 
fore apparently  different  from  logical  meaning.  Here 
again,  if  the  contextual  processes  which  form  the  psycho- 
logical meaning  consist  in  apprehension  of  that  real  object, 
concrete  or  abstract,  which  forms  the  logical  meaning,  I 
could  accept  the  doctrine.  But  the  author  goes  on  to  give 
descriptions  which  seem  inconsistent  not  only  with  this 

1  P.  188. 


THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  43 

reading  of  his  view  but  with  one  another.  "  The  meaning 
of  the  printed  page  may  now  consist  in  the  auditory- 
kinaesthetic  accompaniment  of  internal  speech."  "  There 
would... be  nothing  surprising... in  the  discovery  that,  for 
minds  of  a  certain  constitution,  all  conscious  meaning  is 
carried  either  by  total  kinaesthetic  attitude  or  by  words." 
"  As  a  matter  of  fact,  meaning  is  carried  by  all  sorts  of 
sensational  and  imaginal  processes."  "We  should  probably 
find  that... any  mental  process  may  possibly  be  the  mean- 
ing of  any  other1."  I  can  neither  put  these  statements 
together  nor  yet  understand  how  on  any  reading  they  can 
provide  for  our  actual  knowledge  of  the  world. 

From  his  protests  against  the  "psychology  of  reflec- 
tion," and  against  the  interference  of  philosophical  or 
epistemological  considerations  in  psychology,  I  have  now 
and  then  been  inclined  to  think  that  Professor  Titchener 
considers  this  last  argument  an  illegitimate  one.  I  cannot 
so  consider  it,  nor  can  I  get  over  the  difficulty  it  puts  in 
the  way  of  a  purely  sensational  psychology.  On  the  other 
hand,  certain  of  Professor  Titchener's  objections  from  the 
side  of  introspection  seem  to  me  to  suggest  an  unconscious 
begging  of  the  question.  "  It  may  very  well  be  true,"  he 
says,  "  that  the  thought  of  diamonds  was  there  before  the 
sound  of  the  word,"  and  that  "  you  know  what  you  want 
to  say"  in  conversation  before  the  words  themselves 
appear.  But  what  is  a  thought-of  ?  and  what  is  a  know- 
ing2 ?  These  questions,  on  the  non-sensationalist  hypo- 
thesis, of  course  cannot  be  answered  by  any  analysis  of 
the  process  into  a  complex  of  images :  it  seems  probable 
that  they  could  never  be  answered  except  by  a  description 

1  pp.  177,  178.     Italics  mine.  2  p.  152. 


44  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

involving  constant  reference  to  the  object  known,  as  it 
enters  more  or  less  fully  and  more  or  less  vividly,  with 
more  or  less  complication  of  associates,  into  the  content 
of  consciousness.  But  it  is  just  this  reference  to  the 
object  that  Professor  Titchener  rules  out1. 

Much  of  course  remains  to  be  done  in  the  discovery  of 
the  details  of  non-sensational  cognition.  But  for  my 
purpose,  and  I  should  say  for  the  purpose  of  any  theory 
of  knowledge,  its  existence  must  be  assumed.  That  is, 
I  shall  assume  that  whether  or  not  thought  is  always 
accompanied  by  imagery  it  is  by  no  means  bounded  by 
imagery ;  and  that  the  mind  is  capable  of  apprehending 
directly  not  only  sensuous  reality  but  any  reality  whatever. 


C.    THOUGHT. 

Let  us  then  admit  the  existence  of  a  third  level  of 
apprehension,  or  rather  of  an  indefinite  number  of  levels, 
upon  which  we  may  meet  with  all  those  objects  of  know- 
ledge which  cannot  enter  in  sense  or  sense-imagery.  For 
want  of  a  better  general  title  we  must  bring  all  these 
levels  under  the  name  of  thought.  It  is  in  these  regions 
that  we  are  able  to  apprehend  all  "  objects  of  higher  order" 
— shape  and  position,  melody  and  rhythm,  likeness  and 
difference.  We  find  here  that  meaning  or  quality  in 
things  which  is  presented  to  the  artist's  mental  vision, 
and  which  by  his  art  he  tries  to  make  plain  to  ours.  Here 
we  find  invented  objects  and  remembered  objects,  so  far 

1  Op.  cit.  pp.  145-152. 


THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  45 

as  they  go  beyond  imagery.  On  these  levels,  if  anywhere, 
we  apprehend  our  own  feelings,  activities  and  dispositions, 
and  those  of  others.  On  these  levels  we  can  apprehend 
not  only  "  objects  "  in  the  narrower  sense  but  also  "  objec- 
tives" :  those  "facts"  of  which  the  apprehension  constitutes 
both  judgment  and  the  cognitive  element  in  assumption. 
Here  we  can  show  forth  those  connections  and  identities 
in  things  in  the  showing  of  which  all  argument  consists. 
Here,  finally,  we  have  that  complete  grasp  of  a  whole 
in  its  parts  which  sets  us  above  the  need  of  discursive 
argument. 

For  all  these  levels  I  intend  to  go  on  using  the  meta- 
phor of  sight  and  the  terms  "  present "  and  "  apprehend." 
(I  use  the  latter,  as  was  said  at  the  beginning,  simply  as 
the  correlative  of  the  former,  and  not  in  any  sense  connected 
more  closely  with  its  etymology.)  To  my  mind  they 
describe  the  facts  better  than  any  other  terms  could  do. 
Judgment,  for  instance,  must  come  under  the  general  head 
of  apprehension,  even  if  we  reserve  the  name  for  the 
apprehension  of  objects  of  a  particular  sort. 

Certain  Important  Presentations. 

In  our  miscellaneous  list  of  thought-presentations 
three  points  need  particular  mention  on  account  of  their 
connection  with  many  controversies. 

a.  Objectives  can  be  apprehended : — the  contents  of 
affirmative  and  negative  judgments.  Sense  of  course  can 
apprehend  neither :  to  grasp  them  is  the  peculiar  office  of 
thought. 

Most  writers  on  the  subject,  including  Meinong  and 
his  followers,  have  seen  in  the  nature  of  objectives  a  reason 


46  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

for  denying  that  judgment  can  fall  under  apprehension  at 
all.  The  determination  of  affirmative  and  negative,  they 
have  said,  must  belong  not  to  content  but  to  act :  but  it 
cannot  belong  to  such  an  act  as  apprehension,  therefore 
judgment  (and  similarly  assumption)  must  be  an  act  other 
than  apprehension.  I  agree  with  Mr  Bertrand  Russell1  in 
believing  that  this  claim  is  based  on  a  confusion.  The 
fact  seems  to  be  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  of  "yes- 
no  determination,"  of  which  one  belongs  to  an  act  of 
choice  and  has  no  special  connection  with  cognition,  whilst 
the  other  belongs  to  a  cognitive  content.  The  first  dis- 
tinction of  yes  from  no,  affecting  our  act,  is  seen  in  the 
contrast  of  granting  and  denying  a  request.  The  second 
distinction,  affecting  primarily  not  an  act  of  ours  but  an 
object  that  we  know,  is  shown  in  the  contrast  of  the 
presence  with  the  absence  of  some  feature  in  the  object. 
The  first  difference,  of  acceptance  and  rejection,  does  not 
concern  us  here:  the  second,  which  does  concern  us, 
qualifies  an  object  in  the  known  world  and  is  itself  known, 
and  I  see  no  reason  why  the  knowledge  of  it  should  not 
be  described  as  apprehension. 

b.  Connections  of  fact  can  be  apprehended.  It  is  of 
course  most  important  for  psychology  to  recognise  that 
such  apprehension  exists  and  constitutes  the  foundation 
of  inference.  For  otherwise  we  have  no  defence  against 
the  popular  doctrine  that  reasonable  thought  is  governed 
by  association. 

If  we  take  association  to  have  its  ordinary  technical 
meaning  of  the  force  of  habit  in  thought,  it  is  evident  that 

1  See  Mr  KusselPs  articles  in  Mind,  1904,  on  "  Meinong's  Theory  of 
Complexes  and  Assumptions,"  especially  pp.  348-52.  For  him,  however, 
the  apprehension  of  an  objective  is  not  a  judgment  but  an  assumption. 


THE    FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II  47 

a  train  of  good  new  reasoning  can  no  more  be  governed  by 
association,  generally  speaking,  than  any  other  purposive 
activity  can  be  governed  by  habit  in  its  main  lines.  Habit 
may  support  us  usefully  in  details,  but  that  will  usually 
be  all.  We  find  our  way  to  a  new  conclusion  in  thinking 
as  we  find  our  way  to  a  new  district  in  exploring  a  coun- 
try, not  mainly  by  habit,  but  by  observing  the  lie  of  the 
land  and  searching  out  the  road. 

If  association  is  used  in  an  untechnical  sense  to  cover 
all  kinds  of  connection  of  content,  then  naturally  inference 
is  association.  But  if  it  is  used  in  its  technical  sense  of 
habit,  then  nothing  can  be  more  different  than  the  two 
kinds  of  connection.  Association  connects  thought-con- 
tents by  means  of  making  habitual  the  transition  between 
the  respective  acts  of  thought.  Inference  connects  con- 
tents by  means  of  uncovering  the  bond  that  exists  between 
the  objects.  Difficulty  comes  only  from  the  constant 
combination  of  the  two  processes.  We  usually  remember 
our  multiplication  tables,  for  instance,  by  the  help  of  true 
association,  but  we  believe  in  them  on  account  of  inference 
or  of  trust  in  past  inferences1.  Unless  it  is  by  confusion 
and  self-suggestion,  association  is  of  course  unable  to  found 
belief2. 

1  The  same  combination  of  two  processes,  too  elementary  in  this  case 
to  be  naturally  called  inference  and  association,  but  still  of  the  same  kind, 
is  found  in  the  tied  ideas  of  perception.   We  expect  green  grass  to  be  cool 
to  the  touch  because  (without  being  able  to  argue  the  point)  we  believe 
that  the  nature  of  the  object  grass  connects  them.     But  habitual  transi- 
tion probably  helps  the  green  to  remind  us  of  the  cool. 

2  All  this,  a  commonplace  in  logic,  is  really  not  a  commonplace  in 
popular  psychology.    Training-college  students,  brought  up  on  text-books 
of  "  psychology  for  teachers,"  will  attribute  miracles  to  association  with  a 
confidence  that  might  be  incredible  to  a  logician  who  was  not  familiar 
with  this  literature. 


48  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

c.  Other  people's  minds,  with  their  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings and  activities,  are  apprehended  on  these  levels  of 
thought.  However  we  come  by  our  knowledge  of  other 
selves,  whether  by  an  analogical  argument  or  by  some 
simpler  way,  the  fact  remains  that  we  do  know  a  great 
deal  of  them.  When  in  true  thought-knowledge  I  con- 
template the  physical  world,  not  only  my  objects  but  the 
contents  of  my  mind  are  made  of  wood  and  stone.  When 
I  contemplate  my  friend,  the  contents  of  my  mind  are 
"  made  "  of  his  spirit  and  his  spiritual  activity.  For  this 
it  is  that  enters  my  consciousness  and  is  present  to  my 
thought1. 

Uninferred  Knowledge. 

As  we  glance  over  the  kinds  of  knowledge  obtained  on 
the  level  of  thought,  it  becomes  evident  that,  even  with  the 
widest  meaning  of  the  term  inference,  not  all  of  them  can 
be  classed  as  inferential.  Such  an  account  would  indeed 
be  impossible,  since  without  infinite  regress  we  cannot 
suppose  that  every  piece  of  thought-knowledge  is  derived 
inferentially  from  other  pieces  of  thought-knowledge,  and 
since  our  sensations,  being  incapable  of  apprehending 
objectives,  are  incapable  by  themselves  of  supplying  us 
with  any  premises  for  inference.  Hence  non- inferential 

1  I  suspect  that  some  readers  may  find  difficulty  in  accepting  this 
doctrine,  yet  it  seems  to  me  inevitably  true.  If  the  content  of  know- 
ledge be  defined  as  I  have  defined  it  from  the  beginning,  as  the  thing 
known  in  so  far  as  we  are  knowing  it,  then  if  we  are  knowing  a  person 
all  that  we  know  in  him  will  be  content  of  knowledge  for  us.  I  hope 
that  any  difficulty  may  be  partly  removed  by  Chapters  vu.  and  vin., 
"Defence  of  the  Presentation  of  Reality  in  Thought"  and  "The 
Apprehension  of  Feeling."  In  any  case  I  cannot  see  how  on  my  own 
lines  I  can  avoid  believing  in  the  thesis. 


THE   FIELDS  OF  PKESENTATION.      II  49 

apprehension  must  occur  in  thought  as  well  as  in  sense, 
and  must  in  fact  be  of  common  occurrence.  This  con- 
clusion is  natural  enough,  [since  inference  is  only  a  special 
method  for  making  the  features  of  reality  clear  to  ourselves 
and  to  others],  and  its  truth  would  probably  never  have 
been  doubted  but  for  an  impression  that  knowledge  which 
claims  to  be  non-inferential  must  somehow  claim  to  be 
infallible. 

A  list  of  the  objects  of  uninferred  knowledge,  set  forth 
by  Dr  Stout  in  an  admirable  essay1,  gives  first  "  self- 
evident  propositions,"  and  secondly  "  pleasures,  pains, 
emotions,  desires  and  sensations,  so  far  as  they  are  being 
felt  or  sensed2."  The  list  was  probably  not  intended  to 
be  exhaustive.  One  might  add  for  instance  our  appre- 
hension of  images3 ;  and  also  our  knowledge  of  the  objects 
which  we  assume.  Shakespeare,  having  decreed  that 
Cordelia  dies,  knows  without  inference  that  she  is  dead. 
Once  more,  we  ought  apparently  to  add  one  important 
and  interesting  example — that  of  memory. 

Meinong  has  written  a  valuable  paper  on  this  subject4, 
and  continued  the  discussion  in  a  more  recent  book5.  His 
arguments  may  be  paraphrased  as  follows.  First,  memory 
does  not  look  like  inference.  "  I  was  unhappy  yesterday  " 
does  not  seem  to  be  inferred  from  known  facts  of  to-day. 
When  we  say  "  I  must  have  put  this  paper  in  the  drawer 
since  it  is  there  now,"  we  are  inferring,  but  we  imply 

1  In  Mind,  1908. 

2  In  my  view  a  feeling  may  be  felt  without  being  known,  but  the  dis- 
cussion of  that  subject  must  be  postponed. 

3  Of  course  this  is  not,  as  such,  thought-knowledge. 

4  "Zur    erkenntnisstheoretischen   Wiirdigung    des    Gedachtnisses " 
(Viertelj.  /.  wiss.  Ph.  1886). 

5  Ueber  die  Erfahrungsgrundlagen  unseres  Wissens  (1906). 

W.  4 


50  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      II 

"I  do  not  remember  putting  it  there."  The  case  is  the 
same  with  a  judgment  made  on  first  waking  in  the 
morning,  "I  feel  so  unhappy  that  I  know  something 
must  have  gone  wrong  yesterday."  So  far  is  true  memory 
from  resembling  an  inference  from  introspection  that,  as 
Meinong  points  out,  the  very  phrase  "  I  remember  "  is  a 
little  unusual  and  artificial.  The  typical  memory-judgment 
takes  the  simpler  form,  "  Such  an  event  occurred." 

Secondly,  what  is  there  from  which  we  could  infer  our 
judgments  of  memory  ?  There  is  scarcely  one  iastance  of 
belief  in  fact  which  does  not  itself  involve  belief  in  remem- 
bered facts.  "  I  noticed  yesterday  that  the  peak  of  the 
hill  has  a  peculiar  shape."  This  memory -judgment,  we 
may  think,  could  be  tested  by  to-day's  sense-perception. 
Yet  how,  except  by  memory  again,  can  we  justify  the 
necessary  premise  that  hills  do  not  usually  change  their 
shape  in  the  night  ?  Or  we  may  test  it  by  an  appeal  to 
our  companions'  recollection,  yet  there  again  we  are  as- 
suming the  validity  of  recollection  as  such.  Even  a  purely 
personal  examination  of  my  own  memory  must  use  that 
memory,  for  all  my  acts  of  recollection  except  one  are 
already  past.  I  must  remember  what  in  each  case  I  did 
remember,  if  I  am  to  ask  whether  that  remembrance  was 
correct.  Finally,  any  account  of  memory -judgment  which 
makes  it  an  inference  from  memory-images  falls  under  the 
same  condemnation. 

Our  belief  in  the  past,  to  sum  up,  does  not  seem  to 
rest  on  inference  from  other  beliefs,  and  when  we  try  to 
make  it  so  rest  we  find  that  we  have  too  few  beliefs  apart 
from  it  for  anything  to  rest  on.  Memory  in  general  there- 
fore must  be  added  to  our  sum  of  knowledge  not  derived 
from  inference. 


THE    FIELDS    OF    PRESENTATION.      II  51 


D.    SUMMARY  OF  CHAPTER. 

This  chapter  has  been  of  an  irregular  kind.  Taking  in 
turn  the  three  apprehension-levels  of  sense,  sense-imagery, 
and  thought,  we  have  examined  in  connection  with  each 
whatever  point  seemed  most  interesting.  In  the  first  case, 
we  asked  what  object  could  be  supposed  to  present  itself 
in  sensation  :  in  the  second,  we  examined  the  claim  of 
imagery  to  constitute  the  whole  of  our  non-sensational 
knowledge,  and  decided  that  there  must  be  a  kind  of 
knowledge,  called  shortly  "thinking,"  which  went  far 
beyond  imagery :  thirdly,  we  specified  certain  contents  of 
our  knowledge  which  could  only  be  found  on  these  higher 
levels  of  thought,  and  we  noted  that  some  of  these  con- 
tents were  matters  of  immediate  knowledge,  in  the  sense 
not  that  we  were  infallible  with  regard  to  them,  but  that 
we  did  not  obtain  them  by  inference. 

Having  thus  dealt  separately  with  the  different  species 
of  knowledge,  we  must  now  observe  the  way  in  which  they 
combine. 


4—5 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  FIELDS  OF  PRESENTATION.     Ill 
The  Expansion  of  Presented  Contents 

WE  remarked  in  our  second  chapter  that  a  distinction 
must  always  be  made  between  what  at  any  moment  was 
appearing  in  consciousness  and  what  was  ready  to  appear. 
No  manifestation  of  an  object  exhausts  the  object;  the 
latter  can  always  expand  its  expression  and  tell  us  more 
and  more.  Not  only  can  the  content  thus  spread  and 
grow,  but  in  a  normal  attentive  mind  it  tends  almost  in- 
evitably to  do  so.  And  this  expansion  is  not  confined  to 
the  level  or  department  of  consciousness  in  which  the 
object  originally  appeared  to  us ;  it  is  likely  to  involve 
them  all.  The  touch  of  a  friendly  cat  in  a  dark  room  is 
likely  to  call  up  the  visual  image  of  the  cat  and  a  good 
deal  of  knowledge  about  it.  Every  department  gives  the 
object  room  for  special  manifestations  of  its  nature,  and 
when  the  expansion  is  prevented  our  discomfort  may  be 
great.  Dr  Stout's  "  anoetic  consciousness1"  is,  I  suggest, 
presentation  deprived  of  this  tendency  to  expand.  The 
object  shows  itself  in  the  presentation-field,  but  only  as  a 

1  Analytic  Psychology,  vol.  i. 


THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      Ill  53 

particular  grey,  with  no  expansion  into  "  greyness "  or 
into  "  cat." 

In  phrases  which  may  mislead,  but  which  if  they  do 
not  mislead  are  excellent,  such  expansion  has  been  called 
"  interpretation,"  and  the  matter  presented  in  the  higher 
fields  has  been  said  to  be  the  "  meaning  "  of  what  is  pre- 
sented in  the  lower.  The  furry  touch  has  acquired  meaning 
when  the  presentment  is  able  to  expand  over  all  the  fields 
which  are  necessary  to  give  us  an  adequate  view  of  "the 
cat."  We  are  usually  a  good  deal  more  interested  in  the 
higher  extension  than  in  the  simple  view  of  the  object 
with  which  we  began,  and  in  this  rather  peculiar  but  in- 
teresting meaning  of  the  phrase  the  sensation  may  be  said 
to  "  stand  for  "  or  "  symbolise  "  what  follows ;  to  be  inter- 
esting in  a  "representative"  capacity.  Acquirement  of 
meaning  means  increase  of  possibilities.  The  law  of  the 
object's  nature  is  able  to  act  more  freely  and  richly ;  the 
experience  becomes  developable;  can  be  rolled  out  into 
many  others.  A  small  presentation  comes  to  stand  for 
more  in  the  sense  of  deepening  its  aspect  of  promise ;  we 
see  in  it  the  beginnings  of  much  potential  experience. 

The  word  "symbol,"  however, is  always  a  little  danger- 
ous, and  it  is  especially  dangerous  in  the  case  of  downward 
expansion,  for  it  exposes  us  to  the  whole  temptation  of 
exaggerating  the  importance  of  images.  Not  only  does  a 
sensation  spread  upwards,  but  anything  presented  initially 
in  thought  will  generally  ripple  downwards  as  far  as  it  can 
go.  A  cat  which  we  think  of  cannot  usually  present  itself 
in  sense-perception  (though  something  very  like  this  is  apt 
to  happen  in  a  dream  where  we  begin  to  think  or  to  read), 
but  it  presents  itself  readily  in  sense-imagery,  visual  or 
verbal.  Then  we  are  apt  to  lose  ourselves  m  all  sorts  of 


54  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      Ill 

mazes  if  we  begin  to  speak  of  this  lower  presentation,  the 
image,  as  a  symbol  of  the  higher  presentation,  the  idea. 
For  we  are  led  thus  to  look  on  the  whole  appearance  as 
primarily  sensuous,  making  it  an  image  symbolic,  an  image 
with  a  meaning ;  and  then  we  naturally  consider  that  the 
symbol  serves  instead  of  what  is  symbolised,  and  so  come 
to  deny  or  ignore  the  existence  of  the  primary  higher 
presentation ;  and  by  this  time  the  path  from  psychology 
to  the  theory  of  knowledge  is  lost  amongst  chasms  un- 
fathomable. 

"Streben  nach  vollen  Erleben" 

This  expansion  of  the  contents  of  cognition  follows 
from  what  Lipps  has  called  our  "tendency  towards  full 
experience1."  We  tend  to  submit  ourselves  to  the  object  as 
fully  as  possible ;  to  let  it  exhibit  itself  in  every  depart- 
ment of  our  presentation-field ;  even,  in  "  Einfi^hlung"  to 
assume  its  position  and  feel  what  it  may  be  supposed  to 
feel.  Sometimes  the  striving  is  too  strong  for  the  proper 
maintenance  of  the  boundaries  between  universes,  and  the 
thought  merges  into  a  hallucination;  but  right  contempla- 
tion also  is  a  making  grow.  To  contemplate  is  to  set  the 
object  in  a  clear  field  and  to  let  it  unfold  before  us  in  the 
contents  of  consciousness.  Where  first  we  found  only 
sense-contents  we  presently  find  shape  and  position  and 
likeness  and  distinction,  and  connections  with  all  the  world, 
and  relations  on  which  inferences  rest.  Picturesquely,  we 
say  that  we  think  the  thing  out. 

What  in  this  way  happens  to  a  presentation  on  the 

1  E.g.  Ftihlen,  Wollen,  und  Denken  102,  and  Bewusstsein  und  Gegen- 
stdnde  100—127. 


THE   FIELDS   OF    PRESENTATION.      Ill  55 

supervention  of  thought  has  a  parallel  in  what  happens  to 
an  impulse  on  the  supervention  of  will.  The  impulse 
develops  and  explains  itself.  It  works  out  into  ordered 
schemes  of  means  and  end,  into  a  steady  and  purposeful 
way  of  living,  which  may  be  but  slightly  affected  by  the 
dying  out  of  the  desire  in  its  old  narrow  form.  The  con- 
tent of  conation  clothes  itself  with  will  as  the  content  of 
cognition  with  thought.  Or  rather,  lest  the  clothing 
should  be  taken  to  be  a  mere  addition  from  outside,  we 
had  better  say  that  in  will  and  thought  both  contents 
receive  new  life,  and  new  and  greater  power  to  express 
the  subject  in  the  one  case  and  the  object  in  the  other. 
The  condition  is  that  the  current  of  our  life  should  be 
turned  that  way ;  that  the  object  in  question  should  gain 
attention  and  that  the  disposition  in  question  should  gain 
control. 

Expansion  through  Sense  and  Thought. 

No  one  field  of  presentation  is  sufficient  by  itself  to 
give  an  adequate  view  of  a  concrete  object.  Sense  must 
if  possible  supplement  thought,  and  thought  must  help 
sense,  and  all  kinds  of  thought  must  assist  one  another. 
If  this  is  to  be  done,  each  of  the  fields  in  question  must  be 
capable  of  having  reality  presented  within  it,  and  hitherto 
we  have  assumed  that  this  was  the  case,  and  endeavoured 
to  describe  as  well  as  we  could  such  presentations  as 
seemed  to  occur. 

Nevertheless  there  exist  and  have  always  existed 
philosophers  for  whom  this  assumption  has  seemed  un- 
justifiable, because  they  have  found  in  it  one  or  other  of 
two  different  mistakes.  Some  have  refused  it  because  in 


56  THE   FIELDS   OF   PRESENTATION.      Ill 

their  opinion  reality  could  not  be  presented  in  sense, 
others  because  they  considered  that  it  could  not  be 
presented  in  thought.  Either  of  these  opinions  would 
evidently  have  serious  consequences  for  our  whole  account 
of  knowledge,  and  therefore  it  is  necessary  that  two 
chapters  should  now  be  devoted  to  their  consideration. 
I  can  scarcely  hope  to  refute  doctrines  which  have  gained 
the  adhesion  of  some  of  the  greatest  minds,  but  I  will  try 
to  make  clear  the  way  in  which  I  differ  from  each,  and  my 
reasons  for  doing  so.  It  is  possible  that  the  result  may  be 
that  of  making  plain  to  more  enlightened  readers  that 
I  have  merely  misunderstood  the  writers  to  whom  I  shall 
specially  refer ;  and  I  should  be  glad  to  believe  that  this 
was  the  case. 


CHAPTER  VI 

DEFENCE   OF   THE   PRESENTATION  OF   REALITY 

IN  SENSE 

MY  representative  opponent  in  this  chapter  is  Dr  Stout. 
And  I  may  as  well  begin  by  saying  that  after  persistent 
and  repeated  study  I  am  still  not  quite  sure  whether  he  is 
really  in  opposition.  I  think  at  one  moment  that  we  are 
fundamentally  divided,  and  at  another  moment  that  after 
all  he  may  be  only  expressing  the  same  thing  in  a  rather 
different  way.  The  best  I  can  do  will  be  to  set  forth 
Dr  Stout's  account  by  means  of  quotations,  and  then  to  set 
forth  my  own  in  contrast,  whether  that  contrast  be  really 
only  one  of  language  or  whether  it  goes  down  to  the  roots 
of  our  philosophy. 

The  following  quotations  from  Dr  Stout  seem  to  be  the 
most  representative  that  I  can  find  : — 

Manual  of  Psychology,  1901. 

p.  134.  "Sensations  as  such... are  psychical  states. 
These  psychical  states  as  such  become  objects  only  when 
we  attend  to  them  in  an  introspective  way.  Otherwise 
they  are  not  themselves  objects,  but  only  constituents  of 
the  process  by  which  objects  are  cognised." 


58  DEFENCE    OF   THE    PRESENTATION 

Groundwork  of  Psychology,  1908. 

p.  1.  "A  psychical  process  is  a  process  forming  part 
of  the  life  history  of  some  individual  consciousness.  It  is 
some  one's  experience,  and  it  actually  exists  only  while  it 
is  being  actually  experienced." 

pp.  3,  4.  "  All  subjective  states  are  psychical ;  but  not 
all  psychical  states  are  subjective.  Sensations  in  general, 
so  far  as  they  enter  into  the  relation  of  subject  and  object 
at  all,  fall  to  the  side  of  the  object,  and  not  to  that  of  the 
subject.  When  I  listen  to  the  sound  of  a  bell,  the  act  of 
listening  is  subjective.  But  the  sensation  of  sound  is  my 
object.... The  same  holds  good  of  sensations  in  general. 
They  are  all  psychical  states.  They  actually  exist  only 
while  they  are  being  experienced.  But  so  far  as  they 
enter  into  the  relation  of  subject  and  object  at  all,  they 
are  objective  and  not  subjective." 

p.  37.     "Sensations... are  psychical  objects." 

"  Things  and  Sensations,"  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  British 

Academy  for  1905. 

p.  8.  "  We  speak  of  experiencing  a  toothache  as  we 
speak  of  jumping  a  jump.  To  experience  a  toothache  is 
to  experience  a  certain  kind  of  experience.  Such  imme- 
diacy does  not  include  any  distinction  of  subject  and 
object.  The  experiencing  is  distinguished  from  the  con- 
tent experienced  only  as  colour  in  general  is  distinguished 
from  this  or  that  special  colour." 

"  Are  Presentations  Mental  or  Physical  ?  "  in  the  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1908-9. 
p.    235.     "We    must    regard    dream    apparitions    as 
psychical  or  mental  existents.     But,  in  this  respect,  we 
can  draw  no  essential  distinction  between  dream  presenta- 


OF   REALITY    IN    SENSE  59 

tions. .  .and  the  presentations  connected  with  the  perception 
of  actually  existing  physical  things." 

p.  241.  "Presentations  certainly  are  not  specific 
qualities  of  conation  or  attention  ;  neither  are  they  modes 
of  cognition,  if  by  this  is  meant  the  mental  act  or  state  of 
our  being  aware  of  something  in  distinction  from  the 
something  of  which  we  are  aware.  But  the  real  ques- 
tion is  whether  mental  existence  is  confined  merely  to 
consciousness  in  this  sense.... There  is  nothing  in  (Mr 
Alexander's  argument)  which  has  any  bearing  on  my 
contention  that  there  are  certain  existents  so  connected 
with  conation  and  feeling  as  to  form  with  these  part  of  the 
single  system  which  we  call  an  individual  mind." 

p.  245.  "  Doubtless  all  emotion  involves  conation  and 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain....  But  these  elements  are 
so  blended  in  a  continuous  unity  with  organic  sensations 
that  it  seems  quite  arbitrary  to  contrast  them  as  subjective 
with  the  organic  sensations  as  objective.... Sensations,  then, 
may  be,  in  the  proper  sense,  subjective." 

Now  in  contrast  with  these  opinions  my  own  account 
stands  as  follows  : — 

Nothing  exists  except  myself  and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  My  existence  takes  shape  in  action ;  in  part  of 
this  I  express  myself  against  the  world,  in  the  other  part 
the  activity  is  receptive  and  the  world  expresses  itself 
against  me.  In  this  forth-going  and  incoming,  this  ex- 
pression and  apprehension,  my  life  consists.  That  which 
I  receive  and  apprehend  is  the  world  of  reality.  My 
presentation-field  of  objects  is  part  of  this  world,  and  lies 
chiefly  outside  my  body.  The  content  of  my  apprehension 
is  also  chiefly  outside  my  body,  consisting  of  just  so  much 
of  the  world  as  I  apprehend. 


60         DEFENCE  OF  THE  PRESENTATION 

Nothing  enters  my  life  except  on  the  one  hand  my 
own  activities  (impulses,  likings,  creatings),  and  on  the 
other  hand  so  much  of  the  real  world  as  presents  itself  to 
me.  The  content  of  sensation  is  not  an  activity  of  mine. 
Therefore  it  forms  part  of  the  world  of  reality.  If  it  be 
asked  how  it  fits  into  that  world,  and  what  relation  it  can 
possibly  be  supposed  to  bear  to  an  abiding  physical  object, 
I  will  only  say  that  reality  is  already  bound  to  fit  together 
so  many  odd  things,  such  as  physical  objects,  laws,  qualities, 
relations,  powers,  situations,  and  events,  that  it  can  scarcely 
make  much  objection  to  including  the  contents  of  sensation 
as  well.  For  guidance,  however,  we  may  note  that  the 
latter's  immediate  connections  will  be  with  a  part  of  the 
physical  world  which  includes  that  object  I  call  my  body. 

My  mind  can  contain  the  whole  universe,  yet  there  is 
no  room  in  it  for  anything  which  is  not  either  a  part  or 
act  of  my  self  or  else  a  part  or  act  of  rny  not-self.  The 
act  of  sensing,  like  all  my  acts,  belongs  to  me,  but  what 
I  sense  does  not.  No  "  modification  of  consciousness"  and 
no  "psychical  object"  can  escape  the  alternative,  for  there 
is  no  room  for  anything  between  me  and  the  world  with 
which  I  meet. 

The  Sensum. 

What  really  concerns  me  is  to  distinguish  sensation 
from  feeling  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  make  it  a  possible 
starting-point  for  thought  on  the  other.  In  order  to 
obtain  these  ends,  it  seems  to  me  necessary  that  we  should 
do  what  many  thinkers  strongly  object  to  doing, — dis- 
tinguish between  the  sensum  and  the  act  or  event  of 
sensing  it.  The  latter  is  not  important  here :  it  may  be 
called  an  act  of  recipience,  or  in  the  case  of  marginal 


OF   REALITY   IN  SENSE  61 

sensation  at  any  rate  it  may  be  thought  worthy  of  no 
better  title  than  "  event "  of  recipience :  so  small  may  be 
the  activity  involved  on  the  part  of  the  apprehending 
mind.  What  is  important  is  the  sensum,  the  content 
received.  It  appears  to  me  necessary  to  insist  that  the 
event  of  sensation  is  the  event  of  the  entrance  of  an 
element  into  consciousness,  in  just  the  same  way  as  is  the 
event  or  act  of  thought.  I  urge  that  to  give  up  this  is  in 
the  first  place  to  lose  the  distinction  between  sensation 
and  feeling,  and  in  the  second  place  to  make  the  super- 
vention of  thought,  which  admittedly  has  an  objective 
content,  exceedingly  difficult  to  explain.  We  will  take 
these  points  in  turn. 

Sensation  as  Distinguished  from  Feeling. 

Psychologists  have  usually  (though  not  always)  taught 
that  sensation  is  an  experience  distinct  in  kind  from 
conative  experience  and  from  feeling  in  the  technical 
sense.  Dr  Stout  himself,  as  I  understand  him,  teaches 
this  doctrine1 ;  Dr  Ward  certainly  teaches  it.  Now  if  the 
distinction  is  to  be  made,  I  can  see  no  other  such  natural 
and  fitting  way  of  describing  the  difference  as  to  say,  that 
sensation  is  an  experience  of  reception  whilst  the  others 
are  experiences  of  response.  In  sensation,  we  should  say, 
an  objective  element  enters  consciousness :  feeling  and 
striving-experience  are  the  subjective  elements  in  which 
I  respond  to  what  enters,  and  express  myself  as  against 
the  world.  In  elementary  life,  or  with  distracted  atten- 
tion, I  naturally  do  not  think  about  myself  or  about  the 

1  E.g.  in  a  very  interesting  article  on  the  activity-experience,  in  The 
British  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  n.  July,  1906. 


62  DEFENCE    OF   THE   PRESENTATION 

world,  nor  do  I  take  any  notice  of  the  difference  between 
the  two  sorts  of  experience.  That  distinction  between  self 
and  not-self  which  leaves  my  own  body  on  the  not-self  side 
is  of  so  little  practical  importance,  that  it  is  long  indeed 
before  I  come  to  recognise  it.  All  this  I  grant,  for  it  does 
not  touch  the  ordinary  doctrine  that  sensation  is  different 
from  feeling  whether  the  difference  be  noticed  or  not,  nor 
my  own  claim1  that  the  difference,  whether  we  know  it  or 
not,  is  the  difference  between  recipient  and  responsive 
experience.  Dr  Stout,  in  one  of  the  passages  with  which 
my  opinions  seem  to  conflict2,  considers  the  case  of  a 
spectator  at  a  football  match  who  unconsciously  imitates 
the  movements  of  the  players,  so  that  movement-sensations 
blend  with  the  impulsive  and  emotional  elements  in  his 
sympathetic  excitement.  Is  it  not  absurd,  the  author  asks, 
to  say  that  the  sensations  (in  my  terminology  the  sensa) 
are  present  as  objects  whilst  the  other  elements  are  not  ? 
It  seems  to  me  really  not  absurd,  but  the  most  natural  way 
of  describing  that  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  elements 
which,  whether  or  not  it  is  noticed,  we  admit  to  exist. 

I  am  willing  to  accept  as  typical  of  sense-experience 
an  instance  of  it  to  which  Dr  Stout  often  appeals :  the 
instance  of  physical  pain.  This,  with  its  distinction  from 
the  feeling  and  striving  which  it  calls  forth,  seems  to  me 
an  instance  peculiarly  suitable  for  my  own  exposition. 
Physical  pain,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  is  emphatically  objective. 
It  is  not  a  way  of  experiencing  but  a  thing  that  we  ex- 
perience. It  comes  to  us,  comes  upon  us.  We  are  not  "in" 
it  as  we  are  in  our  hatred  of  it  or  our  struggles  to  escape 
from  it :  we  are  opposed  to  it :  under  it.  I  know  that  when 

1  Which  I  take  to  be  practically  the  same  as  Dr  Ward's. 

2  Arist.  Soc.  1908-9,  244. 


OF    REALITY    IN    SENSE  63 

we  reflect  and  introspect  we  may  use  much  the  same 
phrases  as  these  about  some  impulse  or  disposition  which 
we  separate  from  our  main  self:  bat  to  do  this  we  must 
reflect,  must  turn  round.  Surely  no  such  reflection  is 
required  in  the  case  of  pain.  No  part  of  ourself  is  in  it: 
it  is  altogether  something  inflicted  upon  us.  It  is  not  a 
way  of  loving  or  hating:  it  is  something  that  we  hate.  The 
knowledge  of  the  cause  of  pain  and  the  endeavour  to 
remove  it  comes  indeed  only  later.  What  is  primitive  is 
the  struggle  against,  the  incredulity  towards,  the  writhing 
endeavour  to  escape  from,  not  the  cause  of  the  pain  but 
the  sensed  pain  itself. 

In  the  case  described  we  are  attending  to  a  sense- con  tent, 
and  it  would  seem  that  we  attend  to  it  without  performing 
any  task  so  elaborate  as  that  of  introspection.  Just  this, 
according  to  the  doctrine  I  support,  shows  the  difference 
between  sensation  and  feeling.  Feeling  and  impulse 
cannot  be  attended  to  except  by  introspection  and  reflec- 
tion :  their  tendency  as  they  grow  in  force  is  not  primarily 
to  gain  attention  but  to  gain  control  over  our  inward  or 
outward  behaviour.  But  when  we  struggle  against  pain, 
or  listen  to  a  musical  note,  or  enjoy  the  colour  of  a  butter- 
cup, we  attend  to  a  sense-content  without  any  turning  of 
our  attention  inwards,  such  as  occurs  when  we  attend  to 
our  dislike  or  our  enjoyment.  This  is  what  I  mean  by 
urging  that  sense-contents  are  objective  from  the  first. 
What  is  thus  claimed  for  a  content  in  the  focus  of  atten- 
tion must  be  claimed  similarly  for  a  marginal  content. 
Sensa,  in  a  word,  must  be  looked  on  everywhere  as  objective 
elements  in  consciousness,  in  contrast  with  the  subjective 
elements  of  feeling  and  impulse  :  or  else  another  distinction 
must  be  proposed  between  these  two  kinds  of  experience. 


64         DEFENCE  OF  THE  PRESENTATION 

Sensation  as  Leading  to  Thought. 

My  second  plea  is  this  :  that  if  the  objective,  presenta- 
tive,  and  "  received  "  character  of  sense-contents  be  given 
up,  it  becomes  very  difficult  to  explain  the  transition  from 
these  to  the  contents  of  thought,  which  are  usually  ad- 
mitted to  be  objective  elements. 

If  the  cognition  be  taken  to  begin  in  sensation  as  in 
an  "  immediate  unity  "  of  subject  and  object,  and  if  this 
means  not  only  that  no  distinction  between  subjective  and 
objective  is  yet  recognised  by  the  sensitive  subject  but 
also  that  no  such  difference  is  there,  the  question  arises 
how  we  ever  come  to  make  the  distinction,  or  discover  that 
object  world  which  we  know  in  thought.  "Why  should 
thought  refer  a  '  modification '  of  the  individual  conscious- 
ness to  something  which  is  not  a  modification  of  the 
individual  consciousness  but  exists  independently  of  that 
consciousness1?"  Lipps  accounts  for  the  procedure  by 
an  ultimate  and  irreducible  "instinct2."  Dr  Stout,  in  his 
account  of  anoetic  consciousness3,  leaves  the  step  unex- 
plained, and  explicitly  conceives  the  possibility  of  a  sentient 
creature  which  should  never  be  led  to  take  it.  There  is 
surely  less  difficulty  in  the  whole  account  if  we  suppose 
that  what  thought  has  to  do  in  supervening  on  sensation 
is  not  to  refer  to  an  object  or  to  surround  with  an  object 
something  that  is  in  no  sense  objective,  but  only  to  turn  a 
very  small  and  narrow  objective  content  into  one  that 
shall  be  wider,  deeper  and  richer. 

What  I  desire  therefore  is  to  treat  sense-contents  as 

1  Dawes  Hicks,  Arist.  Soc.  1905-6,  p.  296. 

2  Das  Wissen  von  fremden  Ichen,  pp.  694-7. 

3  Analytic  Psychology,  vol.  i. 


OF   REALITY   IN    SENSE  65 

I  have  treated  thought-contents :  to  consider  them  as 
objective;  as  presented,  apprehended,  received:  and  as 
forming  the  content  of  our  first  glimpse  of  what  presently 
reveals  itself  as  the  physical  world.  Sense-contents  like 
thought-contents  may  be  called  psychical  with  a  meaning 
which  does  not  exclude  many  of  the  latter  from  being  also 
physical :  for  all  mental  contents  exist  in  my  mind,  and 
the  whole  universe  exists  there  when  I  embrace  it  in 
thought.  Sense-contents  like  thought-contents  often 
receive  little  attention,  for  our  attention  usually  flows 
through  and  past  what  we  already  know  of  the  object 
towards  that  which  we  do  not  quite  know.  Sense-contents 
have  "  existential  presence1 "  inasmuch  as  they  are  there 
and  exist  before  us,  are  present  with  us :  but  this  gives 
them  no  greater  nearness  and  no  less  objectivity  than  is 
possessed  by  thought-contents,  which  also  are  present  with 
us.  In  short,  in  sense  and  in  thought  alike  we  apprehend 
an  object  which  is  presented. 

Do  Sense- Contents  belong  to  the  Real  World? 

I  believe  all  this  to  be  true,  yet  for  most  forms  of 
metaphysics  one  evident  difficulty  remains.  Granted  that 
in  sensation  we  apprehend  a  presented  content,  has  that 
content  any  claim  to  belong  to  the  real  world  ?  Does  not 
the  existence  of  a  sensum  depend  on  the  presence  of  my 
sensitive  self?  Is  it  not  therefore  inserted  by  my  own 
mind  into  that  world  which  is  truly  presented  in  thought 
alone  ?  The  answer  cannot  be  simple. 

To  begin  with,  it  must  be  said  that  anything  which 
can  be  presented  has  according  to  my  definition  some  sort 
of  reality.  It  is  able  at  least  to  be  apprehended  :  it  comes 
1  Dr  Stout's  term. 

w.  5 


66  DEFENCE   OF  THE   PRESENTATION 

before  us  and  upon  us :  we  have  so  far  to  reckon  with  it : 
it  forms  part  of  the  circumstances  of  our  life.  I  accept 
Dr  Stout's  comparison  of  sensations  with  dream-images, 
which  for  me  are  still  presentations  of  reality,  though  that 
reality  lies  far  away  from  the  physical  world,  "  draussen  im 
Fabelland."  Every  presented  object  has  as  much  reality 
as  enables  it  to  be  presented :  what  further  reality  it  has, 
and  of  what  sort,  are  matters  for  further  investigation. 

In  the  case  of  sense-presentation  we  have  already 
examined  in  part  what  that  further  reality  is.  In  the 
ordinary  case,  we  decided,  the  object  presented  in  sense 
was  most  naturally  determined  as  being  a  certain  part  of 
the  physical  world  in  which  my  own  body  was  included. 
What  I  feel  is  the  wind  against  my  face,  what  I  see  is 
a  forest  from  which  ether  waves  pass  to  my  eye.  Further 
investigation  of  the  sensum  may  bring  me  information  both 
about  the  forest  and  about  a  colour-blindness  in  my  retina. 
So  far  one  might  say  simply  that  the  object  presented  was 
this  complex  part  of  the  physical  world,  and  certainly  real. 

But  from  the  point  of  view  of  ordinary  realism  and 
ordinary  science  the  difficulty  of  course  is  still  to  come. 
Granted  that  the  object  presented  in  sense  is  the  one 
described  above,  still  this  remains — that  just  that  part  of 
the  object  which  enters  in  the  sense-content  is  a  part 
which,  when  it  is  not  so  entering,  does  not  exist  at  all. 
The  physical  world  is  presenting  itself,  is  exhibiting  itself 
before  me,  but  the  exhibition  is  a  special  one  for  my 
benefit.  The  relation  is  very  subtle ;  these  contents  must 
not  be  said  to  be  created  by  apprehension,  seeing  that 
apprehension  can  create  nothing;  it  is  just  that  my 
presence  gives  the  world  its  opportunity,  and,  my  conscious 
life  being  there,  other  bodies  combine  with  my  body  to 
flash  a  sensum  into  that  life.  The  buttercup  explodes  in 


OF   REALITY   IN   SENSE  67 

yellow ;  the  sky  salutes  me  with  blue ;  the  vexed  nerve 
not  only  thrills  but  stings. 

The  mystery  of  these  objects,  which  somehow  depend 
for  their  existence  on  the  presence  of  an  apprehending 
person,  and  which  yet  cannot  without  absurdity  be  sup- 
posed to  be  created  by  his  recipience  of  them,  is  undeniably 
great ;  yet  it  seems  fair  to  conjecture  that  some  of  it 
would  be  removed  if  we  understood  better  how  sensation 
came  about,  and  knew  the  whole  relation  between  body 
and  soul.  Meanwhile  I  urge  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
mystery,  great  as  it  is,  to  force  these  objects  out  of  line 
with  other  objects.  For  the  purposes  of  psychology  and 
philosophy,  if  not  of  physics,  they  are  simply  very  short- 
lived parts  of  the  real  world. 

We  have  to  claim,  in  short,  that  the  peculiarity  of  the 
nature  of  sense-contents  is  not  of  importance  for  this 
particular  point  in  our  theory  of  knowledge.  If  these 
contents  are  presented  and  if  they  are  real,  then  we  have 
all  that  for  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  we  require. 
The  nature  and  origin  of  their  reality  is  indeed  most 
important  for  metaphysics,  but  for  our  present  purpose  it 
seems  irrelevant.  The  object  which  exhibits  itself  in 
sense  must  indeed  be  more  complex  than  we  had  hitherto 
observed  :  apparently  it  must  consist  not  only  of  bodies  in 
connection  with  a  living  body,  but  of  all  these  conjoined 
with  a  mind.  This  may  lead  us  perhaps  to  look  more  care- 
fully into  the  apparent  simplicity  of  other  objects.  But  for 
the  present  my  end  is  attained  if  I  have  been  able  to  make 
it  apparent  that  even  in  sensation  reality  is  apprehended. 

At  all  events  I  can  make  my  view  no  clearer  than  this, 
and  can  only  hope  in  the  end  that  Dr  Stout  does  not  really 
disagree  with  it. 

5—2 


CHAPTER  VII 

DEFENCE   OF  THE   PRESENTATION   OF   REALITY 
IN   THOUGHT 

ACCORDING  to  the  opinion  criticised  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  the  contents  of  sense  are  too  near  to  us  to  be 
presentations  of  an  objective  reality.  According  to  the 
opinion  now  to  be  discussed,  the  objects  of  thought  are 
too  far  removed  from  us  to  be  presented  at  all. 

The  opinion  now  in  question  is  in  one  way  more  diffi- 
cult to  discuss  than  the  former,  because  usually  it  is 
rather  assumed  than  explicitly  set  forth.  It  comes  up 
again  and  again  in  the  best  philosophy,  and  yet  I  cannot 
believe  at  present  that  it  is  anything  but  a  remnant  of 
the  fallacy  of  introjection  and  of  the  obsession  of  repre- 
sentative ideas.  What  I  oppose  is  the  constantly-recurring 
tendency  to  believe  that  only  in  sensuous  experience  are 
we  in  contact  with  the  real  world.  The  sense  datum,  it 
is  continually  supposed,  is  all  that  is  "  given  "  to  us,  and 
round  it  we  have  to  make  a  "  construction  "  of  our  own. 
Then,  by  mere  force  of  assertion  apparently,  we  are  held 
to  "  identify  "  this  construction  with  the  real  world  which, 
except  through  the  hole  of  sense,  we  cannot  reach. 

Now  the  chief  point  of  which  we  must  remind  our- 
selves is  that  reality  in  the  general  sense  is  simply  what 


DEFENCE   OF   THOUGHT  69 

does  in  any  way  present  itself  to  us.  It  is  a  fact  of 
experience  that  in  all  cognition  and  not  only  in  sense  we 
have  something  before  our  eyes,  something  given  in  the 
sense  that  no  choice  of  ours  has  shaped  it,  and  in  the 
sense  that  it  does  not  express  ourself  as  our  desires  and 
impulses  express  ourself.  It  is  our  material,  a  circum- 
stance of  our  life.  What  I  mean  by  reality  is  the  substance 
of  all  such  appearances,  and  belongs  in  no  way  uniquely 
to  sense-experiences.  What  I  mean  by  the  real  tower  is 
not  only  that  which  I  see  in  the  distance  but  that  which 
I  expect,  intellectually,  to  overshadow  me  when  I  approach, 
and  that  of  which  I  remember  the  erection  and  could 
state  the  height  and  conjecture  the  purpose  and  reason 
out  the  relations:  I  mean  that  which  in  all  these  ways 
I  actually  know.  I  remember  and  reckon  on  and  describe 
the  tower,  and  not  any  construction  of  mine  which  I 
identify  with  the  tower.  For  by  the  name  I  mean  nothing 
more  remote  than  what  in  all  these  ways  appears  to  me. 
Thus  by  the  very  force  of  words  reality  is  presented  not 
only  in  sense  but  in  thought. 

Inattentively  at  first,  I  hear  a  noise.  It  strikes  me, 
comes  before  me,  is  an  object  to  me.  As  I  turn  my 
attention  that  way,  I  find  more  in  this  object  than  I 
found  at  first.  It  shows  itself  not  only  as  a  noise  but  as 
a  musical  noise,  as  a  tune,  as  the  tune  of  a  well-known 
song,  as  produced  by  a  particular  composer,  as  well  or 
badly  rendered.  These  are  all  aspects  of  the  real  tune, 
and  not,  in  the  natural  sense,  of  a  construction  of  mine. 
In  all  these  ways  the  reality  presents  itself  to  me.  So 
also  is  it  with  a  bodily  pain ;  and  with  a  physical  thing 
which  I  touch  or  see  :  and  with  objects  such  as  those  in 
the  world  of  mathematics,  which  mere  sense  can  never 


70         DEFENCE  OF  THE  PRESENTATION 

apprehend.     So  also  with  a  human  being  whom  I  learn 
to  know. 

"  But  only  through  sense,"  it  may  be  said,  "  have  we 
any  guarantee  that  the  object  in  question  is  really  present 
with  us."  Sensation  is  apparently  a  guarantee  that  the 
object,  or  effluences  from  the  object,  or  waves  of  ether 
which  have  lately  left  the  object,  have  the  moment 
before  come  in  contact  with  our  body.  But  why  should 
that  involve  for  the  object  any  unique  privilege  in  the 
way  of  being  now  in  our  mind  ?  Let  us  pause  a  moment 
to  examine  the  meaning  of  presence  to  a  mind. 

There  appear  to  be  two  methods  which  may  help  us 
to  realise  this  meaning.  One  is  the  pushing  of  our  cate- 
gories one  step  up ;  the  consideration  of  the  universe  for 
the  moment  not  as  substance  and  quality  but  as  law  and 
expression.  A  real  thing,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  is  the 
method,  or  necessity,  or  law,  in  a  group  of  events.  The 
laws  of  its  nature  govern  the  behaviour  of  other  objects 
in  relation  to  it  and  our  own  experience  in  respect  of  it. 
The  number  five  is  a  knot  of  such  laws ;  the  constitution 
of  a  country  is  another  more  complex  and  far-reaching 
group ;  a  beech-tree  is  a  third  ;  a  man  is  a  fourth.  Now 
"presence"  under  this  category  can  only  mean  the  actuality 
of  government  by  the  law-group  in  question  ;  a  thing  is 
present  wherever  the  laws  of  its  nature  rule.  The  category 
of  substance  seems  inevitably  to  carry  with  it  some  asso- 
ciation of  restricted  position  in  space  or  time.  A  substance, 
we  feel,  cannot  be  here  if  it  is  somewhere  else ;  it  cannot 
be  now  if  it  was  once  and  has  ceased  to  be.  Therefore  if 
we  cognise  such  a  thing,  we  think,  we  are  cognising  what 
is  away  from  us,  and  our  knowledge  of  it  must  be  round- 
about ;  what  is  present  with  us  cannot  be  the  real  thing 


OF   REALITY   IN   THOUGHT  71 

but  must  be  something  else,  perhaps  an  idea.  But  under 
the  category  of  law  an  object  is  present  wherever  the 
laws  of  its  nature  rule,  and  that  is  the  only  meaning 
which  presence  has.  "  I  see  Birmingham "  means  that 
the  nature  of  Birmingham  is  expressing  itself  in  my  per- 
ceptual experience,  governing  the  happenings  there  ;  and 
the  contemplation  of  a  thing  in  memory,  in  imagination, 
or  in  the  most  elaborate  thought  means  exactly  the  same 
kind  of  fact.  In  all  of  these  that  law  which  is  the  object 
is  there,  for  it  works,  and  there  is  no  other  meaning  for 
the  presence  of  a  law.  Hence  it  is  literally  true  to  say 
that  the  past  or  the  future  can  be  "  present  with  me,"  or 
that  the  friend  I  think  of  has  "  entered  into  my  thought " 
or  has  been  "  much  in  my  mind."  I  can  no  more  think  of 
a  thing  which  is  not  there  within  my  thought  than  I  can 
obey  a  law  which  is  not  obeyed.  What  is  presented  to 
us  in  any  field  is  quite  truly  and  literally  in  our  presence, 
and  what  is  only  presented  in  thought  may  be  "nearer 
than  hands  and  feet." 

The  second  method  is  to  reflect  that  we  really  do  not 
keep  our  minds  inside  our  heads,  or  that,  if  we  do,  at  any 
rate  the  mind's  eye  can  see  through  the  skull.  The 
notion  that  we  have  direct  apprehension  in  sensuous 
experience  only  is  surely,  I  urge,  a  mere  remnant  of  the 
belief  that  the  mind  lives  inside  the  body,  joined  with 
the  undeniable  truth  that  an  external  object's  influence 
can  penetrate  the  body  only  by  stimulating  the  sensory 
nerves.  When  once  we  give  up  this  idea,  what  meaning 
can  there  be  in  "reaching  the  mind"  other  than  simply 
"  being  apprehended "  ?  That  is  present  to  the  mind 
which  is  there  before  it ;  I  can  no  more  think  of  a  thing 
which  is  outside  thought  than  I  can  see  a  thing  which  is 


72          DEFENCE  OF  THE  PRESENTATION 

out  of  sight ;  and  mental  vision  is  not  hindered  by  distance 
in  space  or  time  or  even  by  the  separation  of  its  object 
from  the  world  of  fact.  Or  if  we  use  the  phrase  "  in  the 
mind,"  then  our  mind  is  capable  of  putting  itself  forth  to 
embrace  the  whole  universe. 


Knowledge  Inferred  and   Uninferred. 

Some  of  the  chief  obstacles  in  the  way  of  believing 
that  thought  brings  us  into  contact  with  reality  seem  to 
have  been  found  in  connection  with  inference.  Where 
any  thought-knowledge  has  been  admitted  to  be  uninferred 
it  has  often  been  admitted  also  to  involve  the  real  presence 
and  immediate  vision  of  its  object ;  but  it  has  seemed 
much  harder  to  admit  this  of  inferential  thought.  This 
has  come  about  partly,  I  think,  on  account  of  the  ambiguity 
of  the  phrase  "  immediate  knowledge."  Knowledge  that 
is  non-immediate  in  the  historical  sense  of  having  been 
reached  by  means  of  other  knowledge  was  thought  to  be 
also  non-immediate  in  the  epistemological  sense  of  being 
out  of  touch  with  its  object.  The  other  cause  seems  to 
have  been  the  tendency  to  describe  inference  as  construc- 
tion. Inference,  like  all  apprehension,  is  certainly  an 
act,  and  often  on  account  of  its  difficulty  it  is  an  ener- 
getic and  strenuous  act,  but  still,  like  all  apprehension, 
it  is  a  recipient  or  exploratory  and  not  a  creative  act. 
In  it,  as  in  the  simplest  vision,  I  am  completely  sub- 
missive to  the  reality  that  I  meet  and  do  no  more  than 
trace  the  outlines  which  are  to  be  found  in  it.  This  fact 
is  only  disguised  by  the  way  in  which  the  recipient 
activity  is  continually  helped  and  guided  by  a  separate 
and  exceedingly  interesting  creative  act — the  construction 


OF   REALITY   IN   THOUGHT  73 

of  hypotheses.  Hypotheses  are  nothing  at- all  but  sug- 
gestive pictures  and  guiding  lines,  yet  so  useful  are  they, 
and  so  constantly  do  we  find  reality  projecting  through 
the  picture  we  have  drawn,  that  it  is  hard  for  us  not  to 
suppose  that  picture  and  substance  have  blended  into 
one,  and  so  to  think  that  we  have  partly  constructed  that 
which  in  real  believing  inference,  not  in  hypothesis,  stands 
before  our  eyes. 

Objects  of  Higher  Order. 

A  different  hindrance  has  beset  some  philosophers, 
arising  from  the  tradition  that  what  is  given  must  consist 
only  of  simple  or  "  foundling "  and  never  of  "  founded  " 
contents.  Anything  in  the  way  of  a  relation  or  of  a 
combination  form  has  been  supposed  to  be  contributed  by 
the  apprehending  mind,  and  therefore  to  be  no  part  of 
presented  reality.  Now,  as  we  said,  with  the  question  of 
the  nature  or  of  the  creation  of  reality  we  have  in  this 
book  nothing  to  do  so  far  as  we  can  avoid  it.  It  may  be 
that  the  object  presented  to  us  does  in  some  cases, 
possibly  in  all  cases,  include  in  some  way  a  part  of  our 
own  mind.  Nevertheless  reality  is  able  to  include  that 
mind,  and  such  presentation  would  still  be  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  real.  Whether  or  not  the  founded  content 
exists  by  the  help  of  our  mind,  it  certainly  is  not  created 
by  our  recipient  apprehension  of  it.  It  stands  the  test 
of  reality  in  that  it  behaves  as  real:  in  that  it  stands 
over  against  us  and  dictates  and  is  dictated  to  us  :  in 
that  we  can  reckon  on  it  and  have  to  reckon  with  it. 


74  DEFENCE   OF   THE    PRESENTATION 

Professor  James  on  Conception. 

The  philosophy  last  quoted  has  been  vehemently 
opposed  in  recent  years  by  a  brilliant  champion,  main- 
taining the  immediate  presence  of  the  real  object  in 
contents  of  higher  order.  It  seems  strange  that  this 
champion  should  himself  become  on  yet  another  ground 
the  opponent  of  the  presentation  of  reality  in  thought. 
He  is  still  for  some  reason  so  possessed  by  the  tradition 
of  separating  thought  from  immediate  knowledge,  that,  in 
order  to  preserve  our  power  of  knowing  them  immediately, 
he  seems  disposed  to  hand  all  the  higher-order  contents 
bodily  over  to  sense. 

Radical  Empiricism  asserts,  says  Professor  James, 
"  that  relations  between  things  are  just  as  much  matters 
of  direct  particular  experience  as  the  things  themselves1." 
"The  great  obstacle.  ..is  the  rooted  rationalist  belief  that 
experience  as  immediately  given  is  all  disjunction  and  no 
conjunction,  and  that  to  make  one  world  out  of  this 
separateness,  a  higher  unifying  agency  must  be  there2." 
"  Intellectualistic  critics  of  sensation  insist  that  sensations 
are  disjoined  only.  Radical  empiricists  insist  that  con- 
junctions between  them  are  just  as  immediately  given  as 
disjunctions  are3."  I  am  not  quite  sure  who  the  intel- 
lectualistic  critic  is,  having  failed  to  find  any  statement 
quite  so  bad  as  this  in  the  works  of  the  arch-enemy  Green; 
but  that  does  not  much  matter.  My  own  position  is  as 
follows.  (1)  Relations  of  all  sorts  are  given  as  their  terms 
are  given  ;  in  the  sense  that  when  we  look  for  them  we 
find  them,  that  their  nature  is  fixed  by  no  choice  of  ours, 

1  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  xii,  xiii.  2  Op.  cit.  xiii. 

3  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  280. 


OF    REALITY   IN   THOUGHT  75 

and  that  they  are  objects  presented  to  us.  (2)  They  are 
usually  not  given  quite  so  immediately  in  point  of  time  as 
are  their  terms ;  we  have  to  look  a  little  more  carefully 
into  what  is  before  us.  (3)  When  relations  are  presented, 
whether  they  be  conjunctions  or  disjunctions  or  any  other 
kind,  they  are  presented  not  in  sense  but  in  thought. 
There  is  no  meaning  in  the  distinction  at  all  if  sense  is  to 
be  supposed  capable  of  grasping  these1., 


General  Objectivity  of  Objects  of  Thought. 

On  the  whole  subject,  then,  I  agree  with  Professor 
Alexander2.  "  The  difference  between  what  is  revealed  in 
sense  and  what  is  added  in  interpretation  is  solely  a  matter 
of  the  method  of  the  revelation.  We  are  always  by  one 
method  or  another  seeing  things  themselves." 

It  follows,  to  my  mind,  that  I  must  object  to  the 
other  metaphor  according  to  which  thought  manipulates 
reality,  though  Prof.  Alexander  in  the  same  paper  uses 
it  alternately  with  that  of  sight.  It  follows  in  the  same 
way  that  when  Green  speaks  of  "  what  may  indifferently 
be  called  a  constructive  act  on  the  part  of  the  subject,  or 
a  manifestation  of  itself  on  the  part  of  the  object,"  I 
should  strongly  prefer  the  second  phrase3.  Similarly  I 
should  avoid  Dr  Bosanquet's  description4.  "  ...This  deter- 
minate reality,  which  the  individual  has  constructed  by 
identifying  significant  ideas  with  that  world  of  which 
he  has  assurance  through  his  own  perceptive  experience." 

1  For  further  examination  of  Professor  James'  position  see  appendix 
to  this  chapter. 

2  Arist.  Soc.  1909-10.  »  Green's  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  387. 
4  Logic,  vol.  i.  pp.  3-4. 


76  DEFENCE   OF   THE   PRESENTATION 

"Perception  is  his  point  of  contact  with  reality  as  such." 
It  is  only  with  caution  that  I  should  use  Herr  Rickert's 
very  suggestive  description  of  knowledge  as  obedience  to 
an  imperative ;  caution  being  needed  on  account  of  the 
suggestion  of  "construction"  even  here.  If  we  are  careful 
always  to  think  of  the  imperative  as  "  see  me  thus," 
"  read  me  thus,"  and  not  as  "  make  me  thus,"  the  descrip- 
tion may  be  used  to  excellent  purpose1.  Finally,  there  is 
a  danger  even  in  the  useful  term  "  Vorstellungsproduk- 
tion,"  employed  by  Meinong's  school2.  We  should  all 
agree  that  the  act  of  apprehension  was  "  produced  "  and 
that  the  'founded  object  which  we  apprehend  was  not 
produced  by  the  apprehension  but  founded  in  reality. 
But  I  should  wish  to  make  it  specially  plain  that  the 
content  of  cognition  was  not  produced  either,  since  for 
me  it  is  simply  a  part  of  the  whole  object ;  that  part 
which  in  thought-apprehension  we  come  newly  to  see. 
Our  coming  to  see  it  may  be  mediated ;  our  seeing  it 
is  not. 

The  objects  of  thought,  then,  are  real  objects,  not 
constructed  by  us  but  given  to  us ;  they  are  materials 
and  circumstances;  they  are  "hard"  facts,  which  we 
"face";  in  them  we  meet  with  the  solid  objective  workL 
We  construct  nothing ;  the  effort  required  is  only  that  of 
focussing  and  guiding  our  sight,  and  perhaps  of  seeing  in 
the  dark.  Reality  lies  before  us  on  all  levels  of  presenta- 
tion and  whichever  way  we  look.  If  we  only  see  it 
"  through  a  hole3,"  at  all  events  the  hole  is  nothing  worse 
than  the  pupil  of  our  eye. 

1  Bickert,  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntniss,  p.  66. 

2  E.g.  Ameseder  in  Gegenstandstheorie  und  Psychologic,  p.  487. 
8  Bradley,  Principles  of  Logic,  p.  70. 


OF   REALITY    IN   THOUGHT  77 

Note.  I  may  add  here  once  for  all  that  I  find  no  reason 
to  believe  in  any  kind  of  knowledge  which  would  be 
superior  to  the  presentation  of  reality.  It  has  been  held 
sometimes  that  with  perfect  knowledge  the  object  would 
cease  to  be  presented  to  us  because  it  and  we  had  become 
one.  With  regard  to  this  we  may  find  some  help  again 
in  the  substitution  of  the  category  of  law  for  that  of 
substance.  When  reality  is  looked  upon  as  a  substance, 
odd  associations  of  physical  grasp  and  resistance  and 
strain  seem  to  enter  into  our  thoughts  about  know- 
ledge. We  picture  the  subject  and  object  as  somehow 
interlocking  and  pulling  each  other  close,  and  incline  to 
think  that  for  perfect  knowledge  they  would  have  to 
coalesce  and  become  one.  But  with  the  category  of  law 
this  tendency  vanishes.  The  better  we  know  an  object, 
the  more  elaborately  and  freely  and  variously  do  the  laws 
of  its  nature  express  themselves  in  our  experience,  but 
there  is  no  tendency  for  their  field  of  show  to  come  any 
nearer.  As  the  mists  clear  away,  the  landscape  only 
becomes  more  and  more  evidently  something  which  is  not 
the  spectator ;  and  perfect  knowledge  would  surely  be 
only  a  clearer  apprehension  of  the  presented. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   VII 
PROFESSOR  JAMES  ON  CONCEPTION 

IT  is  related  in  the  biography  of  Clerk  Maxwell  that 
from  early  childhood  his  interest  in  the  mechanism,  the 
"  how,"  of  any  object  was  always  the  first  thing  with  him. 
"  What's  the  go  o'  that  ?  "  he  would  ask  continually.  And 
no  mere  general  answer  would  content  him.  "  What,'* 
he  would  ask,  "  is  the  particular  go  of  it  ? " 

This  is  the  search  for  conceptual  knowledge  in  one  of 
its  simplest  forms,  but  it  provides  a  convenient  symbol 
and  metaphor  for  all  such  search.  The  endeavour  to  con- 
ceive has  usually  been  deemed  an  innocent  habit  in  the 
philosopher,  natural  or  moral,  and  Professor  James's  prohi- 
bition of  the  habit  seems  at  first  sight  like  a  command  to 
the  inquiring  boy,  "  Go  back  and  look  at  the  thing,  but 
refrain  from  thinking  about  it."  Why  are  we  to  be  snubbed 
in  this  way  ?  I  can  not  help  thinking  that  Professor  James 
is  misled,  for  one  thing,  by  his  own  matchless  power  of 
metaphor. 

It  is  seldom  fair  to  cross-question  metaphors,  and 
Professor  James's  are  so  vivid  and  delightful  that  one  is 
not  tempted  to  cross-question  except  when,  as  in  the 
present  case,  they  lead  us  to  quite  specially  inconvenient 
results.  But  when  the  inconvenience  makes  one  look  back, 
his  conception-metaphors  seem  to  me  to  be  really  puzzling 
from  the  first.  We  "  lay  hold  of  our  experiences  by " 
concepts,  he  says  ;  we  string  reality  on  them ;  they  are 
extracted  samples,  or  photographs.  "To  understand  life 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   VII  79 

by  concepts  is  to  arrest  its  movement,  cutting  it  up  into 
bits  as  with  scissors1."  I  can  only  say  that  I  don't  think  I 
do  anything  of  the  sort,  and  I  don't  see  how  it  is  done* 
"  Concept "  must  mean  either  an  act  of  conceiving  or  a 
content  conceived.  For  me,  the  first  is  a  process  or  event, 
and  therefore  neither  a  string  nor  a  pair  of  pincers.  The 
second  is  an  element  in  presented  reality,  and  that  again 
is  not  a  string,  but  a  current  or  a  nerve — a  real  thing 
seen. 

It  is  ill  to  contend  in  metaphors  with  a  master  of 
metaphor ;  yet  my  way  of  expressing  the  facts  surely 
avoids  the  difficulties  of  the  other  way,  and  therefore 
suggests  that  they  are  difficulties  of  allegory  only.  In  my 
account,  sensation  gives  us  our  first  and  most  elementary 
seeing  or  feeling  of  the  experience-stream.  The  rest — 
perception  and  conception  and  their  like — are  u  seeing 
what,"  "  seeing  how,"  "  seeing  into  " ;  they  are  the  unfold- 
ing of  the  bud ;  the  epiphany  of  the  rainbow  in  the  heart 
of  the  sunshine.  The  first  shimmer  of  the  stream's  surface 
grows  as  we  look  at  it  into  the  crumpled  silver  tissue  of 
crossing  ripples  and  patterned  gleams,  and  deepens  into 
levels  whence  bubbles  rise,  and  undercurrents  that  crease 
the  surface  above  and  stir  the  sand  below,  and  all  "  the 
light  and  sound  and  darkness"  of  the  stream's  heart.  This 
it  is  to  conceive.  We  come  to  see  not  only  the  glint  of  the 
stream,  but  the  make  of  it, "  the  go  of  it."  And  I  no  more 
substitute  my  concepts  for  sense-reality  than  I  substitute 
the  undercurrents  or  the  shaping  bed  for  the  flash  of  the 
surface.  Nor  do  I  ever  assert  that  either  alone  can  give, 
the  whole  truth. 

1  The  Hibbert  Journal,  April,  1909,  p.  568. 


80  PROFESSOR  JAMES   ON    CONCEPTION 

I  have  two  quarrels  with  Professor  James's  moral  of 
"  back  to  sense." 

1.  If  words  are  to  have  any  ordinary  meaning,  he  is 
surely  attributing  to  sense-experience  a  richness  which 
it  cannot  have  till  thought  supervenes.  It  is  after  all 
literally  true,  as  Mill  and  Berkeley  teach  us,  that  with  the 
eyes  of  our  body  we  can  not  see  a  man,  nor  a  stream 
either.  We  are  so  much  used  to  extending  the  meaning 
of  "  sight "  that  perhaps  illustration  from  touch  and  hear- 
ing will  impress  the  truth  better.  Think  of  the  poverty 
and  barrenness  of  a  succession  of  touches  in  the  dark, 
which  we  can  not  read  off,  or  interpret,  or  recognise.  Or 
think  of  the  ear  assailed  by  a  continuous  meaningless 
clash  of  instruments.  The  listener's  "  whole  experience  " 
is  altered,  we  say  carelessly,  when  he  realises  at  last  that 
five  familiar  tunes  are  being  played  at  once.  Perhaps  it 
is,  but  "sensation"  is  just  our  name  for  the  element  which 
is  supposed  unaltered.  In  so  far  as  the  experience  changes, 
it  is  something  more  than  sense.  Relations,  says  Professor 
James,  are  "just  as  integral  members  of  the  sensational 
flux  as  terms  are1."  True,  for  neither  terms  nor  relations, 
neither  notes  nor  tunes,  were  "  given  "  us  in  that  clash  and 
blare.  They  were  there  for  the  finding,  but  it  was  not 
sensation  that  could  find  them.  What  is  secret  in  sense 
gives  up  its  secrets  in  thought.  "  Intellectual istic  writers 
on  sensation  insist  that  sensations  are  disjoined  only. 
Radical  empiricism  insists  that  conjunctions  between 
them  are  just  as  immediately  given  as  disjunctions  are'2." 
Both  are  '  immediately  "  given,  I  agree,  but  not  in  sense. 
Confined  to  sense,  we  know  sensations  neither  as  disjoined 

1  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  279. 

2  Op.  cit.  p.  280. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER  VII  81 

nor  as  conjoined.  Such  terms  and  such  relations  are  re- 
vealed when  we  open  our  eyes  wide  enough  to  see  them. 
"  Pure  sensation,"  for  such  a  writer  as  Green1,  is  surely  the 
unreachable  limiting  case  of  experience  accepted  without 
any  inspection  ;  with  our  eyes  narrowed  to  a  thread's 
width ;  with  the  given  confined  to  the  one  field  and  for- 
bidden to  expand  or  reveal  itself  in  other  fields.  Hence 
we  have  neither  "  One,  and  then  two,  and  then  three,"  nor 
yet  "  one,  with  two  and  three,"  but  only  "  one,  one,  one," 
each  forgotten  as  it  passes ;  or  rather  it  is  "  thus,  thus, 
thus  "  ;  or,  still  more,  it  is  "  thu-u-u-u-s-s-s-s — "  to  the  end 
of  the  chapter.  It  is  a  buzzing  which  must  not  expand 
into  "  bee." 

2.  "  The  immediate  feeling  of  life  solves  the  problems 
which  so  baffled  our  conceptual  intelligence2."  Not  at  all ; 
it  sets  them.  Let  us  grant  to  Professor  James  that  in  one 
sense  of  the  word  we  are  "  given  "  all  sorts  of  things  as 
"  integral  members  of  the  sensational  flux,"  just  as  we 
are  given  Mr  Chamberlain  in  a  puzzle  picture;  still  the 
problem  is  to  find  them.  We  have  experience  folded ;  the 
problem  is  to  unfold  it.  The  "  feeling  "  gives  us  the  going 
thing;  conceptual  intelligence  seeks  for  the  go  of  it.  The 
stream  runs  and  shines  ;  but  what  is  that  running  ?  How 
do  the  currents  turn  and  cross  and  enfold  one  another  ? 
It  shines,  but  what  is  in  the  shine  and  the  blue  ? 

It  would  appear  that  in  this  matter  Professor  James  has 
misunderstood  Mr  Bradley '&  complaints.  Mr  Bradley,  I 

1  I  agree  with  Professor  James  in  objecting  to  Green's  speaking  as  if 
our  own  "  combining  thought  "  created  relations  instead  of  finding  them ; 
as  if  it  "did  something"  to  sense  experience,  instead  of  finding  in  it  what 
sense  cannot  find. 

2  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  260.     The  Hibbert  Journal,  p.  574. 

w.  6 


82        PROFESSOR  JAMES  ON  CONCEPTION 

take  it,  stands  with  us  by  the  stream  of  experience,  and  we 
indicate  to  him  certain  elements,  and  movements,  and 
directions,  and  eddies,  which  we  seem  to  make  out  in  its 
flow.  "  Such  and  such  relations,  such  and  such  attributes  ; 
such  natures  of  time  and  space."  Mr.  Bradley's  comment 
is,  "  A  very  slovenly  piece  of  work.  If  those  two  currents 
are  on  one  level,  as  you  say,  how  can  their  crossing  look 
like  that  ?  How  can  the  eddy  you  trace  in  that  corner 
throw  such  a  shadow  on  the  sand  ?  Your  scheme  is  right 
in  its  main  lines,  perhaps,  but  in  some  ways  it  is  shame- 
fully scamped  and  muddled.  You  must  learn  to  see  better 
than  this."  To  which  Professor  James  replies,  "  But  the 
stream  does  run." 

None  of  us,  surely,  are  denying  the  fact  of  experience. 
The  instruments,  we  all  admit,  are  blaring  in  our  ears. 
We,  common-sense  philosophers,  have  resolved  the  noise 
fairly  satisfactorily  to  ourselves,  into  our  five  familiar  tunes. 
Then  comes  Mr  Bradley  to  torment  us.  "Are  you  sure," 
he  says,  "  that  these  are  really  the  tunes  you  hear  ?  It 
occurs  to  me  that  not  one  of  them  can  be  exactly  as  you 
maintain.  How  can  this  and  that  conjunction  come  in  ? 
How  can  this  particular  dissonance  possibly  be  rendered 
in  that  way?  Are  you  right  in  reading  it  as  five  tunes 
at  all  ? "  When  we  are  thoroughly  bewildered  with  this 
teasing,  Professor  James  comes  to  reassure  us ;  and  he 
says,  "  Thought  finds  impossibility  in  tasks  which  sense- 
experience  easily  performs1."  "With  a  world  of  particu- 
lars, given  in  loveliest  union — the  '  how '  of  which  you 
'understand'  as  soon  as  you  see  the  fact  of  them,  for  there 
is  no  how  except  the  constitution  of  the  fact  as  given — 
he  asks  for  some  ineffable  union  which,  if  he  gained  it, 
1  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  256. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   VII  83 

would  only  be  a  duplicate  of  what  he  has  already  in  his 
full  possession1."  "  Never  mind  the  tunes  ;  there  is  a  great 
deal  of  noise  going  on." 

One  must  confess  that  Mr  Bradley  exposes  himself 
rather  recklessly  to  having  his  point  missed,  on  account  of 
the  unexpectedness  of  his  transition  from  "  appearance  " 
to  "reality."  We  know  how  in  a  sunny  brook  the  eddies 
cast  trembling  but  stationary  shadows  on  the  sand  at  the 
bottom ;  and  it  is  often  easier  to  see  the  shadow  than  to 
find  the  knot  or  crumple  which  is  the  eddy  itself — much 
easier  than  it  is  to  see  the  run  of  the  water  in  the  knot. 
Now  Mr  Bradley,  after  tormenting  us  about  our  careless 
reading  of  the  make-up  of  the  brook,  quite  suddenly  gives 
up  any  attempt  to  help  us  with  it,  and  drops  down  to  this 
fixed  shadow-scheme  at  the  bottom.  "  Somehow,"  he  says, 
"to  cast  these  shadows,  the  real  water-currents  must  be 
thus  and  thus,  though  we  cannot  see  how  they  manage 
it."  But  the  spectator,  seeing  the  speaker's  eyes  so 
abruptly  turned  from  the  body  of  the  stream  to  its  bed, 
concludes  that  in  Mr  Bradley's  opinion  the  stream  does 
not  exist.  "  For  this  philosopher,"  he  concludes,  "  there 
is  only  the  surface  and  the  bed  ;  appearance  and  reality ; 
a  fleeting  veil  of  gleams  above  a  stretch  of  patterned 
sand." 

There  are  three  truths  and  three  corresponding  false- 
hoods in  Professor  James's  texts,  and  every  one  of  them 
can,  with  a  little  straining  of  the  reader's  eyes,  be  found 
in  the  works  of  Mr.  Bradley. 

(a)  "  Do  not,"  says  Professor  James,  "  condemn  reality 
as  soon  as  you  find  difficulty  in  seeing  how  it  works.     Be 
modest,  and  doubt  whether  you  have  seen  rightly."     This 
1  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  369. 

6—2 


84        PROFESSOR  JAMES  ON  CONCEPTION 

is  a  gentle  statement  of  Mr  Bradley 's  judgment,  which  is, 
"  Your  seeing  is  that  of  a  sloppy-minded  imbecile."  They 
join  in  condemning  our  poor  attempts  at  interpretation. 
"Dried  specimens";  "bits  cut  with  scissors,"  says  Professor 
James;  "an  unearthly  ballet  of  bloodless  categories1";  "a 
spectral  woof  of  impalpable  abstractions,"  says  Mr  Bradley. 
True  it  is  that  we  must  be  modest ;  the  falsehood  lies  in 
denying  that  we  have  reached  any  reality  at  all. 

(b)  Professor  James  says :  "Get  full  data."    "  The  only 
way  in  which  to  apprehend  reality's  thickness  is  either  to 
experience  it  directly  by  being  a  part  of  reality  oneself,  or 
to   evoke  it  in  imagination  by  sympathetically  divining 
some  one  else's  inner  life2."      "  If  you  are  to  make  out 
the  tunes  rightly,  you  must  open  your  ears  to  the  whole 
volume  of  sound."     True,  and  most  valuable.     The  false- 
hood only  comes  when  he  tries  to  maintain  that  the  data 
are  the  solution ;  that  to  see  the  stream  is  to  see  its  make, 
and  to   hear  the  noise  is  to  hear  the  tunes.      In  being 
myself  I  get  my  own  experience  in  full,  but  how  closely  it 
is  often  folded,  how  undiscovered  are  its  treasures,  how 
little  of  its  thickness  do  I  apprehend !     How  seldom,  in 
short,  can  I  see  the  go  of  it  and  of  me.     Mr  Bradley's 
share  in  this  truth  is  obvious.     His  share  in  the  falsehood 
is,  I  think,  more  seeming  than  real,  but  those  accuse  him 
of  it  who  object  to  his  "  it  must  be  and  can  be,  therefore 
it  is."    This,  they  say  rightly,  but  I  believe  irrelevantly,  is 
no  sufficient  answer  to  "  how  is  it  ?  " 

(c)  "  Here,  then,  inside  of  the  minimal  pulses  of  ex- 
perience, is  realised  that  very  inner  complexity  which  the 
transcend  en  talist   says  only  the  absolute  can  genuinely 

1  Logic,  p.  533. 

2  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  250,  251.     The  Hibbert  Journal,  p.  571. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTER   VII  85 

possess1."  This  is  exactly  what  Mr  Bradley  says  about 
feeling2,'  and  the  truth  and  the  danger  are  the  same  in 
both.  Only  Professor  James  seems  to  me  to  make  the 
mistake  which  Mr  Bradley  is  only  accused  of  making ;  a 
failure  to  distinguish  sufficiently  between  the  folded  and 
the  unfolded  unity. 

Professor  James  returns  to  feeling  in  petulance,  Mr 
Bradley  in  despondency.  "  These  matters  are  too  high 
for  us,"  the  latter  writer  seems  to  say  now  and  then.  "All 
our  guesses  are  wrong;  we  cannot  see  how  things  are;  let 
us  cling  to  our  knowledge  that  they  are.  Truth  beyond 
this  seems  unattainable."  This  has  usually  been  put  down 
to  Mr  Bradley's  agnosticism.  Would  it  be  unjust  to  take 
the  other  position  as  a  result  of  too  violent  pragmatism  ? 
"We  make  truth.  We  make  it  very  badly  and  with 
difficulty.  Let  us  give  up  making  it." 

I  have  tried  to  write  from  the  standpoint  of  those  who 
conceive  that  reality  does  not  wait  for  our  thinking  to 
make  it,  but  that  the  discovery  of  reality  does;  that  some 
discoveries  can  be  made ;  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  philo- 
sophers to  go  on  trying  to  make  them.  And  in  spite  of 
everything  this  is  presumably  the  real  standpoint  of  all 
of  us. 

1  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  284. 

2  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  520 — 522. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ILLUSTRATIVE  AND  ADDITIONAL:    THE  APPRE- 
HENSION   OF  FEELING 

LET  us  conclude  the  first  part  of  this  essay  with  a 
chapter  somewhat  out  of  the  main  line  of  thought,  and 
repeating  in  a  different  and  independent  way  various 
arguments  and  dogmas  which  have  been  touched  on 
before.  A  digression  of  this  sort  may  perhaps  serve  to 
illustrate  the  concrete  application  of  the  method  hitherto 
used,  and  to  show  certain  consequences  which  appear  to 
follow  from  the  theory  of  knowledge  which  I  have  tried 
to  set  forth.  This  chapter  will  therefore  consist  of  a 
self-contained  essay  on  one  of  the  current  problems  of 
philosophy — that  of  the  possibility  of  apprehending  our 
own  feeling. 

This  is  not  the  place  for  propounding  or  establishing 
a  complete  psychology  of  feeling,  and  I  must  therefore 
only  explain  quite  briefly  what  my  opinion  of  its  nature 
is.  We  have  used  in  this  essay  from  the  beginning  the 
twofold  and  not  the  threefold  division  of  mental  process, 
treating  conation-experience  and  feeling-experience  as  if 
they  were  related  to  each  other  far  more  closely  than 
either  of  them  to  presentation.  The  doctrine  I  have 
assumed  is  practically  the  same  as  that  set  forth  by  Lipps 


THE   APPREHENSION   OF   FEELIN&  87 

in  his  latest  edition  of  Fuhlen,  Wollen,  und  Denken.  That 
is,  I  have  assumed  that  the  complement  to  presentative 
experience  is  the  experience  of  activity,  of  striving.  All 
feeling  is  activity-feeling,  but  toned  in  many  ways — 
toned  pleasantly  or  unpleasantly  for  instance.  The  matter 
of  names  is  not  important,  and  it  might  be  preferable  in 
some  ways  to  describe  the  fundamental  experience  as 
conative,  reserving  the  title  of  feeling  for  what  Lipps  calls 
the  colouring  or  tone-quality1.  But  in  the  present  chapter 
I  shall  generally  use  feeling  as  a  short  expression  for  the 
whole  subjective  side  of  our  life. 

A.     The  Knowledge  of  Present  Feeling. 

On  the  subject  of  our  knowledge  of  present  feeling 
I  have  little  to  say,  and  nothing  new;  and  I  am  sorry  to 
admit  that  the  little  which  I  have  brings  me  once  more 
into  disagreement,  or  apparent  disagreement,  with  Dr Stout. 
This  great  psychologist  believes,  as  I  cannot  believe,  that 
feeling  which  is  present  is  ipso  facto  known.  For  him,  it 
will  be  remembered,  sensational  experience,  though  cog- 
nitive, is  not  the  apprehension  of  any  object ;  hence,  being 
provided  with  at  least  one  example  of  a  cognition  which 
is  not  apprehension,  he  is  not  impeded  by  the  ordinary 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  psychologist  who  has  to  claim 
a  knowledge  of  present  activity  in  a  sense  that  would 
make  a  cognition  apprehend  itself  as  its  own  object. 
Dr  Stout  quotes  Professor  Ward  as  saying  that  you  might 
as  well  suppose  a  man  to  put  himself  in  a  basket  and 
carry  himself.  But  his  own  point  of  view  enables  him  to 

1  This,  I  think,  would  make  the  doctrine  consistent  with  Dr  Stout's. 
See  his  article  in  The  British  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  n.  See  on  the 
same  subject  Urban's  Valuation,  pp.  85 — 95. 


88  ILLUSTRATIVE   AND   ADDITIONAL: 

avoid  this  difficulty.  "  I  should  say  that  a  cognition 
knows  itself  against  its  object  by  a  reflective  process." 
"  It  seems  to  be  an  all-pervading  fact  of  ordinary  expe- 
rience that  the  knowing  consciousness  is,  however  indis- 
tinctly, aware  of  itself.  In  being  aware  of  an  object  we 
are  aware  of  it  as  something  known,  and  eo  ipso  we  are 
aware  of  the  correlative  knowing.... When  we  desire  any- 
thing, we  are  aware  of  it  as  desired ;  it  has  a  qualification 
which  is  absent  in  the  case  of  an  object  which  we  do  not 
desire.1 " 

My  difficulty  here  is  in  the  first  place  of  course  that 
on  general  grounds  I  believe  knowledge  to  consist  in 
apprehension,  and  that  therefore  Dr  Ward's  difficulty  lies 
directly  in  my  way  and  is  insuperable.  In  the  second 
place,  it  is  that  in  the  appeal  to  ordinary  experience 
I  cannot  find  enough  to  make  me  alter  my  general  view. 
It  is  said  that  we  know  our  desire,  but  it  seems  to  me 
that  such  knowing  is  a  reflective  act,  and  that  the  primary 
process  is  simply  to  know-and- desire,  to  desire  the  known. 
Similarly  in  cognition,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  we  cognise 
what  we  apprehend,  but  not,  in  that  same  act,  the  act  of 
apprehending  itself.  I  would  suggest  that  there  may  be 
a  certain  danger  (of  course  not  for  Dr  Stout  himself)  in 
the  ambiguity  of  the  phrase  "  conscious  process."  When 
this  name  is  applied  to  a  bodily  event  it  implies  that  the 
event  is  known,  that  it  is  presented  in  sensation ;  but 
when  it  is  applied  to  a  mental  event  "conscious"  seems 
to  be  the  mere  equivalent  of  "  mental."  That  is,  we  use 
"  conscious  process "  indifferently  to  mean  "  process  of 
consciousness"  and  "process  presented  in  consciousness," 
and  we  must  not  argue  from  one  meaning  to  the  other. 
1  Arist.  Soc.  1905-6,  p.  371. 


THE   APPREHENSION   OF   FEELING  89 

I  hold  then  that  present  feeling  is  not  in  the  ordinary 
meaning  known.  Nevertheless  I  consider  that  in  another 
sense  it  can  be  partly  known,  even  while  it  still  exists. 
What  this  knowledge  is  will  become  clear  in  the  course  of 
the  examination  of  the  second  part  of  our  subject,  the 
apprehension  of  past  feeling. 

B.     The  Knowledge  of  Past  Feeling. 

If  we  take  a  first  general  glance  at  the  subject  the 
arguments  which  strike  us  seem  to  be  two. 

(a)  At  first  sight  we  are,  I  think,  inclined  to  say 
that  we  can  remember  our  feelings.  I  remember  a  day 
at  school  when  I  was  extremely  happy,  and  I  certainly 
seem  to  remember  the  happiness.  "  Do  you  not,"  it  may 
be  said,  "  perhaps  remember  the  cause,  and  the  attendant 
cognitions,  and  so  infer,  not  remember,  that  you  were 
happy?"  The  cause  was  and  is  entirely  unknown  to  me; 
the  mood  came  unexplained.  The  attendant  circum- 
stances were  London  streets,  a  fresh  wind,  and  grey  roofs 
shining  in  grey  light  after  rain.  There  were  organic 
sensations,  I  suppose,  but  I  cannot  say  that  I  remember 
them.  The  happiness  certainly  seems  at  first  sight  not 
to  be  inferred  but  to  be  directly  remembered. 

Against  this  argument  that  we  can  remember  feelings 
two  different  objections  have  been  brought.  One  is, 
"  This  is  not  a  remembrance,  a  presentation  of  feeling  ;  it 
is  a  revival.  You  put  yourself  in  the  old  position,  and 
are  again  glad."  The  other  is,  "You  do  not  remember 
the  happiness ;  you  only  remember  that  you  were  happy." 
Both  of  these  must  be  returned  to  later  on. 

(/3)     The  second  argument  which  occurs  to  us  is  a  logical 


90  ILLUSTRATIVE   AND  ADDITIONAL  : 

deduction  from  the  fact  of  our  present  investigation.  "  Here 
are  we  examining,  judging,  and  investigating  feeling.  How 
can  it  be  said  that  we  do  not  know  it  ?  If  we  judge,  we 
must  at  least  apprehend.  Again,  we  can  desire  feelings  and 
expect  them,  and  be  pleased  or  vexed  with  ourselves  for 
having  them.  In  all  these  cases  is  not  feeling  the  object 
of  our  apprehension  ? " 

The  objection  brought  against  this  argument  is, 
"  This  is  not  knowing,  but  knowing  about.  You  do  not 
apprehend  your  feelings,  but  only  that  you  did  or  will 
feel." 

This  answer  evidently  has  the  same  sort  of  purport  as 
the  former  statement  that  "we  do  not  remember  happiness, 
but  only  remember  that  we  were  happy."  It  is  certainly 
very  difficult  sometimes  to  know  what  exactly  we  mean 
when  we  say  that  we  remember.  It  will  be  wisest  then 
to  examine  in  the  next  place  a  few  of  the  different  things 
that  remembering  may  mean.  Or  rather,  not  to  tie 
ourselves  to  words,  we  will  examine  what  we  can  do  with 
a  past  process. 

i.  The  simplest  thing  to  do  with  a  past  process  is  to 
repeat  it.  I  can  submit  myself  again  to  a  sensation ;  can 
go  again  through  the  arguments  for  my  beliefs ;  can  repeat 
to  myself  the  poem  which  I  learnt.  We  certainly  use  the 
word  "remember"  with  this  meaning  sometimes.  We  say 
not  only,  "Do  you  remember  that  poem?"  meaning  "Can 
you  repeat  it";  but,  in  the  same  sense,  "Can  you  remember 
it  ? "  This  of  course  is  the  simplest  thing  to  do  with  feeling. 
I  can  easily  be  happy  again  at  the  renewed  thought  of  a 
piece  of  good  fortune;  can  revive  my  anger  at  an  old 
injury.  It  is  possible  that  sometimes  when  we  speak 


THE  APPREHENSION  OF  FEELING         91 

of  remembering  feeling  we  mean  only  this.  "Feeling- 
memory"  in  the  sense  of  habit  of  feeling  comes  under 
this  account.  A  cat  of  my  acquaintance,  having  once 
caught  his  leg  in  a  watch-chain  and  swung  by  it  in  the 
air,  swore  softly  with  a  true  revival  of  feeling  whenever 
he  met  the  watch-chain  afterwards. 

ii.  Next,  there  is  another  thing  we  can  do  with  a 
past  process.  We  can,  without  really  repeating  it,  play 
at  repeating  it.  When  I  cannot  look  at  the  blue  sky, 
I  may  image  it.  Instead  of  playing  on  the  violin  the 
tune  I  played  just  now,  I  may  go  over  it  in  my  head. 
When  I  have  ceased  to  believe  in  the  premises  of  my  old 
faith,  I  may  still  go  over  the  arguments  that  followed. 
Without  reviving  my  belief,  I  may  still  recall  it.  Where 
I  no  longer  know,  I  may  still  assume.  I  may  project 
myself  back  into  the  old  place1. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  chapters  in  recent 
psychology  is  that  which  works  out  the  similar  process 
on  the  side  of  feeling.  As  I  recall  my  sight  of  past 
snows,  my  belief  in  a  lost  leader,  so  can  I  recall  the 
feelings  which  accompanied  them,  and  in  all  these  cases 
to  recall  is  not  to  revive.  As  I  can  act  through  to  myself 
a  scene  of  youth  in  which  I  heard  that  I  had  failed  in  an 
examination,  so  can  I  call  up  the  dull  misery  of  the  hour 
— can  feel  it  in  play  as  I  hear  the  announcement  in  play. 
Since  I  know  that  this  failure,  by  affecting  my  plans, 
really  laid  the  foundation  of  future  success,  I  am  far  from 

1  Of.  Professor  Alexander  in  Proc.  Aristotelian  Soc.  1908-9.  "Suppose 
...I  am  remembering  an  event  as  happening  to  myself.... The  past  object 
is  before  my  mind,  but  it  is  not  present.  But  my  past  self  is  present.  It 
is  an  extension  backwards  of  myself. ...We  find  just  what  we  should 
expect  to  find  if  we  understood  mental  events  to  be  mere  directions  of 
consciousness.  A  past  direction  is  a  present  consciousness." 


92  ILLUSTRATIVE   AND   ADDITIONAL: 

being  miserable  about  it  now.  In  the  same  way  I  can 
share  every  sorrow  of  a  hero  of  tragedy  in  the  course  of  a 
uniformly  pleasant  evening. 

This,  I  think,  is  very  often  what  we  mean  when  we 
speak  of  remembering  feelings  ;  and  the  failure  to  recog- 
nise the  existence  of  these  fancy- feelings  has  been  the 
source  of  many  of  our  difficulties  of  theory.  For  most 
people  this  way  of  remembering  is  easy  enough — easier 
probably  than  imaging  past  organic  sensations.  We  have 
only  been  induced  to  believe  that  we  cannot  recall  feeling 
because  we  have  disbelieved  a  priori  in  a  recall  distinct 
from  revival.  Whenever  we  succeeded  in  the  easy  task 
of  play-feeling  we  have  thought  that  we  must  be  having 
the  real  feelings  again1. 

Now,  have  we  here  a  case  of  apprehending  past  feel- 
ing ?  When  I  first  met  with  this  chapter  of  psychology 
I  thought  we  had.  Now  I  am  fairly  sure  that  we  have 
not. 

German  descriptions  are  obscure  on  this  point  by 
reason  of  their  use  of  the  same  word,  Vorstellung,  for 
image  and  for  presentation.  Hofler2,  taking  his  account 
of  fancy- feelings  from  an  article  of  Witasek's,  makes  no 

1  Cf.  Professor  Alexander,  Proc.  Aristotelian  Soc.  1908-9,  pp.  35,  36. 
"Before  it  can  be  established  that  we  have  emotional  or  feeling  memory 
we  must  show  that  we  are  not  merely  remembering  the  bodily  accompani- 
ments, or  the  attendant  circumstances,  or  the  provoking  object,  of  a  past 
emotion,  and  so  reviving  that  emotion.... We  feel  our  present  self  ex- 
tending backwards  to  the  remembered  event,  and  the  pleasurable  tinge  in 
this  experience  is  the  ideal  pleasure.    It  is  quite  distinguishable  from  the 
pleasure  that  we  feel  in  the  same  object  when  actually  present.... It  is  a 
pleasure  ideally  present,  referred  to  the  past  of  myself,  which  past  is 
called  up   by  the   memory  of  the  external  conditions  under  which  it 
occurred." 

2  Psychologie,  pp.  209,  210. 


THE  APPREHENSION   OF   FEELING  93 

distinction  between  this  sense  of  having  feelings  vorge- 
siellt  and  the  sense  in  which  the  psychologist  has  processes 
vorgestellt  when  he  examines  them  as  objects.  Witasek1 
himself  seems  to  take  the  fancy-feelings  as  presented. 
But  Meinong2,  still  referring  to  Witasek,  takes  them  as 
analogous  on  the  feeling  side  to  assumptions  on  the 
knowledge  side,  and  therefore  as  being  still  of  the  nature 
of  feeling,  and  not  objects  of  knowledge.  In  Meinong's 
account,  that  is,  they  are  not  presentations  but  true 
feeling-images. 

I  have  little  doubt  myself  that  Meinong's  treatment 
is  right.  The  Scheingefuhle  are  still  feelings,  though  not 
"actual"  feelings,  not  feelings-in-earnest,  just  as  assump- 
tions are  still  cognitive  though  they  are  not  real  beliefs. 
We  are  not  here  apprehending  our  past  feelings.  We  are 
only  playing  at  feeling  them  over  again. 

So  far  as  we  have  gone,  Dr  Ward's  objection  to  all 
presentation  of  feeling  still  holds3.  It  is  true  that  what 
is  not  originally  presentation  cannot  be  made  presentation 
by  being  repeated,  in  earnest  or  in  play.  The  question 
is,  then,  whether  we  can  do  anything  with  a  past  process 
except  do  it  again.  Is  there  such  a  thing  as  contem- 
plation apart  from,  or  over  and  above,  repetition  ?  We 
shall  find  that  our  attempt  to  answer  this  question  involves 
the  answer  to  the  second  of  the  two  objections  from  which 
we  started,  in  that  it  obliges  us  to  think  out  the  connec- 
tion between  knowing  and  knowing-about. 

1  Z.  f.  Psych.,  1901.     Zur  psychologischen  Analyse  der  dsthetischen 
Einfiihlung.    In  his  more  recent  work  on  aesthetics  Witasek  takes  fancy- 
feelings  to  be  ordinary  feelings  based  on  assumptions  instead  of  on 
judgments. 

2  Ueber  Annahmen. 

3  Ency.  Brit.,  first  article  on  Psychology,  p.  44b. 


94  ILLUSTRATIVE   AND   ADDITIONAL: 

iii.  Suppose  that  I  see,  on  the  dress  of  a  saint  in  a 
stained  glass  window,  a  border  of  a  peculiar  shade  of  rose. 
I  can,  first,  repeat  this  seeing  by  going  to  the  church 
again.  Secondly,  without  going  to  the  church,  I  may 
visualise  the  tint.  Thirdly,  I  may  do  more.  I  may 
remark  to  myself  on  the  unusual  nature  of  the  colour. 
I  may  reflect  that  it  occurred  only  in  one  other  window 
of  the  church's  magnificent  series  of  ancient  glass,  and 
that  I  do  not  remember  having  seen  it  in  any  other 
church.  I  may  wonder  what  particular  process  was  used 
to  produce  it;  may  judge  it  to  be  a  shade  or  two  paler 
than  a  La  France  rose ;  may  notice  its  rare  harmony  with 
the  other  colours  in  the  window,  and  think  it  gives  a 
tenderness  and  unexpected  delicacy  to  the  whole  picture 
which  could  not  be  otherwise  attained.  In  all  these 
judgments  I  am  apprehending  that  piece  of  colour  which 
is  their  subject;  and  in  all  of  them  I  am  doing  something 
more  than  merely  repeat  the  process  in  which  I  appre- 
hended it  before. 

Suppose  that  I  have  been  taught  in  childhood  a 
certain  account  of  the  history  of  this  saint.  I  may  go 
over  it  now  in  undisturbed  faith.  Or,  if  faith  has  dis- 
appeared, I  may  still  go  over  the  story  as  a  story,  without 
altering  a  detail.  Thirdly,  I  may  compare  it  with  the 
histories  of  other  saints,  Christian  and  heathen.  I  may 
judge  it  to  be  beautiful,  to  be  useful  in  education,  to  be 
fit  to  be  taught  as  a  parable  if  not  as  literal  truth.  I  may 
form  theories  as  to  the  way  in  which  it  arose.  In  all 
these  thoughts  I  am  apprehending  in  a  new  way  the 
story  which  I  used  to  believe  and  may  still  assume.  This 
new  apprehension  is  neither  belief  in  the  story  nor  assump- 
tion of  it ;  but  it  is  real  apprehension  nevertheless. 


THE  APPREHENSION   OF   FEELING  95 

Finally,  take  my  childhood's  feelings  towards  this 
saint.  If  my  faith  has  been  retained  I  may  revive  them 
now,  or  something  near  them  ;  or  by  self-suggestion,  even 
if  my  faith  has  been  shaken,  I  may  manage  to  repeat 
them.  If  I  prefer  it,  I  may  without  any  illusion  still 
play  at  taking  the  old  place,  still  feel  my  old  devotion  in 
image  though  not  in  actuality.  Thirdly,  I  may  use 
contemplation  other  than  repetition.  I  may  estimate  the 
value  of  these  feelings  in  moral  and  religious  develop- 
ment. I  may  note  the  history  of  their  growth  and  decline, 
the  way  in  which  surroundings  and  interests  helped  them 
or  hindered.  I  may  see  what  they  rested  on ;  remember 
the  commonness  of  such  feelings  in  the  young.  In  all 
these  judgments  I  apprehend  their  subject.  In  knowing 
these  things  I  know  feeling.  This  is  the  true  apprehen- 
sion of  past  feeling.  But  further  commentary  is  needed. 

In  examining  this  whole  question  of  the  know- 
ledge of  feeling  I  was  troubled  by  the  apparent  self- 
contradictoriness  of  the  statement,  "Feeling  cannot  be 
apprehended."  How,  I  asked,  could  one  make  a  judg- 
ment without  apprehending  its  subject  ?  How  could  one 
think  about  a  thing  without  thinking  of  it  ?  The  last 
section  has  shown  that  I  still  maintain  this  objection. 
But  I  think  now  that  the  original  statement,  if  carefully 
expressed,  may  be  maintained  as  well.  To  examine  this, 
let  us  as  before  leave  the  controversial  ground  of  feeling 
and  deal  first  with  objects  cognised. 

(a)   Take  first  my  tint  of  rose-colour1.   I  can  apprehend 

1  It  will  be  just  the  same  if  I  take,  e.g.  a  movement  sensation,  which 
in  popular  language  "only  exists  at  the  moment  of  sensing."  I  have  not 


96  ILLUSTRATIVE  AND  ADDITIONAL: 

it  in  image  and  sensation.  I  can  also  apprehend  it  in 
thought,  as  produced  in  the  fifteenth  century,  as  similar 
to  the  La  France  roses  outside,  yet  not  like  them  destined 
to  fade ;  as  connected  with  certain  ether- vibrations ;  as  a 
glory  to  the  church.  All  this  is  real  apprehension.  I 
know  the  tint,  not  know  about  it.  Yet  it  remains  true 
that  a  blind  man  could  be  taught  all  this  knowledge  and 
still  lack  that  knowledge  which  I  had  by  sense.  Or,  to 
take  an  example  which  is  much  better  because  it  is  less 
likely  to  lead  to  irrelevant  paths,  if  I  were  not  able  to 
visualise  colour  I  could  still  have  in  absence  all  this 
apprehension  of  thought,  could  know  in  absence  all  the 
colour's  history  and  its  gloriousness.  But  the  rose-ness 
of  it  I  could  get  only  by  going  to  the  church  again. 

Sense  and  thought,  that  is,  know  the  same  object,  but 
what  sense  sees  in  it  thought  cannot  see.  Green  was 
wrong  in  holding  that  perfectly  adequate  conception  needs 
no  sensation  to  fill  it  up1.  Thought  knows  the  object 
[I  insist  upon  this]  but  not  in  its  sensational  capacity.  If 
the  eye  of  sense  is  considered  as  occupying  the  blind  spot 
in  the  eye  of  thought,  then  we  may  say  picturesquely 
that  thought,  in  knowing  our  object,  knows  about  that 
element  in  it  which  sense  knows.  Of  course  it  is  most 
important  to  remember  the  other  side;  that  sense  is 
blind  to  what  thought  sees,  which  is  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  what  is  in  the  object.  But  that  does  not  affect 
us  just  here. 

(6)  So  far  the  facts  are  clear  enough.  They  are  rather 
harder  to  see  and  fix  when  we  come  to  the  next  level. 

taken  trouble  to  use  examples  of  this  sort,  because  their  peculiarity  seems 
to  make  no  difference  to  my  line  of  argument. 
1  Works,  n.  190. 


THE   APPREHENSION   OF   FEELING  97 

Take  a  statement  in  that  history  of  the  saint  which 
I  formerly  believed.  I  can  repeat  my  belief  in  it,  or 
I  can  play  at  repeating  and  assume  it.  Thirdly,  in  con- 
templation other  than  repeating,  I  can  apprehend  its 
connections,  history,  value  and  the  rest.  This  is  still 
apprehension;  it  is  acquaintance,  immediate  knowledge. 
I  am  said  to  be  thinking  about  the  statement,  but 
really  I  am  thinking  it  about  I  am  pulling  it  about, 
making  it  exhibit  itself,  putting  it  in  new  fields  of  thought 
to  govern  them,  making  it  grow. 

I  am  still  apprehending  the  statement.  But  so  far  as 
I  am  not  repeating  my  original  apprehension,  so  far  I  am 
not  apprehending  just  that  in  it  which  I  apprehended  before. 
The  exhibition  in  new  fields  is  new.  I  still  know  the 
object,  but  it-in-its-original-aspect  I  know-about. 

With  regard  to  both  my  instances,  the  colour  in 
the  glass  and  the  history  of  the  saint,  what  I  am  most 
afraid  of  is  that  emphasis  may  be  laid  on  the  second  part 
of  the  last  sentence  to  the  overlooking  of  the  first. 
I  insist  with  all  possible  earnestness  that  if  I  know  about 
I  know.  If  I  cannot  visualise  the  appearance  of  the  rose- 
coloured  border,  I  can  still  know  its  position  and  value 
and  uncommonness,  its  purpose  and  its  history.  I  know 
that  its  tint  is  like  that  of  a  rose,  different  from  a  hyacinth, 
deeper  than  the  sunset;  unexpected,  beautiful.  My 
knowledge  is  not  about  it  but  of  it.  I  know  nearly  all 
that  is  in  it,  that  makes  it ;  I  know  it.  A  man  with  the 
window  in  front  of  him,  but  with  a  concussion  of  the  brain 
confining  him  to  bare  perceiving,  would  know  the  border 
too,  but  know  less  of  it,  less  in  it.  Each  of  us  knows  it, 
and  each  knows-about  that  in  it  which  the  other  knows. 
We  must  absolutely  reject  the  plan  of  giving  the  titles  of 

w.  7 


98  ILLUSTRATIVE  AND  ADDITIONAL: 

knowledge  and  acquaintance  to  sense-knowledge  alone, 
and  denying  it  to  any  apprehension  in  which  only  the 
sense-element  is  invisible. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  is  only  a  matter  of  words,  that 
if  we  abstract  and  limit  further,  and  take  "the  content  of 
my  sensation"  for  our  "object,"  we  shall  have  to  say 
simply  that  thought  knows  about  it  without  knowing  it. 
No,  for  in  this  very  judgment  the  "sense-content"  has 
become  an  object  of  thought.  And  a  thousand  other 
judgments  press  in;  the  sense-content  has  a  history,  a 
place  and  date  in  my  mental  life,  and  relations  to  other 
contents ;  we  can  form  theories  as  to  its  success  in  reveal- 
ing the  object ;  theories  as  to  its  difference  from  the 
sense-content  of  a  colour-blind  person  looking  at  the 
window.  The  "object"  of  sense  has  indeed  blossomed 
and  swelled  beyond  the  bounds  of  sense.  No  slip  of 
reality  can  be  cut  so  fine  that  it  will  not  grow  in  the 
thought-field.  No  object  can  be  made  so  microscopically 
small  that  it  will  not  govern  an  infinite  range  of  thought. 

The  difficulty  lies  indeed  in  explaining  what  it  is  that 
thought  is  debarred  from.  Did  I  say  that  the  rose-ness 
was  invisible  to  it  ?  In  that  very  judgment  the  rose-ness 
is  apprehended.  Fortunately  explanation  is  helped  by 
the  fact  that  nearly  everyone  admits  that  there  is  a 
debarring,  and  knows  the  sorb  of  exhibition  which  the 
object,  rose-colour,  gives  in  sense  alone.  I  need  only  lay 
full  emphasis  on  the  other  side,  insisting  that  rose-colour 
is  known  not  only  in  sense  but  in  thought. 

That  which  sense  sees  in  an  object  thought  can- 
not see ;  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  explain  this  as  the  result 
of  a  character  of  uniqueness  or  peculiar  immediacy  pos- 
sessed by  sense.  It  is  simply  a  special  case  of  the  obvious 


THE  APPREHENSION  OF  FEELING         99 

rule  that  "  so  far  as  I  am  not  repeating  my  original 
apprehension,  so  far  I  am  not  apprehending  just  that 
aspect  of  the  object  which  I  apprehended  before."  The 
exhibition  in  new  fields  must  be  new.  If  I  ask  a  different 
question  the  object  must  give  a  different  answer.  Take 
a  level  where  sense  does  not  enter  at  all,  and  let  our  object 
be  "  the  bishop  who  re-modelled  Exeter  Cathedral,  com- 
pleting the  change  from  the  Norman  to  the  Decorated 
style."  This  is  my  first  introduction  to  Bishop  Grandisson, 
but  I  may  deepen  and  enlarge  my  acquaintance  with  him 
afterwards.  So  far  as  I  do  not  repeat  my  first  apprehen- 
sion of  him,  so  far  I  do  not  know  him  in  the  original  way. 
It  is  possible  that  I  may  cease  to  be  able  to  recall  that 
first  knowledge.  Yet  I  shall  hardly  be  said  to  have  ceased 
to  know  Grandisson  because  I  am  obliged  to  ask  "  What 
was  it  exactly  that  he  had  to  do  with  the  Cathedral  ? " 
Or  it  may  be  that  my  first  introduction  was  to  "  a 
bishop  of  Exeter  called  Grandisson."  Returning  after 
some  years,  I  may  say  "  I  know  all  about  the  bishop  who 
re-modelled  the  Cathedral,  but  I  cannot  remember  for  the 
moment  who  he  was" — meaning  only  "I  have  forgotten 
his  name."  It  will  scarcely  be  denied  here  that  the 
so-called  knowing-about  is  a  better  knowing  than  the 
original  apprehension,  but  the  original  is  omitted.  Once 
more,  let  our  object  be  the  content  of  the  assertion 
"  St  Dorothy  sent  flowers  from  heaven  to  the  youth  who 
loved  her."  This  exhibition  of  the  object  is  no  more  the 
end  of  it  than  the  guide-book  or  passport  description  is 
the  end  of  a  man.  I  may  think  it  about ;  may  estimate 
the  place  of  this  incident  in  the  story,  its  bearing  on  what 
precedes  and  follows,  its  value  for  the  mediaeval  or  modern 
story-teller  and  poet,  or  for  the  child  who  hears  it  in  a 

7—2 


100  ILLUSTRATIVE   AND   ADDITIONAL: 

Catholic  school ;  I  may  think  of  its  probable  origin  and 
its  possible  use  as  an  allegory.  In  all  this  I  apprehend  the 
incident,  but  not  just  as  I  apprehended  it  to  begin  with. 

The  case  of  feeling  is  now  probably  clear  enough. 
I  can  apprehend  it,  and  I  do  so  whenever  I  make  a  judg- 
ment about  it.  But,  as  with  sensation  and  belief,  my 
apprehension  does  not  give  me  j  ust  that  element,  or  aspect, 
or  exhibition  of  it  which  I  had  before.  So  far  as  I  do  not 
repeat  a  process,  so  far  I  do  not  get  just  what  that  process 
gave.  Everything — everything  in  the  widest  and  vaguest 
sense — is  a  law-complex  which  works  inexhaustibly,  and 
works  differently  in  every  field.  Thought  cannot  exhaust 
what  enters  in  sense,  but  neither  can  sense  exhaust  it: 
and  feeling  cannot  exhaust  feeling.  My  conclusion  is, 
then,  that  feeling  and  activity-consciousness  are  in  just 
the  same  position  with  regard  to  after-apprehension  as  are 
the  presented  elements  in  consciousness.  For  each  we  may 
use  either  repetition,  or  play-repetition,  or  apprehension- 
other- than-repetition.  So  far  as  we  do  not  repeat,  so  far  we 
do  not  get  the  same  exhibition  of  the  thing  as  we  got  before. 

The  sense  in  which  I  suggested  that  we  might  know 
present  feeling  will  now  be  clear  also.  We  know  it 
when,  and  only  when,  our  present  act  is  to  think  of  our 
present  feeling.  In  that  sense  I  know  it  while  I  write 
this  passage.  But  in  an  ordinary  act  of  cognition  we 
cannot  know  present  feeling  any  more  than  we  can  see  our 
own  face :  it  is  not  invisible,  but  we  happen  always  to  be 
looking  the  other  way.  As  in  a  ghost  story,  I  leave  rny 
past  selves  all  along  the  road,  and  when  I  like  I  can  turn 
and  see  them.  Nevertheless  I  cannot  see  what  they  saw, 
nor  can  I  feel  what  their  attitudes  felt  like,  except  by 


THE  APPREHENSION  OF  FEELING        101 

getting  into  them  again.  This  is  a  perfectly  possible 
proceeding,  but  it  is  a  revival  or  recall  of  past  process  and 
not  an  apprehension  of  it.  Between  repetition  and  appre- 
hension I  have  to  choose. 

Note.  Our  relation  to  the  feelings  of  others  will 
obviously  come  under  the  preceding  account.  I  may 
share  them  in  genuine  sympathy :  or  I  may  play  at 
sharing  them,  in  imaginative  Einfuhlung :  or  I  may 
apprehend  them  in  that  in  thought  1  perceive  what  they 
are.  That  is,  theymay  supply  me  both  with  primary  or 
imaged  feelings,  and  with  objective  contents  of  knowledge. 

The  investigation  contained  in  this  chapter  was 
occasioned  by  the  study  of  Professor  Alexander's  most 
suggestive  and  provocative  paper  on  "  Mental  Activity 
in  Willing  and  in  Ideas1."  I  have  come  to  agree  with 
a  good  deal  of  its  doctrine,  but  with  one  passage  I 
am  bound  to  disagree  even  more  completely  than  I 
did  at  first  reading  of  it.  It  appears  on  page  27  of  the 
paper :  "  To  me,  I  myself  cannot  be  a  cognitum,  I  can 
only  be  a  cognitum  to  a  being  who  stood  outside  both 
me  and  physical  things,  in  the  same  way  as  I  myself 
stand  outside  physical  things  and  life.  Life  is  an 
individual  thing  to  the  liver.  But  I  can  contemplate 
another  being's  life  though  I  cannot  live  it.  Now  it 
is  as  impossible  for  me  to  contemplate  my  own  mind  as 
for  an  animal  to  live  another  animal's  life.  There  is  no 
reason,  however,  in  the  nature  of  things  why  a  race  of 
beings  should  not  arise  or  be  now  in  existence  who  can  con- 
template minds.  Such  beings  would  be  of  a  higher  order 
of  mind  and  for  them  minds  would  be  objects  of  knowledge." 
1  Arist.  Soc.  1908-9. 


102  THE  APPREHENSION   OF   FEELING 

I  hope  it  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  pages  what  my 
comment  on  this  would  be. 

(1)  I  can  and  do  contemplate  my  own  mind  as  I 
contemplate    physical    things,    and    life,    and    anything 
else   in    the    universe.      Professor   Alexander   proves   it 
by  writing  papers  about  his  mind. 

(2)  But  to  contemplate  is  not  the  same  as  to  live 
through.     My  contemplation  of  an  animal's  life  is  a  quali- 
tatively different  experience  from  the  animal's,  and  my  con- 
templation of  my  own  life  is  a  different  experience  from 
the  living  of  it ;  hence  I  can  only  contemplate  the  part 
which  I  am  not  engaged  in  living. 

(3)  As  for  the  higher  race  of  beings,  they  will  have 
the  advantage  of  being  able  to  contemplate  any  part  of 
my  life  they  choose,  since  they  are  not  engaged  in  living 
any  of  it ;  and  they  will  presumably  have  the  disadvantage 
of  a  much  more  limited  access  to  what  they  want  to  know. 
So  far  they  are  in  the  same  position  as  my  next-door 
neighbour.     If  they  are  able  by  some  means  to  share  my 
feelings  and  thoughts,  they  may  overcome   the  limit  of 
access  by  living  my  life  as  well  as  contemplating  it.    They 
will  then  be  in  the  same  position  as  myself.     Of  course  if 
they  are  cleverer  than  myself  they  will  be  able  to  do 
much  more  with  that  position.     And  if  they  can  "  enter 
into"    my   beliefs    and    feelings   without   being   actually 
possessed  by  them,  as  I  do  fitfully  with  my  past  self  and 
with  other  people,  they  will  keep  a  calm  and  detachment 
of  mind  which  will  enable  them  to  understand  me  much 
better  than  I  understand  myself.     But  I  cannot  imagine 
any  other  way  than  this.     They  can  contemplate  heaven 
and  earth  and  myself  and  themselves,  and  so  can  I.     And 
for  all  of  us  "seeing  life"  is  a  different  thing  from  living  it. 


PART  II 

ERROR 


CHAPTER  IX 

IS  ANY  KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE? 

HITHERTO  we  have  dealt  with  the  nature  of  knowledge 
in  the  narrower  sense  of  that  term,  without  complicating 
the  matter  by  consideration  of  the  fact  that  cognition  in- 
cludes not  only  true  knowledge  but  mistakes.  We  must 
now  take  account  of  this,  and  in  order  to  guard  against 
false  accounts  it  will  be  necessary  to  begin  by  asking 
whether  any  part  of  cognition  is  free  from  this  mixture. 
Is  there  any  department  of  experience  in  which  it  is 
impossible  to  make  a  mistake  ? 

No  one,  I  believe,  has  ever  claimed  infallibility  for 
inference,  therefore  we  may  confine  our  examination  to 
uninferred  knowledge.  With  regard  to  this  we  shall  not 
even  now  attempt  a  complete  enumeration  of  its  different 
kinds,  but  shall  only  examine  the  most  prominent.  There 
are  not  many  kinds  for  which  infallibility  has  been  seriously 
claimed. 

1.  The  apprehension  of  a  priori  truths,  such  as  the 
law  of  connection  between  premises  and  conclusion  in  a 
syllogism,  is  an  instance  of  knowledge  that  is  highly  certain 
and  trustworthy.  The  propositions  apprehended  are  self- 
evident  in  a  marked  degree,  and  they  are  continually  being 


106  IS   ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE? 

tested  and  easily  justified  by  means  of  all  our  other  know- 
ledge and  by  new  experiments.  Since  they  are  the  basis 
of  inference,  they  cannot  themselves  be  strictly  inferred, 
but  they  are  plain  without  inference.  Nevertheless  this 
self-evidence  is  clearly  a  matter  of  degree  and  not  of 
uniqueness  of  kind,  for  it  varies  with  the  simplicity  of  the 
truth  and  not  with  its  uninferrable  nature.  The  connec- 
tion between  premises  and  conclusion  in  a  first-figure 
syllogism  is  no  more  a  priori  than  the  corresponding 
connection  in  the  fourth  figure,  yet  it  is  undeniably  easier 
to  see.  In  the  second  case  indeed  it  is  quite  possible  to 
make  a  mistake.  We  must  grant,  then,  that  the  cognition 
of  propositions  of  this  kind  is  not  as  such  infallible ; 
it  is  only  on  a  high  level  of  certainty  because  in  the 
most  important  cases  the  propositions  are  very  easy  to 
apprehend. 

2.  Memory,  which  we  have  seen  reason  to  class  as  un- 
inferred,  is  undeniably  fallible.     Occasionally  we  attempt 
to  defend  it  by  a  shift  of  names ; — when  a  recollection  is 
proved  false  we  say  of  it  not  "  I  remembered "  but  "  I 
thought  I  remembered."     But  it  has  never  been  main- 
tained that  we  have  here  a  real  difference  in  the  quality 
of  our  experience.     A  false  memory  is  just  the  same  sort 
of  experience  as  a  true  one ;  therefore  memory  as  such  is 
not  infallible. 

3.  Infallibility  has  sometimes  been  claimed  for  intro- 
spective judgments,  but  the  claim  has  not  often  been  made 
by  psychologists,  who  are  too  well  aware  of  the  difficulty 
of  introspection.     In  simple  cases,  certainly,  introspective 
knowledge  is  amongst  the  most  certain  that  we  have ;  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  be  mistaken  in  judging  that  I  have 
at  this  moment  a  visual  sensation  of  marks  on  a  white 


IS  ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE?  107 

ground  and  certain  sensations  of  noise  and  of  contact,  nor 
in  judging  that  I  am  trying  to  write  about  the  theory  of 
knowledge.  But  the  judgments  must  be  simple  if  they 
are  to  be  certain,  hence  introspection  as  such  is  not  infal- 
lible. The  belief  that  it  is  so  has  sometimes  been  made 
more  plausible  by  a  confusion  with  two  other  things.  One 
is  the  certainty  of  that  non-introspective,  non-apprehen- 
sive, "  immediate  "  knowledge  of  our  present  feelings  arid 
conations  in  which  some  writers  believe.  As  was  ex- 
plained in  the  chapter  on  the  apprehension  of  feeling,  I 
cannot  see  my  way  to  believing  that  such  knowledge  exists 
at  all ;  it  appears  to  me  that  we  feel  our  feelings,  but  that, 
except  in  fallible  reflection,  we  do  not  know  them.  The 
other  confusion  is  with  the  undeniable  infallibility  of 
"  simple  apprehension  "  so  far  as  it  goes.  This  will  be 
explained  presently. 

4.  The  really  serious  question  comes  up  in  connection 
with  sensations.  The  opinion  that  these  cannot  go  wrong 
is  of  course  a  natural  one  for  those  who  hold  that  sensa- 
tions are  "  immediately  given  "  in  a  way  in  which  other 
knowledge  is  not  given  ;  but  we  have  opposed  this  opinion, 
urging  on  the  one  hand  that  all  knowledge  was  "  given," 
and  on  the  other  hand  that  the  contents  of  sensation  like 
all  other  contents  were  presented  as  objects.  What  we 
have  to  investigate  is  the  claim  of  a  special  sort  of  given 
contents  to  be  necessarily  true  representatives  of  the 
objects  to  which  they  belong. 

The  prima  facie  argument  against  this  claim  is  the 
existence  of  inappropriate  sensations  and  of  hallucinations. 
A  green  rose-leaf  is  presented  to  a  colour-blind  man,  and 
it  seems  to  him  the  same  colour  as  the  rose.  A  cold-spot 
is  stimulated  by  a  warmed  steel  point,  and  we  feel  the 


108  IS  ANY   KNOWLEDGE  INFALLIBLE  ? 

point  as  cold.  A  hypnotist  suggests  to  his  subject  that 
the  gold  coin  in  his  hand  is  burning  him,  and  immediately 
the  subject  feels  the  burn.  In  all  these  cases  have  we  not 
false  sensations  ?  The  answer  is  instructive  and  valid. 
We  have,  it  is  said,  nothing  wrong  here  in  the  actual 
sensational  experience.  The  error  enters  only  in  the  per- 
ceptive judgment  by  which  the  sense-content  is  enlarged. 
There  would  have  been  no  error  had  I  judged  that  with 
my  defective  eye  the  tint  of  the  rose  is  indistinguishable 
from  that  of  the  rose-leaf,  or  that  the  pain  was  a  vivid 
image  not  connected  with  my  hand.  These  true  cogni- 
tions could  still  have  contained  the  same  sense-content  as 
the  false  ones,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  when  my 
opinion  is  corrected  the  sense-content  does  often  really 
remain  unchanged ; — when  I  know  that  the  steel  point  is 
warm  I  still  feel  it  as  cold.  Sense-content,  then,  is  inde- 
pendent of  these  errors  and  untouched  both  by  them 
and  by  their  correction.  Therefore  sense-experience  is 
infallible. 

Now  the  interesting  point  is  that  this  kind  of  defence 
need  not  be  confined  to  sense  experience.  Take  an  object 
of  higher  order  such  as  we  find  in  an  illusion  of  direction 
or  of  comparative  length.  When  we  thoroughly  under- 
stand the  illusion-picture  and  know  that  the  lines  are 
really  straight  and  parallel  they  may  still  appear  markedly 
curved  and  convergent,  and  we  say  that  there  is  no  fault 
so  long  as  we  are  not  misled  by  the  appearance.  Or  take 
a  false  memory.  I  remember  an  event  in  my  childhood 
which  I  know  from  circumstantial  evidence  cannot  possibly 
have  occurred,  and  I  find  that  this  knowledge  has  not  the 
least  effect  upon  the  clearness  and  firmness  of  the  memory. 
I  say  naturally  that  I  am  not  in  error  from  this  event 


IS   ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE?  109 

appearing  to  me  when  I  look  towards  iny  past,  so  long  as 
I  do  not  believe  that  it  really  did  happen  in  my  past.  In 
common  language  we  say  that  there  can  be  no  error  in 
apprehending  any  object  whatever,  so  long  as  I  do  not 
believe  in  it. 

Belief,  in  this  sense,  is  the  apprehension  of  a  content 
as  belonging  to  a  particular  part  of  reality.  There  is  no 
error  in  the  sting  of  heat  unless  I  connect  it  with  the 
object  touching  me  instead  of  my  body,  or  with  my 
body  instead  of  my  imaging  mind.  There  is  no  error  in 
remembering  until  I  assign  the  scene  to  the  actual  past. 
I  may  think  of  the  doings  of  wizards  without  the  least 
error  until  I  say  "  Wizards  exist  and  in  fact  behave  thus." 
The  infallible  way  and  the  only  way  of  avoiding  error 
is  to  stop  short  of  the  line  round  our  content  at  which  it 
unites  with  a  special  and  determinate  universe  of  reality1. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  infallibility  of  sense  is  nothing 
but  a  special  case  of  the  infallibility  of  all  such  simple 
apprehension.  Sense  cannot  lie,  for  it  is  incapable  of 
pronouncing  on  the  critical  point ;  in  it  we  are  too  low  for 
any  distinction  of  universe.  It  is  infallible  not  because  of 
its  immediacy  but  because  of  its  inarticulateness. 

The  Search  for  Foundations  of  Knowledge. 

It  appears,  then,  that  no  knowledge  worth  speaking  of 
is  infallible.  We  must  now  represent  that  this  makes  very 
little  difference  to  our  security.  The  search  for  some  in- 
fallible experience  has  nearly  always  been  prompted  by 

1  It  is  most  important  to  remember  that  the  introspective  judgment 
"that  I  am  apprehending  this  and  that"  is  quite  different  from  simple 
apprehension. 


110  IS   ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE? 

the  desire  to  find  safe  foundations  for  our  knowledge  to 
rest  on ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  on  no  foundation  which 
has  ever  been  proposed  would  our  knowledge  have  had 
room  to  rest.      Suppose  that  sense-knowledge  in  some 
concrete  meaning  of  the  term,  or  that  introspective  judg- 
ment, were  to  be  proved  infallible,  and  that  on  these  we 
attempted  to  base  the  rest  of  our  knowledge,  how  could  it 
be  done  ?     The  case  would  be  different  if  every  kind  of 
uninferred   knowledge    were   as   such    unerring,   but   for 
memory  at  least  such  unerringness  has  never  been  claimed, 
and  yet  we  cannot  proceed  one  step  without  trusting  to 
memory.     Nowhere  in  cognition  is  an  unshakable  foun- 
dation to  be  found  for  the  mass  and  breadth  of  our  belief. 
The  world  of  knowledge,  in  fact,  is  here  in  just  the 
same  position  as  the  world  of  will.    We  find  on  the  surface 
of  the  latter  a  mass  and  tangle  of  miscellaneous  desires. 
Some  of   our  purposes   hang   together  and  support  one 
another,  but  some  do  not.     Some  are  the  embodiments  of 
dispositions  that  lie  deep  in  our  nature  and  send  their 
roots  into  every  part  of  it ;  others  seem  to  have  scarcely 
any  roots  at  all.    Yet  in  all  of  them  we  are  desiring,  seek- 
ing, valuing.     By  their  means  we  have  to  find  out  that 
way  of  life  which  is  our  good  on  the  whole.     In  this  good 
some  of  our  present  stray  desires  will  certainly  not  be 
fulfilled,  and  we  cannot  find  any  department  of  desire 
which  is  safe  from  error  of  this  sort.     No  one  concrete 
purpose  or  valuation  can  be  pronounced  a  priori  to  be 
certainly  right,  not  even  our  most  primitive  instincts,  or 
our  most  delicate  intuitions,  or  our  most  faithful  loyalty 
to  general  rules.      Any  one  of  these  may,  under  certain 
circumstances,  mislead  us.      Not  one  desire  is  infallible, 
and  yet  on  the  whole  man  does  work  out  his  good. 


IS   ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE?  Ill 


Knowledge  without  Foundations. 

Are  we  then  left,  in  ethics  or  in  epistemology,  with 
a  castle  in  the  air  ?  The  answer  is  neither  new  nor 
original. 

We  have  found  that  "  primary  reality  "  in  both  worlds 
— the  immediately  given  in  every  sense  of  immediate — 
the  actually  desired  and  actually  cognised — provides  in  no 
department  a  safe  and  infallible  foundation  for  the  rest1. 
Everywhere,  as  experiences  which  primarily  are  indistin- 
guishable, we  have  both  right  and  wrong,  both  truth  and 
mistake.  A  right  desire  or  a  true  belief  is  not  in  itself  a 
different  sort  of  experience  from  the  wrong  and  false ;  its 
self-evidence  is  the  same;  it  is  only  by  other  evidence 
that  we  distinguish  the  two.  Of  no  kind  of  experience 
can  we  say,  Here  error  is  impossible. 

To  defend  the  reality  of  the  known  universe  by  dis- 
puting this  seems  a  plan  exactly  parallel  to  the  defence 
of  morals  by  intuitionist  ethics.  Since  the  beginning  of 
morality  there  have  been  those  who  sought  within  value- 
experience  for  some  infallible  bit  of  experience  on  which 
the  whole  of  conduct  might  be  based.  Some  had  intuitions 
of  the  Ten  Commandments ;  some  turned  to  our  most  ele- 
mentary feelings  and  maintained  that  the  perfect  clue  for 
our  guidance  lay  there.  Nevertheless  the  reply  has  always 
been  made  that  in  the  first  place  not  one  of  these  valua- 
tions was  unerring,  and  that  in  the  second  place,  even  if 
they  had  been  unerring,  each  was  too  narrow  and  small  to 

1  On  the  mixed  nature  of  "primary  reality"  see  a  very  interesting 
review  of  Mr  Schiller  by  Dr  Stout,  in  Mind  for  1907.  On  this  particular 
point  I  agree  with  Mr  Schiller  as  against  his  critic. 


112  IS   ANY   KNOWLEDGE   INFALLIBLE? 

provide  the  foundation  of  ethics.  There  is  not  one  in- 
fallible desire,  and  yet  the  world  of  values  stands  firm,  and 
there  is  one  kind  of  life  and  no  other  which  is  satisfactory 
to  man.  Ethics  has  to  be  based  not  on  any  one  part  of 
value-experience  but  on  the  whole  character  of  humanity, 
which  can  only  reveal  itself  gradually,  on  a  large  scale,  and 
in  many  different  ways. 

So  must  it  be  with  knowledge.  No  one  particular 
judgment  of  ours  need  be  infallible,  yet  the  universe 
stands  firm.  In  arithmetic,  for  instance,  every  one  of  our 
operations  is  exposed  to  error,  and  yet  the  laws  of  number 
hold  and  we  find  them  out;  and  through  our  uncertain 
operations  we  obtain  an  immense  body  of  beautifully 
established  knowledge.  So  with  the  whole  of  cognition, 
justified  by  the  whole  Wirklichkeits2usammenhangl.  The 
lack  of  unshakable  foundations  within  experience  is  no 
great  matter,  for  every  such  foundation  has  turned  out  to 
be  far  too  narrow  for  the  breadth  of  the  structure.  It  is 
enough  that  the  world  which  manifests  itself  in  the  whole 
of  experience  should  be  real. 

1  Lipps,  Bewusstsein  und  Gegenstande,  p.  98. 


CHAPTEE   X 

ERROR  AND  THE  REAL 

"  IT  is  enough,"  we  said  at  the  end  of  the  last  chapter, 
"that  the  world  which  manifests  itself  in  the  whole  of 
experience  should  be  real."  In  the  mixed  contents  of 
feeling  and  will  a  real  world  of  character  shows  itself;  in 
the  mixed  contents  of  cognition  a  real  universe  is  pre- 
sented. Now  here  we  must  go  into  more  detail.  What 
real  object  can  be  said  to  be  presented  in  an  erroneous 
apprehension  ? 

In  our  original  distinction  between  content  and  object 
we  said  that  the  object  was  progressively  revealed  in  the 
content  as  investigation  proceeded.  This  would  seem  to 
leave  us  in  this  case  with  a  choice  of  descriptions.  We 
may  take  the  "object"  in  error  either  as  that  which 
we  finally  believe  in,  or  as  that  which  we  believe  in 
whilst  the  error  still  prevails.  Either  description  will 
bring  out  some  truth.  The  one  looks  on  erroneous 
contents  as  being  peculiar  exhibitions  of  ordinary  objects ; 
the  other  takes  them  to  be  presentations  of  objects 
which  in  themselves  are  peculiar.  We  will  begin  with 
the  first. 

w.  8 


114  ERROR  AND   THE   REAL 


1.     Error  as  Abnormal  Presentation. 

In  this  account  we  start  from  the  fact  that  all  mistakes 
are  imperfect  apprehensions  of  the  ordinary  world.  Some- 
thing must  be  present  with  us  in  order  even  to  be  mis- 
understood. A  column  of  figures,  for  one  child  in  the 
class,  adds  up  to  an  amount  not  reached  by  any  other 
child  or  by  the  teacher.  A  man  bearing  pain  heroically 
appears  to  us  as  a  man  insensible  to  pain.  A  fictitious 
injury,  brooded  over  by  a  sullen-tempered  person,  appears 
to  him  presently  as  an  actual  injury.  In  all  these  experi- 
ences, at  the  time  when  and  in  so  far  as  the  error  is 
true  error,  our  attitude  is  that  of  the  ordinary  recipient 
apprehension;  if  our  mistake  is  genuine,  we  are  not 
choosing  to  make  a  mistake,  but  are  receiving  what  comes 
to  us.  What  comes  is  a  peculiar  manifestation  of  the 
object,  because,  presumably,  there  is  something  peculiar 
in  our  conditioning  body  or  mind.  Nevertheless  it  is  a 
real  manifestation  of  an  ordinary  object.  One  of  the  laws 
that  make  up  the  very  nature  of  6  +  3  is  this :  that  for  a 
boy  in  a  particular  degree  of  hurry,  with  a  particular 
share  of  carelessness,  it  will  add  up  to  10. 


2.     Error  as  Presentation  of  Abnormal  Objects. 

In  the  second  description,  instead  of  saying  that  the 
peculiarities  of  our  mind  or  body  condition  the  particular 
appearance  of  the  "  external "  universe,  we  reckon  them 
along  with  this  as  elements  in  that  given  world  which 
appears.  We  have  then  no  reason  to  say  that  any  mode 
of  presentation  is  peculiar  or  abnormal,  but  instead  we 


ERROR  AND  THE   REAL  115 

comment  on  the  peculiarity  of  some  of  the  objects  with 
which  our  life  presents  us. 

In  the  first  place,  all  these  objects  are  presented,  are 
actually  seen.  They  are  present  with  us,  forced  upon  us, 
given  and  apprehended,  just  as  certainly  as  any  others. 
An  erroneous  content,  like  any  other  content,  falls  wholly 
on  the  object  side  of  life.  It  is  not  an  expression  of 
myself  in  the  sense  in  which  an  impulse  or  a  feeling  is 
an  expression  of  myself;  it  is  something  given,  to  which 
I  respond.  To  put  it  shortly,  as  before,  when  I  am 
genuinely  mistaken  I  am  never  choosing  to  make  a 
mistake1. 

This  means  that  all  these  objects  in  some  way  and  to 
some  extent  are  real,  for  they  are  proving  themselves 
real — making  themselves  count.  Nevertheless  they  are 
unable  to  count  for  much.  Their  self-evidence  is  there, 
but  other  evidence  collapses  about  them.  They  break 
their  promises ;  they  rouse  expectations  and  disappoint 
them ;  they  contradict  themselves.  Presently  we  "  see 
through  them";  they  become  "transparent"  fallacies. 
And  finally  they  fade  altogether  out  of  our  world. 

Every  object  which  can  appear  to  us  has  reality 
enough  to  appear;  it  is  for  us  to  discover  how  much 
more  reality  it  has.  An  ordinary  object  can  appear  on 
its  own  account,  and  it  can  do  more,  for  it  can  appear  to 
other  people,  and  can  keep  its  promises,  and  can  affect 
other  objects,  and  can  often  live  with  a  life  of  its  own. 
The  object  in  error  appears  only  parasitically,  clinging 
to  other  objects,  and  in  all  the  further  tests  it  fails. 

1  If  we  say  in  the  ordinary  phrase  that  objects  appear  "  to  "  the  mind, 
then  by  the  very  force  of  words  these  objects,  like  all  others,  are  "  extra- 
mental." 

8—2 


116  ERROR   AND  THE  REAL 

» 

No  more  than  other  objects  is  it  created  by  our  appre- 
hension of  it,  but  it  has  no  more  reality  than  serves  it 
to  appear1. 

Other  Accounts  of  Error. 

Mistakes  have  been  described  in  many  other  ways, 
but  we  are  cut  off  from  using  many  of  the  descriptions 
by  the  doctrines  laid  down  in  earlier  parts  of  this  essay. 
We  are  not  at  liberty,  for  instance,  to  say  in  the  usual 
sense  that  error  lies  in  the  failure  of  our  ideas  to  corre- 
spond with  reality,  and  that  truth  lies  in  their  success; 
for  in  treating  of  true  cognition  we  denied  the  existence 
of  any  "ideas"  between  us  and  the  real  object.  The 
most  we  can  say  is  that  error  means  the  failure  of  the 
real  world  to  appear  to  us  in  a  normal  way.  Again,  we 
cannot  express  ourselves  by  saying  that  in  error  we  con- 
struct wrongly,  or  combine  the  given  wrongly;  for  we 
have  urged  that  knowledge  is  not  construction  or  combi- 
nation but  apprehension  only,  and  that  not  only  elements 
but  the  forms  of  their  combination  are  presented  to  us. 
Professor  Alexander  says2  that  a  centaur  consists  of  a  real 
head  and  a  real  body,  and  that  I  have  only  put  the  head 
on  the  wrong  body.  But,  in  the  first  place,  I  did  not  put 
it  there ;  I  had  no  choice  in  the  matter,  unless  the  case  is 
one  of  invention  and  not  of  error  at  all.  And  in  the 
second  place  the  combination  form  is  so  essential  a  part 
of  the  content  presented  that  I  remove  only  a  very  small 

1  This  has  to  be  carefully  stated,  for  even  in  an  erroneous  object  in- 
vestigation may  go  on  disclosing  features  without   limit.      Thin   and 
unstable  as  these  objects  are  their  esse  is  far  more  than  percipi. 

2  Aristotelian  Society,  1909-10. 


ERROR   AND   THE   REAL  117 

part   of  error  by  asserting   that    the   elements    are    not 
erroneous1. 

Nor,  further,  can  we  say  that  error  consists  in  taking 
up  a  wrong  attitude  towards  a  real  object — the  attitude 
of  belief  instead  of  doubt  or  assumption ;  for  we  have  laid 
it  down  that  belief  is  characterised  not  by  attitude  or  act 
but  by  content  apprehended.  Nor,  I  fear,  can  we  adopt 
a  very  attractive  account  which  makes  error  consist  only 
in  leaving  things  out,  in  failing  to  see  all  that  is  in  the 
real  object.  In  the  way  of  its  use  there  stands  the  objec- 
tion that  we  do  not  attribute  error  where  the  content 
of  knowledge  is  merely  defective ;  we  attribute  it  only 
when  the  content  has  an  addition  which  is  positively 
wrong.  Where  we  believe  a  slander,  for  instance,  our 
error  lies  not  merely  in  our  failure  to  perceive  the  alleged 
event  as  a  work  of  imagination  but  in  our  apprehension 
of  it  as  an  actual  event  in  a  given  person's  life.  Error  is 
something  more  than  ignorance. 

Error  Described,  not  Explained. 

Our  own  accounts  of  the  subject,  even  more  than  those 
we  have  avoided,  are  obviously  not  explanations  but 
descriptions.  The  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  making 
mistakes  is  far  beyond  the  scope  of  this  essay,  and  would 
involve  the  whole  metaphysics  of  the  relation  of  substance 
to  its  appearances  and  of  the  relation  of  mind  to  the 
universe.  Our  business  here  is  only  to  guard  ourselves 

1  The  assertion  itself  seems  highly  doubtful.  If  I  remember  a  tune 
wrongly  at  all  what  guarantee  is  there  that  it  will  not  appear  with  a 
note  which,  as  it  happens,  has  never  occurred  in  the  actual  world? 

For  excellent  criticism  of  the  combination  view,  see  Dr  Stout's  article 
on  "  Error  "  in  Personal  Idealism,  pp.  34-35. 


118  ERROR   AND  THE   REAL 

against  descriptions  which  seem  misleading,  and  in  par- 
ticular to  guard  against  any  that  would  tend  to  weaken 
our  hold  of  the  fundamental  axiom — that  in  true  know- 
ledge of  whatever  sort  we  have  reality,  in  the  fullest  sense 
of  that  word,  present  in  the  mind. 

Even  a  description  of  error,  with  explanation  un- 
attempted,  forms  indeed  a  crucial  task  for  epistemology. 
The  undeniable  fact  is  that  sometimes  we  know  truly  and 
sometimes  we  make  mistakes ;  and  in  this  we  find  a 
double-edged  sword  which  threatens  the  two  classes  of 
theory.  If  in  cognition  we  are  in  direct  contact  with  real 
object  how  can  we  ever  have  error  ?  If  we  are  not,  how 
can  we  ever  have  truth?  To  the  present  writer1  it 
appears  imperative  to  take  the  first  alternative ;  and  that 
means  that  all  the  chief  difficulties  in  our  way  will  be 
connected  with  this  section  of  the  essay.  The  writer  is 
only  too  well  aware  of  her  incapacity  for  dealing  with 
them  in  any  way  thorough  enough  to  be  satisfactory. 
The  description  may,  however,  be  carried  a  little  further, 
and  may  be  so  used  as  to  make  the  difficulties  themselves 
a  little  more  vivid,  which  is  perhaps  the  most  desirable 
thing  at  present  with  a  view  to  advancing  the  meta- 
physics of  the  subject.  We  may  be  able  to  obtain  this 
vividness  by  means  of  a  rigidly  literal  use  of  a  certain 
ambiguity  of  ordinary  language. 

The  Double  Sense  of  Mind. 

We  hold  fast  even  in  the  department  of  Error  to  the 
doctrine  which  we  have  professed  from  the  beginning, 
namely  that  in  so  far  as  the  mind  is  cognitive  it  is 

1  As  also,  I  am  very  glad  to  observe,  to  Dr  Stout.     See  his  essay  in 
Personal  Idealism. 


ERROR  AND  THE   REAL  119 

recipient  only.  To  cognise  is  to  apprehend  the  given. 
The  object  comes  to  the  knower,  comes  before  him ;  and 
cannot  be  created  or  even  affected  by  his  recipience  of  it. 

Yet  in  Error,  apparently,  something  in  the  concrete 
event  is  affected,  or  even  created,  by  peculiarities  of  the 
individual.  An  ordinary  object  appears  to  him  in  a  way 
in  which  it  does  not  appear  to  other  persons,  or  to  this 
person  at  other  times  ;  or  (taking  our  second  account)  an 
extraordinary  object  appears  to  him,  which  finds  no  place 
in  the  common  course  of  nature. 

The  question  is  how  both  these  statements  can  be 
true.  How  can  the  individual  mind,  receiving  what  is 
presented  to  it,  be  a  factor  in  determining  what  object  or 
what  appearance  of  an  object  it  shall  receive  ?  It  is  the 
business  of  metaphysics  to  explain  the  possibility ;  our 
business  here  is  only  to  state  consistently  and  in  contrast 
the  facts  to  be  explained.  This  task  would  seem  to  be 
most  conveniently  performed  by  a  frank  use  of  the  double 
meaning  which  popular  usage  attaches  to  our  most  im- 
portant term. 

We  are  accustomed  in  fact  to  speak  of  objects  with 
equal  readiness  as  presented  "  to  "  the  mind  and  as  pre- 
sented "in"  the  mind.  These  uses  are  obviously  incom- 
patible, and  involve  a  double  meaning  of  "  mind  "  which 
we  may  turn  to  our  own  account.  Mind  in  the  first  sense 
must  be  that  which  apprehends  the  object ;  mind  in  the 
second  sense  is  a  factor  in  determining  the  appearance  of 
the  object.  When  a  mind  in  the  second  sense  is  abnormal, 
the  world  must  misrepresent  itself  to  mind  in  the  first 
sense. 

I,  it  appears,  sit  within  my  mind,  and  any  peculiarity 
in  the  atmosphere  of  that  mind  may  affect  the  appear- 


120  ERROR  AND  THE   REAL 

ance  of  the  objects  which  come  before  me.  Or,  I  receive 
the  objects  mixed  with  my  mind.  The  development  of  a 
presentation  will  reveal  to  me  something  of  the  world's 
character  and  something  also  of  my  mind's  stupidity  and 
fatigue.  Or,  in  a  vivid  if  difficult  metaphor,  the  outer 
mind  is  the  violin  and  the  world  is  the  bow,  and  I,  the 
inner  mind,  am  the  hearer  of  the  music.  If  the  violin  is 
defective  the  music  will  be  spoilt1. 

With  this  description  and  distinction  the  subject 
must  be  left.  The  metaphysical  questions  which  so 
evidently  are  raised  must  be  answered  in  some  other 
place  than  this  essay. 

1  The  metaphor  is  derived  from  Witasek's  Psychologic,  where  it  is 
used  for  a  different  purpose. 


PAET   III 

THE  MANY-MANSIONED 
UNIVERSE 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  VAKIOUSNESS  OF  REALITY 

"EVERYTHING  that  is  anything  is  an  object1."  The 
category  of  object,  says  Twardowski2,  is  the  most  general 
possible ;  it  is  the  Ens  of  Aristotle  and  the  scholastics ; 
it  includes  everything  existent  and  non-existent.  Every 
kind  of  cognition  is  the  apprehension  of  some  object. 
"  Every  presentation  and  every  belief  must  have  an  object 
other  than  itself  and,  except  in  certain  cases  where  mental 
existents  happen  to  be  concerned,  extra-mental ;... and 
...the  object  of  a  thought,  even  when  this  object  does  not 
exist,  has  a  being  which  is  in  no  way  dependent  upon  its 
being  an  object  of  thought3." 

So  far  as  I  can  see,  in  agreeing  with  this  doctrine 
I  am  assuming  no  more  than  the  simplest  psychological 
account  of  cognition.  I  cannot  apprehend  without  appre- 
hending something.  Cognition  consists  in  the  presenta- 
tion of  something  in  consciousness.  The  something  is 
not  my  experiencing,  for  it  is  experienced.  If  it  were 

1  Mally,  in  Gegemtandstheorie  vnd  Psychologic,  p.  126. 

2  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand,  p.  39. 

3  Russell,  "Meinong's  Theory,"  Mind,  1904,  p.  204. 


124  THE   VARIOUSNESS   OF   REALITY 

created  at  the  moment  I  saw  it  and  annihilated  the 
moment  I  ceased  to  see  it,  it  would  still  have  a  being 
not  dependent  on  my  act  of  seeing,  since  it  would 
have  been  there  for  me  to  see.  It  is  not  an  act  of 
mine ;  it  is  not  myself  at  all ;  it  is  the  world  in  which 
I  live. 

It  is  simply  a  psychological  fact  that  I  actually 
have  objects ;  that  a  world,  of  a  nature  to  be  continually 
determined,  does  come  up  against  me,  does  enter  my 
consciousness.  Sensation  and  perception  are  names  for 
coming  across  objects,  apprehending  them,  in  sense ;  an 
idea  is  the  presentation  of  an  object  in  thought.  To  say 
that  I  only  know  my  own  ideas  can  mean  no  more  than 
that  I  do  not  know  the  objects  which  I  do  not  know.  The 
objects  come  to  me  and  come  against  me,  I  reckon  on 
them  and  must  reckon  with  them,  and  therefore  in  that 
sense  they  are  so  far  real.  Some  are  to  be  reckoned  with 
far  more  than  others ;  and  therefore  have  greater  reality ; 
they  have  more  power  of  expansion,  involve  more,  will  show 
themselves  in  more  lights  and  answer  more  questions. 
There  is  more  to  be  made  of  a  live  man  than  of  a  man  in  a 
dream,  especially  after  I  have  awakened  from  the  dream. 
But,  since  they  determine  my  seeing,  since  they  are  stuff 
that  I  apprehend,  some  reality  is  in  them  all. 

At  present  all  this  seems  to  me  so  plain  that  it  is 
difficult  to  argue  about  it.  I  seem  to  myself  to  be  stating 
nothing  but  the  barest  facts  of  living1.  Descartes  only 
expressed  half  the  basal  certainty ;  for,  since  I  think,  not 
only  must  there  be  an  I  to  think  but  there  must  be 

1  Eussell  says  the  theses  in  question  are  "  generally  rejected."  Surely 
this  implies  some  misunderstanding  on  his  part,  or  on  mine,  or  on  the 
part  of  the  major  part  of  the  world. 


THE   VARIOUSNESS   OF  REALITY  125 

something  that  I  think  of.  What  I  am,  and  what  the 
something  is,  of  course  remains  to  be  determined.  But 
so  far  as  this  description  goes  realism  appears  to  be 
unanswerable,  and  subjective  idealism  to  be  a  most 
elaborate,  unnecessary  and  ill-founded  structure  built 
upon  it. 

Let  us  then  assume  the  truth  of  this  form  of  realism, 
and  go  on  to  develop  some  of  its  consequences. 

Universes  of  Reality. 

It  is  clear  that  these  different  objects  will  fall  con- 
veniently into  various  groups.  This  is  a  fact  of  observa- 
tion ;  it  is  by  no  means  essential  to  the  theory  of  realism. 
If  all  things  had  the  same  sort  of  reality,  if  no  two  had, 
if  we  never  met  the  same  object  twice  or  if  we  never 
met  any  object  but  one,  still  if  we  met  anything,  if  we 
were  conscious  at  all,  we  should  be  apprehending  a  real 
world.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  we  do  find  these 
different  groups,  and  we  speak  of  them  conveniently  as 
belonging  to  different  universes  of  reality. 

One  great  group,  peculiarly  interesting  for  all  our 
practical  purposes,  is  that  of  physical  objects  ;  existing  in 
ordinary  time  and  space.  Closely  connected  with  it  yet 
not  exactly  identical  with  it  is  the  world  of  "  homeless  " 
yet  somehow  actual  objects ;  of  notes  and  colours,  of 
shapes  and  relations  and  complexes,  of  such  "  objectives  " 
as  hold  good  of  the  actual  world.  There  is  the  world  of 
the  objects  with  which  mathematics  deals,  and  so  on. 

Besides  these,  there  are  groups  more  remote.  The 
objects  I  meet  in  a  dream  are  real,  for  they  do  meet  me  ; 
but  they  are  out  of  connection  with  the  objects  of  my 


126  THE   VARIOUSNESS   OF   REALITY 

waking  life.  When  I  try  to  remember  a  dream,  as  opposed 
to  trying  to  continue  it,  I  have  lost  touch  with  these 
objects,  and  can  only  turn  the  former  content  into  an 
object  after  the  fashion  of  ordinary  psychological  investi- 
gation. But  while  the  dream  lasts  I  am  exploring  the 
object  itself;  asking  continually  not  "What  am  I  thinking 
of  you  ? "  but  "  What  will  you  do  next  ? "  And  the  object 
proves  its  reality  by  doing.  Then  there  are  all  the  worlds 
of  fiction.  "  The  golden  mountain  of  fairy-tale  is  as  little 
identical  with  my  image  of  it  as  the  real  mountain  is 
identical  with  my  image  of  it1."  "  Selbst  wenn  wir  die 
Centauren  oder  die  goldenen  Berge  des  Marchens  vor- 
stellen,  so  sind  sie  fiir  uns  doch  da  draussen  im  Fabelland 
und  nicht  'in  uns  '2."  "  When  I  judge  that  Athene  was  the 
daughter  of  Zeus,  I  am  not  making  this  statement  about 
an  idea  in  the  heads  of  the  Greeks3." 

In  contemplating  these  objects  we  are  not  making 
objects  of  our  own  processes.  It  is  possible,  however,  to 
do  this,  and  such  objects  will  not  fall  behind  others  in 
their  possession  of  trans-subjective  reality.  The  objects 
of  "  inner  perception,"  says  Lipps,  though  they  have  not 
existence  independent  of  my  whole  consciousness,  are  still 
independent  of  my  present  consciousness.  "  When  once 
an  experience  has  occurred  it  is  a  fact  eternally  real, 
whether  or  not  I  am  now  conscious  of  it4." 

Finally,  we  must  mention  in  particular  a  class  which 
involves  some  special  difficulties — that  of  objects  with  an 
internal  inconsistency.  We  seem  to  meet  with  them  when 

1  A.  Hoernle,  Mind,  1907,  p.  87. 

2  Munsterberg,  Psychologic,  p.  49. 

3  Meinong,  Stellung  der  Gegenstandstheorie,  p.  48. 

4  Bewusstsein  und  Gegenstande,  p.  51. 


THE  VARIOUSNESS   OF  EEALITY  127 

for  argument's  sake  we  invent  such  a  term  as  "green 
crimson,"  or  whenever  for  practical  purposes  we  employ  a 
reductio  ad  absurdum  proof1.  I  believe  that  these  are  real 
objects  like  the  rest,  but  their  reality  has  been  denied 
and  will  need  special  examination  presently. 

Specification  of  Universe. 

In  ordinary  judgment  we  seldom  trouble  to  express  in 
words  the  situation  of  the  particular  sphere  of  reality  in 
which  our  objects  exist.  Sometimes  this  is  only  because 
the  whole  content  of  our  thought  is  not  put  into  words. 
If  I  describe  an  imaginary  episode  in  a  few  sentences  both 
I  and  my  hearer  are  probably  aware  throughout  that  my 
statements  refer  to  a  non-actual  universe,  and  it  would 
be  absurd  to  make  an  explicit  assertion  of  this  fact. 
Often,  however,  the  nature  of  the  universe  concerned  is 
not  included  in  the  content  of  cognition,  though  it  is  ready 
to  appear  there  at  any  moment.  When  I  read  a  novel  for 
half  an  hour  at  a  time  I  "  know "  that  its  universe  is 
outside  the  actual  world — that  is  to  say  that  I  should 
admit  it  at  once  if  the  question  were  raised  ;  nevertheless 
throughout  most  of  my  reading  the  matter  is  not  before 
my  mind  at  all.  I  know  it ;  there  is  no  illusion  ;  but  I  am 
not  knowing  it.  I  am  interested  in  the  universe  of  the 
novel,  not  in  its  relation  to  any  other  universe ;  and  there- 
fore I  find  it  uncomfortable,  and  the  focus  of  the  picture 
is  clumsily  disturbed,  if  the  author  suddenly  introduces  a 
statement  about  a  certain  episode  being  founded  or  not 
founded  on  fact.  But  it  is  absolutely  unfair  to  conclude 
that  therefore  my  enjoyment  of  fiction  is  founded  on 

1  Meinong,  Stellung  der  Gegenstandstheorie,  Chapter  II. 


128  THE   VARIOUSNESS   OF   REALITY 

illusion1.  There  is  never  illusion  unless  there  is  a  mistake, 
and  it  seems  very  hard  to  be  accused  of  making  a  mis- 
take in  a  judgment  of  relation  simply  because  I  am  not  at 
the  moment  thinking  about  the  relation  at  all. 

Baldwin's  .account  of  our  assignments  of  objects  to 
their  universes  forms  one  of  the  best  parts  in  Thought 
and  Things.  "  Every  object  of  cognition  has  subsistence2 
as  simply  made-up  or  present-existence  comes  later,  when 
the  object  is  determined  as  existing  in  one  or  other  of 
alternate  spheres.  Existence  is  not  a  content  added.  It 
is  rather  an  intent,  an  aspect  of  a  content  already  made-up, 
whereby  it  is  recognised  as  fulfilling  a  certain  sort  of  ex- 
pectation or  demand  made  upon  it."  "  An  existential 
judgment  often  for  the  first  time  determines  the  real 
reference  or  control  of  a  content  which  has  already  had 
formulation  in  a  predicative  or  relational  context.  The 
relational  meaning  may  be  determined  in  the  logical 
mode,  while  the  real  reference  is  still  schematic,  alterna- 
tive, or  quite  undetermined.  For  example,  I  may  say 
c  Sea-serpents  hiss  '  before  I  am  at  all  prepared  to  say 
whether  they  exist  or  not,  and  in  what  realm."  "  Instead 
of  saying  with  Bradley  that  in  judging  'the  sea-serpent 
exists'  we  have  qualified  the  real  world  by  the  adjective 
of  the  sea-serpent,  I  should  say  that  we  have  qualified  the 
sea-serpent  by  the  adjective  of  realness  of  a  restricted  sort. 
The  'realness'  is  constituted  just  by  the... recognition  of 
the  sea-serpent  as  a  '  controlled  '  content.  Of  course,  after 

1  As  e.g.  Hoernle,  Mind,  1907,  p.  88. 

2  Baldwin  says  that  his  "subsistence"  is  equivalent  to  Meinong's 
Bestand;   but  in  Meinong's   usage  we  deny  Bestand  of   e.g.  relations 
which  do  not  hold  (such  as  the  difference  between  two  exactly  similar 
things).    For  Baldwin  these  have  subsistence  since  they  are  objects  of 
thought.     More  words  are  needed. 


THE   VARIOQSNESS   OF   REALITY  129 

reality  as  a  logical  universal  has  arisen,  we  may  use  it 
substantively  to  the  various  contents  as  adjectives,  as  is 
seen  especially  in  negative  judgments  of  existence."  "  The 
pre-supposition  of  a  sphere  of  existence  or  reality  is  always 
the  sleeping-partner  in  the  entire  firm-meaning  expressed 
as  '  Content,  Ltd.'  until  this  partner  claims  the  right,  in 
the  existential  judgment,  to  have  his  name  written  out 
in  the  firm-title,  *  Content,  Reality,  &  Co.1 ' " 

Notes  on  Difference  of  Universe. 

Confusion  occurs  when  the  task  of  remembering  the 
distinction  between  two  universes  becomes  too  delicate 
and  difficult  for  us.  Sometimes,  however,  we  seem  to 
fall  into  the  other  mistake  of  forgetting  identity.  To  a 
schoolboy,  and  indeed  I  think  to  most  of  us,  the  person- 
ages of  a  remote  period  of  history  fail  to  appear  as  in  a 
world  continuous  with  our  own.  They  are  not  actual 
to  us ;  we  think  of  the  time-series  of  their  lives  almost 
as  if  it  were  the  time-series  of  a  novel;  not  as  part  of 
the  time  in  which  we  live.  I  do  not  know  whether 
it  shows  a  peculiar  defect  in  my  intelligence  that  I 
find  the  same  difficulty  even  with  people  and  events 
of  the  present  day  if  they  belong  to  distant  parts  of  the 
world. 

Of  course,  since  "  universe  of  reality  "  is  no  more  than  a 
picturesque  name  for  kind  or  department  of  reality,  it  will 
often  be  indifferent  whether  we  speak  of  two  universes  or 
of  divisions  of  one  universe,  or  of  one  universe  qualified  in 
a  certain  way,  or  thought  of  in  abstraction  from  some 
property  which  really  belongs  to  it.  It  depends  on  our 

1  Thought  and  Things,  Vol.  i.,  pp.  240,  241;  Vol.  n.,  pp.  20,  21,  25. 
W  9 


130  THE   VARIOUSNESS   OF   REALITY 

own  taste  whether  we  say  that  the  older  writers  on 
political  economy  dealt  with  our  actual  world  or  with 
some  other.  And  when  a  remark  is  prefaced  by  the 
phrase  "  humanly  speaking "  I  am  never  sure,  nor  do  I 
think  the  speaker  is  always  sure,  whether  it  is  meant  to 
apply  to  actual  fact  or  not.  But  we  must  be  prepared  to 
recognise  divisions  when  they  are  convenient,  unless  we 
are  to  put  too  great  a  strain  on  our  psychology.  Such  a 
strain  appears  to  be  involved  in  all  attempts  to  impose 
the  same  centre  or  scheme  of  localisation  on  all  universes. 
When  I  say  "  I  have  just  been  enjoying  the  scent  of  these 
roses,"  the  reality  apprehended  is  naturally  and  suitably 
described  as  being  "  continuous  with  present  perception." 
But  the  description  is  very  much  less  appropriate  when  we 
say  "The  death  of  her  first  child  was  a  terrible  shock  to  my 
sister,"  and  it  becomes  almost  absurd  when  our  judgments 
are  "  Pharaoh's  daughter  walked  by  the  river,"  "  Perdita 
was  abandoned  on  the  sea-coast  of  Bohemia,"  and  "Of 
imaginary  curves  of  such  a  kind  the  following  equation 
holds."  The  reality  of  these  objects  is  no  doubt  continuous 
with  that  of  present  perception  in  the  sense  that  by  taking 
pains  we  could  find  the  way  round.  But  this  way  round 
does  not  enter  into  our  ordinary  thought.  Nor,  even  when 
we  do  see  something  of  it,  need  that  element  which  is 
nearest  actuality  be  also  nearest  the  centre  of  the  picture. 
In  a  historical  novel  we  usually  date  the  real  events 
with  reference  to  the  fictitious  events,  and  not  these  by 
those, 

As  we  must  allow  each  universe  the  right  to  its  own 
schemes  of  localisation,  so  must  we  allow  to  each  its  own 
sense  of  "  existential  judgment,"  and  its  own  distinction 
between  necessary  truths  and  truths  of  mere  fact.  We 


THE   VAKIOUSNESS   OF   REALITY  131 

may  have  a  merely  categorical  judgment  within  a  ficti- 
tious as  well  as  within  the  actual  world.  Contrast  "  The 
Utopians  are  a  singularly  orderly  nation  "  with  "  If  another 
nation  attacked  them  they  would  naturally  defend  them- 
selves in  the  following  way."  The  distinction  between 
categorical  and  conditional  would  be  no  clearer  if  these 
judgments  referred  to  the  inhabitants  of  Germany1. 

1  This  in  criticism  of  the  mode  of  expression  in  Bosanquet's  Logic, 
Vol.  i.,  pp.  116,  215. 


9—2 


CHAPTER  XII 

ASSUMPTIONS 

AMONGST  the  objects  just  described  occur  some  which 
have  a  peculiar  and  interesting  quality,  in  that  they  are 
created  by  our  own  choice.  At  the  moment  of  appre- 
hension I  deliberately  determine  the  character  of  the 
object  I  am  to  apprehend.  I  can  do  this  in  the  actual 
world,  by  building  three  ships  and  seeing  them  completed. 
Or  I  can  do  it  in  non-actual  worlds  by  means  simply  of 
the  fiat,  "Let  there  be  three  ships."  That  is,  I  can 
assume. 

Assumption  in  its  ordinary  concrete  use  is  a  double- 
sided  term,  and  we  must  be  careful  not  to  confuse  the 
two  elements  it  implies.  We  create  our  objects,  and  in 
the  same  moment  we  apprehend  them,  and  the  two  pro- 
cesses are  as  distinct  as  they  are  in  the  building  and 
seeing  of  an  actual  ship.  The  being  of  an  assumption- 
object  is  in  no  way  dependent  upon  my  apprehension  of 
it,  inevitable  though  that  apprehension  is.  It  is  dependent 
upon  the  act  of  creation  alone.  The  cognitive  element  in 
an  assumption  differs  in  no  way  from  any  other  cognition. 
Here  as  elsewhere  cognition  is  nothing  but  the  presenta- 
tion of  reality  in  consciousness,  only  in  this  case  the  reality 
presented  is  our  o.wn  creation. 


ASSUMPTIONS  133 

The  Peculiarity  of  Creation  by  Assumption. 

When  I  write  a  chapter  in  a  novel  I  do  in  a  different 
universe  precisely  what  I  do  when  in  the  actual  world 
I  build  a  ship.  I  enlarge  reality  ;  create  more  objects  for 
the  apprehension  of  myself  and  of  others.  These  objects 
would  be  real  if  they  were  only  presented  once  and  then 
destroyed  and  forgotten ;  but  in  most  cases  they  have 
much  more  reality  than  this,  since  they  are  capable  of 
being  presented  again  and  again,  of  being  looked  at  in 
various  aspects,  of  being  explored  and  developed  in  con- 
sciousness to  an  indefinite  extent. 

The  only  difficulty  in  this  matter  seems  to  lie  in  the 
distinction  of  universes.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  keep 
one's  mind  clear  as  to  the  exact  kind  of  reality  which  has 
been  created. 

To  begin  with,  we  have  the  ambiguity  of  the  phrase 

"  Let  there  be ,"  "  Let  it  be  so."  The  effect  of  this  is 

sometimes  an  alteration  in  the  actual  world ;  it  is  the  fiat 
of  creation  in  this  world.  More  often,  however,  we  intend  to 
make  no  such  alteration  but  only  to  assume  it.  The  actual 
change  does  not  occur  in  the  world  of  actuality.  Our 
assumption  has  reference  to  the  actual  world,  but  creates 
its  object  in  the  sphere  of  fiction. 

Next,  take  a  universe  which  is  already  non-actual.  Let 
it  be  that  of  a  novel  in  course  of  composition.  "  Henry  is 
not  yet  utterly  depraved.  Let  him  be  placed  in  a  position 
of  responsibility  and  it  may  save  him  yet.  If  a  sudden  and 
striking  call  were  to  come  he  could  probably  pull  himself 
together.  But  no  such  chance  of  redemption  is  to  be 
granted  him."  That  is,  even  in  the  fictitious  world  of  the 
novel,  the  events  I  apprehend  are  not  to  be  actual.  My 


134  ASSUMPTIONS 

assumption  has  reference  to  the  novel  universe,  but  creates 
its  object  in  a  world  more  fictitious  still.  I  create  against 
the  background  of  the  novel  but  in  a  different  material1. 

Thus  we  may  lay  down  the  rule  that  assumption 
never  creates  in  the  universe  to  which  it  refers.  A  new 
universe  is  always  introduced,  one  remove  further  from 
actuality.  I  can  assume  an  assumption — "  Suppose  your 
opponent  in  this  game  of  chess  were  to  think  of  your 
attacking  him  thus."  Or  I  may  make  the  hero  of  my 
play  write  a  novel  in  which  the  heroine  writes  a  short 
story  describing  the  writing  of  an  epic.  Every  assumption 
brings  in  a  new  universe  without  the  slightest  confusion ; 
every  creation  is  in  a  new  material. 

Finally,  as  before,  an  object  in  each  of  these  universes 
has  its  own  sort  of  existence.  A  high  golden  mountain  is 
not  "  actually"  high,  nor  does  an  existent  golden  mountain 
actually  exist,  since  they  do  not  enter  actuality  at  all.  But 
in  their  own  universe  they  are  high  and  they  do  exist2.  The 
word  "  actually"  is  indeed  quite  ambiguous  on  this  account. 

Conative  Analogy  for  Assumption. 

When  Mr  Hoernle,  in  a  passage  quoted  above,  sug- 
gested that  our  enjoyment  of  fiction  rested  on  illusion,  he 
supported  his  argument  by  the  observation  that  a  wish 

1  In  such  a  phrase  as  "  Let  ABC  be  an  equilateral  triangle  "  there  is 
the  same  ambiguity  as  we  noticed  at  first.   With  regard  to  the  universe  of 
real  space  I  am  assuming ;  in  the  universe  of  fictitious  geometrical  figures 
I  am  creating.     If  I  am  concerned  only  with  a  piece  of  paper  that  lies 
before  me,  then  my  phrase  expresses  no  assumption  but  a  simple  impera- 
tive issuing  in  a  bodily  action.     It  is  in  exactly  the  same  case  as  "Let  us 
build  a  ship."     "Let  us  imagine  a  triangle"  lies  between  the  two.     In 
regard  to  the  world  of  images  it  is  actual  creation,  in  regard  to  that  of 
sense-perception  it  may  fairly  be  called  assumption. 

2  Of.  Meinong,  Stellung  der  Gegenstandstheorie,  p.  17. 


ASSUMPTIONS  135 

can  only  be  maintained  if  we  suppress  the  collision  of  its 
idea  with  reality,  and  that  if  it  is  maintained  it  tends  to 
become  a  desire.  I  urge  that  this  analogy  is  wrong. 
A  wish  belongs  to  my  "actual"  self;  it  is  an  incipient 
desire,  kept  from  passing  into  action  by  the  fact  that  the 
resistance  of  the  environment  (to  neglect  more  compli- 
cated cases)  makes  action  hopeless.  This  is  analogous  to 
an  object  which  is  apprehended  in  the  actual  world  and 
which  yet  is  unable,  on  account  of  the  weakness  of  my 
mind,  to  gain  my  full  attention  and  to  work  itself  out  in 
full  and  consistent  belief.  If  my  puzzle-headedness  gave 
way  a  little  my  attention  would  be  gained  and  the 
development  would  take  place.  If  the  mental  weakness 
increased  even  the  marginal  apprehension  would  dis- 
appear. Similarly  Mr  Hoernle  is  right  in  saying  that  any 
relaxation  of  the  known  pressure  of  the  environment  will 
turn  the  wish  into  a  desire  (and  then  into  an  impulse), 
whilst  an  increase  of  the  restraining  pressure  may  abolish 
it  even  as  a  wish1. 

If  then  a  wish  in  the  conative  sphere  does  not  corre- 
spond to  an  assumption  in  the  cognitive,  what  shall  we 
say  is  the  true  conative  analogy  for  assuming  ? 

So  far  as  I  can  see,  the  following  is  the  proper  line  of 
argument.  When  we  assume,  conation  enters  in  a  peculiar 
way  into  the  cognitive  world.  Normally  it  enters  only  in 
the  activity  of  apprehending  objects  which  were  already 
real,  as  when  we  look  round  to  acquire  new  perceptions, 
or  as  when  we  draw  inferences  from  facts  which  we  know. 

1  For  the  whole  scheme  of  the  cognitive-conative  analogy  as  I  see  it  I 
must  refer  to  my  Logic  of  Will.  When  I  wrote  this,  however,  I  was  un- 
acquainted with  the  notion  of  Scheingefuhle,  and  the  scheme  might  now 
be  greatly  extended  by  their  means. 


136  ASSUMPTIONS 

But  in  assumption  we  have  not  only  a  new  apprehension, 
but  a  new  object  is  created  for  us  to  apprehend.  So  in 
the  analogy  cognition  must  enter  peculiarly  into  the 
conative  sphere.  Its  normal  entrance  develops  our  estab- 
lished dispositions  by  setting  before  us  new  objects  which 
would  satisfy  established  desires,  or  by  finding  means  to  our 
ends  ;  but  in  the  case  analogous  to  assumption  it  must  so 
enter  as  to  create  a  new  disposition  in  us.  Further,  the 
new  object  which  is  created  by  assuming  has  a  reality 
which  is  not  that  of  the  actual  world,  and  therefore  the 
new  disposition  must  be  separated  from  the  actual  in 
some  equivalent  way. 

It  appears  to  me  that  these  conditions  are  satisfied  by 
a  slight  modification  of  Meinong's  answer  to  the  problem. 
For  him  the  analogy  for  assumption  is  a  "Phantasiegefuhl1." 
I  should  prefer  to  say  that  it  was  a  fantasy-cZm're.  "If 
I  were  the  last  person  left  alive  in  the  world  and  my  cat 
were  the  last  animal,  I  should  greatly  desire  that  the  cat 
should  remain  alive  and  fond  of  me."  Here  is  a  desire 
which  is  cut  off  from  actuality  as  an  ordinary  wish  is  not 
cut  off.  The  person  supposed  to  be  concerned  need  not 
even  be  myself;  I  have  fantasy-desires  when  in  watching 
a  play  or  in  reading  a  powerful  novel  I  take  upon  myself 
the  impulse  and  feeling  of  the  hero  of  the  drama. 

In  assumption  and  in  dramatic  desiring  we  have 
analogous  creations,  of  objective  and  subjective  elements 
which  are  not  actual  and  which  yet  in  their  special  way 
are  real.  In  assumption  the  actual  world  has  nothing 
added  to  it,  except  in  the  sense  that  an  event  of  assump- 
tion has  actually  taken  place.  But  the  whole  real  universe 
is  increased,  because  the  newly  created  object  has  such 
1  See,  e.g.,  fiber  Annahmen. 


ASSUMPTIONS  137 

reality  that  at  least  one  presentation  of  it  is  possible. 
In  Einfuhlung  or  in  any  fantasy-conation  the  complex  of 
dispositions  which  makes  my  actual  self  has  nothing 
added  to  it,  except  by  means  of  this  exercising  and 
strengthening  of  my  emotional  imagination.  But  my 
whole  self,  which  is  not  merely  the  actual,  is  increased, 
for  I  have  added  the  personality  of  another  to  my  own, 
with  such  reality  as  allows  of  at  least  some  of  his  cona- 
tions existing  in  me.  By  force  of  Shakespeare's  invention 
the  universe  contains  both  himself  and  Othello.  By  force 
of  the  sympathy  of  a  lad  in  his  audience  that  lad's  self 
contains  not  only  himself  but  Othello  as  well1. 

Returning  to  Mr  Hoernle's  statements,  we  see  that 
this  change  in  analogy  has  freed  assumption  from  its 
connection  with  illusion.  The  passage  into  actual  desire 
and  conation  is  normal  for  an  actual  wish  but  not  for  a 
fantasy-impulse.  Similarly  assumption  in  itself,  apart  from 
confusion  and  error,  involves  no  blending  of  universes. 

Truth  and  Falsehood  in  Assumption- Worlds. 

There  is  no  real  Ivanhoe,  says  Professor  James,  but  as 
many  different  Ivanhoes  as  there  are  different  minds  cog- 
nisant of  the  story.  An  alteration  in  one  man's  version 
does  not  affect  that  of  any  other  man,  and  we  are  con- 
fusing universes  if  we  appeal  from  our  differences  to  the 
idea  in  Scott's  mind2.  One  would  say  that  common  opinion 
would  hardly  go  so  far  as  Professor  James.  It  is  true 

1  Of  course  in  this  contrast  of  the  actual  with  the  rest  of  the  real  no 
disparagement  of  the  former  is  intended.     That  which  actually  exists, 
which  actually  happens,  which  is  actually  true,  has  by  far  the  fullest  and 
richest  kind  of  reality. 

2  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  pp.  27,  28. 


138 


ASSUMPTIONS 


that  we  change  universes  if  we  begin  to  speak  of  Scott 
where  we  have  hitherto  spoken  only  of  Wilfrid  and 
Rowena;  whilst  we  are  reading  intelligently  we  are  not 
regarding  these  personages  as  ideas  in  the  author's  mind. 
Nevertheless  we  should  surely  feel  ourselves  justified  in 
appealing,  not  to  "Scott's  idea,"  but  to  the  "real"  story, 
related  in  this  case  in  a  particular  book.  If  anyone  departs 
from  this  account  of  events  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that 
he  has  gone  wrong;  and  for  this  very  reason  his  alterations 
fail  to  affect  our  own  views.  The  case  would  be  altered  of 
course  if  our  companion  declared  his  intention  of  writing 
a  new  novel  on  the  same  subject  as  Scott;  we  should  then 
have  to  make  it  clear  in  future  (not  which  author  we  meant 
to  imitate,  but)  to  which  version  we  meant  to  conform. 

It  is  a  curious  but  inevitable  fact  that  the  creator  of 
any  world  has  the  rights  of  a  despot  within  it  just  so  far 
as  he  chooses  to  employ  those  rights.  If  Shakespeare 
makes  Sir  Toby  get  drunk  every  day  then  he  does  get 
drunk,  and  no  regrets  on  the  part  of  a  reader  can  make 
him  respectable  company  for  Olivia.  Yet  the  impossibility 
is  partly  determined  by  the  very  fact  that  the  author  has 
not  chosen  to  be  an  absolutely  arbitrary  despot.  The 
drunkenness  he  decreed,  but  for  the  rest  he  left  his  world 
to  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  law  of  actuality,  that 
people  who  behave  in  this  way  are  not  respectable.  In 
general  all  created  worlds  conform  to  these  laws  except  so 
far  as  their  creators  explicitly  abolish  them.  It  is  false 
to  say  that  princes  are  ever  turned  into  swans,  or  that 
a  man  can  live  when  he  is  marble  from  the  waist  down, 
or  that  the  noise  of  breaking  ice  can  become  a  man, 
unless  some  German  peasant  or  Arab  or  Esquimaux  has 
declared  with  authority  that  it  shall  be  true. 


ASSUMPTIONS  139 

It  is  surely  far  less  paradoxical  to  extend  our  theory 
of  truth  and  error  so  as  to  cover  statements  in  these 
assumption-worlds  than  to  follow  Professor  James1  in 
refusing  to  extend  them.  These  objects  which  we  partly 
create  and  for  which  we  partly  borrow  life  from  the 
ordinary  world  have  life  in  them  from  both  sides.  They 
have  solidity  and  resistance.  Their  presentation  in  con- 
sciousness can  develop  harmoniously  in  one  way  and  not 
in  another  way.  We  can  argue  about  any  good  novel ; 
can  maintain  not  only  "  Ivanhoe  did  this,"  but  also  "  He 
would  never  have  done  that."  Of  course  there  are  limits 
to  the  definiteness  of  structure  which  enables  us  thus  to 
argue,  because  in  no  humanly  created  world  can  creation 
be  so  concrete  as  to  determine  everything.  It  is  neither 
true  nor  false  to  say  that  Viola  had  brown  hair.  And  a 
bad  novel  is  harder  to  argue  about  than  a  good,  because 
its  personages  have  so  much  less  in  them. 

Now  there  is  another  reason  on  account  of  which  a 
bad  novel  may  baffle  our  arguments.  That  is,  it  may 
have  a  definite  structure  which  is  inconsistent  with 
itself.  It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  discuss  the  probable 
colour  of  a  heroine's  hair  if  in  Chapter  1  her  eyes  are 
a  velvety  brown  and  in  Chapter  8  they  are  sapphire  blue. 
So  again  we  may  be  baffled  by  Dr  Venn's  bad  theologian 2, 
who  inquires  what  the  duty  of  a  Christian  would  be  in 
case  his  God  issued  an  immoral  command.  We  cannot 
argue ;  not  only  because  the  given  laws  of  our  universe 
are  not  extensive  enough,  but  because  their  nature  invali- 
dates the  ordinary  convention  that  in  case  of  doubt  we 
proceed  on  the  laws  of  the  actual  world.  Here  we  only 

1  And  Mr  Bussell?     See  the  next  section. 

2  Empirical  Logic,  p.  390. 


140  ASSUMPTIONS 

know  that  one  of  the  most  fundamental  of  these  laws, 
that  of  non-contradiction,  does  not  hold  ;  and  it  is  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  say  what  is  left  to  guide  us.  We  know, 
moreover,  that  the  inventor  himself  is  not  prepared  to 
decide  the  question  (as  he  has  the  right  to  do),  because  he 
has  not  noticed  what  he  has  done.  If  he  did  know  it,  it 
would  be  much  better  worth  while  to  discuss  the  con- 
sequences, and  we  might  be  able  to  give  him  advice  on 
the  most  reasonable  method  of  procedure. 

This  brings  us  to  a  curious  and  interesting  subject — 
that  of  objects  which  are  deliberately  created  with  an 
inconsistency  in  their  natures. 

The  Problem  of  Self -Contradictory  Objects. 

What  are  we  to  say  of  such  objects  as  "  a  pentagon 
with  six  corners,"  or  "  crimson  green "  ? 

They  evidently  create  many  difficulties,  and  the 
simplest  plan  would  be  to  deny  that  there  were  any  such 
objects.  Yet  in  every  presentation  something  must  be 
presented.  Therefore  we  must  take  one  or  other  of  two 
alternatives ;  we  must  either  deny  that  any  presentation 
at  all  corresponds  to  such  phrases  as  those  given  above, 
or  else  we  must  hold  that  what  is  presented  is  not  what 
at  first  sight  it  seems  to  be.  These  are  the  only  methods 
by  which  we  can  avoid  the  admission  of  self-contradictory 
objects  into  some  universe. 

The  first  method  is  that  used  by  Lipps1.  The  thought 
corresponding  to  such  phrases,  he  says,  is  only  an  attempt 
at  thought.  It  is  not  merely  that  we  cannot  image  the 
objects,  for  we  can  and  must  think  of  many  things  which 

1  Bewusstsein  und  Gegenstdnde,  pp.  60 — 62. 


ASSUMPTIONS  141 

we  are  unable  to  image — infinite  space  for  instance.  It 
is  that  we  cannot  think  of  them  at  all.  The  second  plan 
is  Mr  Russell's1.  When  we  use  the  phrases  in  question 
objects  are  denoted,  but  objects  of  a  singularly  remote 
and  complicated  kind,  which  contain  no  inconsistency. 

Lipps'  solution  seems  to  me  to  be  blocked  by  psycho- 
logical facts.  The  phrases  which  indicate  self-contradictory 
objects  are  used  intelligently;  they  are  not  mere  com- 
plexes of  sounds,  and  it  seems  impossible  that  no  real 
thought  should  correspond  to  them.  A  reductio  ad 
absurdum  proof,  gone  through  with  a  knowledge  of  what 
the  end  will  be — gone  through  therefore  as  a  deliberate 
examination  of  a  self-contradictory  object,  is  surely  not 
a  mere  attempt  at  thought.  Mr  Russell's  solution  allows 
it  to  be  considered  as  good  and  intelligent  thought,  and 
indeed  at  first  sight  he  seems  to  attribute  to  us  an  almost 
unheard-of  degree  of  intelligence.  Introspection  is  diffi- 
cult, and  when  the  question  is  raised  it  is  not  always 
possible  to  tell  exactly  what  we  have  been  thinking  of; 
yet  I  felt  it  at  first  impossible  to  believe  that  in  an 
ordinary  quiet  moment  of  my  life,  when  I  did  not  know 
that  I  was  doing  anything  extraordinary,  I  had  really 
been  contemplating  the  objects  described  by  Mr  Russell. 
On  consideration,  however,  this  would  seem  to  be  hardly 
a  fair  objection,  for  we  may  contemplate  the  most  com- 
plicated object  without  noticing  its  complication  provided 
that  it  only  shows  us  part  of  itself,  or  that  it  is  presented 
with  a  fallacious  appearance  of  simplicity. 

The  real  objection  to  both  accounts  is,  to  my  mind, 
the  limits  they  set  to  our  imagination.  When  I  set  out 
deliberately  to  think  of  a  self- contradictory  object,  can 
1  "  On  Denoting,"  Mind,  1905. 


142  ASSUMFTIONS 

I  Dot  do  so  ?  No  assumption-object,  after  all,  has  reality 
unless  I,  by  assuming  it,  deliberately  give  it  reality.  In 
all  such  bestowal  of  reality  I  depart  from  the  strict  law  of 
the  actual  world  and  create  a  world  which  is  partly  new. 
Cannot  I,  if  I  so  wish  and  purpose,  set  the  law  of  non- 
contradiction aside  ?  Against  Lipps  I  maintain  that  in 
all  the  present  discussion  I  am  thinking,  and  am  therefore 
thinking  of  an  object,  and  ipso  facto  of  a  real  object.  As 
against  Mr  Russell  I  maintain  that  the  objects  I  think 
of  are  by  no  means  so  difficult  to  apprehend  as  the  things 
which  in  his  view  my  phrases  denote,  but  that  on  the 
contrary  they  are  comparatively  simple  though  self- 
contradictory  presentments.  I  am  glad  to  find  myself 
here  in  agreement  with  Professor  Meinong.  Dr  Stout 
appears  to  disagree1,  yet  he  says  that  an  object  is  real  if 
it  is  possible  to  make  a  mistake  or  even  to  conceive  a 
mistake  concerning  it2;  and  certainly  in  the  matter  of 
self-contradictory  objects  Mr  Russell  conceives  that 
Professor  Meinong  is  making  a  mistake. 

Content  and  Object. 

Not  only  is  the  object  of  my  thought  self-contradictory, 
but  that  part  or  aspect  of  it  which  enters  my  thought 
includes  the  self-contradiction.  Here  as  on  the  general 
relation  of  content  and  object  I  differ  from  Twardowski, 
who  says  that  the  content  can  never  contain  a  self- 
contradiction,  and  that  therefore  the  object  must  be  real 

1  Personal  Idealism,  article  on  "Error,"  p.  37.     "There  is  only  one 
conceivable  way  in  which  the  abstract  object  can  be  unreal.     It  may  be 
unreal  because  by  its  own  intrinsic  nature  it  is  incapable  of  existing.   But 
this  can  be  the  case  only  when  it  is  internally  incoherent." 

2  Op.  cit.  p.  38. 


ASSUMPTIONS  143 

in  order  that  it  may  do  so.  The  content,  he  says,  must 
exist,  and  therefore  cannot  be  inconsistent ;  the  object 
may  be  inconsistent,  for  it  is  real  without  existing1.  In 
my  view  both  can  be  inconsistent  because  neither  of  them 
exists.  I  myself  am  the  only  actual  existent  in  the  case, 
unless  we  apply  the  term  to  my  act  of  apprehension,  which 
actually  occurs. 


The  Truth  about  Self-Contradictory  Objects. 

We  now  return  to  the  problem  we  approached  before. 
What  is  truth,  in  a  universe  where  by  hypothesis  a  self- 
contradiction  does  not  involve  falsehood  ? 

The  difficulty  seems  to  be  no  more  than  an  unusually 
acute  case  of  indeterminateness.  In  the  universe  of 
ordinary  fiction,  it  is  true  to  say  that  Sir  Toby  is  a 
drunkard  and  neither  true  nor  false  to  say  that  Viola  has 
brown  hair.  It  is  false  to  say  that  Viola  is  capable  of 
murdering  Sebastian  for  money : — not  because  this  incap- 
ability is  ever  asserted,  but  because  the  creator  of  this 
universe  has  evidently  taken  over  from  the  actual  universe 
the  law  that  human  beings  cannot  absolutely  belie  their 
characters.  For  similar  reasons  it  is  true  to  assert  that 
while  Orsino  is  in  his  own  garden  he  cannot  be  in  Olivia's. 
But  we  find  greater  difficulties  in  a  universe  where  we 
know  that  one  self-contradiction  at  least  is  according  to 
law.  Are  we  to  consider  the  law  of  non-contradiction  as 
abrogated  altogether,  or  is  it  to  hold  except  in  this  one 
case  ?  and  how  far  does  this  exempted  case  extend  ?  The 
creator  of  the  universe  must  decide,  but  if  he  has  not 

1  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand,  p.  23. 


144  ASSUMPTIONS 

decided  we  must  presume  that  he  followed  the  ordinary 
conventions  of  world-making,  and  then  we  may  fairly 
discuss  what  in  this  case  the  convention  would  naturally 
decree. 

Meinong's  decision  seems  to  me  a  fair  one.  In  my 
way  of  putting  the  matter,  it  amounts  to  saying  that  the 
ordinary  laws  must  be  supposed  to  hold  wherever  they  are 
not  explicitly  denied.  The  same  reason  which  makes  it 
true  to  say  that  green  grass  is  green  and  that  a  golden 
mountain  is  golden,  also  requires  us  to  say  that  a  round 
square  is  round1.  The  roundness  of  a  square  is  an  im- 
possible Sosein,  nevertheless  the  roundness  of  a  round 
square  is  not  impossible  but  necessary2.  Similarly  an 
existent  round  square  is  existent  though  of  course  it 
cannot  actually  exist3. 

As  far  as  I  understand  the  dispute,  Mr  Russell  would 
have  no  special  reason  to  object  to  this  solution  if  he  could 
admit  that  the  self-contradictory  objects  were  real  at  all. 
His  fundamental  difficulty  lies  only  in  their  initial  breach 
of  the  law  of  non-contradiction.  Meinong  urges  that  this 


1  Gegenstandstheorie  und  Psychologic,  p.  8. 

2  Mally,  op.  cit.,  pp.  128,  129. 


3  It  is  existent,  that  is,  just  as  it  is  round,  in  its  own  universe. 
Kussell  seems  to  miss  this  point  when  he  says  that  he  can  see  no  differ- 
ence between  "  is  existent  "  and  "  exists  "  (Mind,  1907,  p.  439).  The  words 
of  course  are  ambiguous  and  indifferent ;  "  to  exist  actually"  only  means 
"  to  be  existent  in  the  actual  world."  But  the  distinction  of  universes  is 
all-important,  and  has  nothing  special  to  do  with  the  self-contradiction  in 
these  objects.  I  create  for  myself  at  this  moment  the  object  of  thought 
"an  existent  plane  figure  with  973  one-inch  sides."  This  is  existent  in 
its  own  universe,  for  I  have  decreed  it  so,  and  its  sides  are  of  the  required 
number  and  length.  But  it  will  not  be  existent  in  the  actual  world  until 
I  take  the  trouble  to  draw  it.  Shakespeare  creates  a  house  for  Olivia, 
and  it  exists,  but  is  not  "actually  "  existent.  Cf.  Stellung  der  Gegenstands- 
theorie, pp.  16,  17. 


ASSUMPTIONS  145 

law  applies  undamaged  to  all  that  is  actual  or  possible1, 
but  Mr  Russell  objects  that  it  is  of  propositions,  not  of 
subjects,  that  the  law  is  asserted,  and  that  "  to  suppose 
that  two  contradictory  propositions  can  both  be  true  seems 
equally  inadmissible  whatever  their  subjects  may  be2." 
I  suppose  Meinong  would  reply  that  it  was  not  equally 
inadmissible ;  that  the  law  applied  to  assertions  made 
with  reference  to  the  actual  world,  not  to  the  worlds 
which  we  made  for  ourselves. 

The  question  perhaps  reduces  itself  to  a  matter  of  words 
and  of  convenience  in  the  end.  It  would  be  possible  without 
inconsistency  to  limit  the  term  "  reality  "  to  such  objects 
as  are  either  actual  or  connected  with  the  actual  world  in 
a  way  in  which  fictitious  objects  are  not  connected.  Sir 
Toby  would  still  be  a  real  object,  but  only  as  being  an 
actual  invention  of  Shakespeare's.  It  would  be  false  to 
say  that  he  was  a  drunkard.  It  would  be  true  to  say 
"  Shakespeare  says  that  Viola  had  a  brother,"  but  false  to 
say  either  that  she  would  or  that  she  would  not  have 
murdered  him.  This  is,  I  think,  a  consistent  usage,  but 
I  do  not  consider  it  the  most  convenient.  I  am  not  quite 
sure  whether  or  not  it  is  Mr  Russell's.  To  clear  up  that 
point,  and  to  settle  the  question  on  its  own  merits,  it 
would  be  well  for  the  disputants  to  discuss  it  with  regard 
to  fiction  as  a  whole,  without  complicating  matters  by 
seeming  to  confine  themselves  to  the  special  and  bizarre 
case  of  self-contradictory  objects. 

1  Stellung  der  Gegenstandstheorie,  pp.  16,  17. 

2  Mind,  1907,  p.  439. 


w.  10 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  MUTUAL  RELATIONS  OF  JUDGMENT,  APPREHEN- 
SION, ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT 

ACCORDING  to  my  view,  the  fundamental  need  in  a 
treatment  of  knowledge  is  to  recognise  that  every  in- 
stance of  knowledge  is  an  instance  of  the  presentation  of 
reality  in  consciousness ;  or,  regarded  from  the  other 
side,  an  instance  of  the  apprehension  of  reality.  When 
this  is  once  settled,  the  disposal  of  our  various  special 
terms  is  not  much  more  than  a  question  of  convenience, 
and  many  uses  may  be  equally  justified  so  long  as  we 
make  ourselves  clear. 

If  we  are  to  mark  out  judgment  from  the  rest  of 
apprehension,  there  are  perhaps  two  or  three  chief  ways 
open  to  us.  We  may  say  that  we  judge  when  we  appre- 
hend an  object  as  belonging  to  the  world  of  actuality  or 
validity  ;  as  being  non-fictitious.  Or  we  may  use  the  term 
whenever  we  assign  an  object  to  its  special  universe, 
whether  or  not  that  universe  is  the  actual  world.  Per- 
sonally I  should  prefer  the  second  alternative.  Our 
distinction  would  then  be  equivalent  to  that  by  which 
Professor  Baldwin  distinguishes  belief;  "  The  particular 
control  which  assigns  a  thought  to  a  sphere  of  existence, 


JUDGMENT,  APPREHENSION,  ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT       147 

inner,  external,  semblant,  or  other1."  Thirdly,  we  may 
adopt  a  different  distinction  and  say  that  to  judge  is  to 
apprehend  an  object  of  higher  order.  This  would  include 
all  the  cases  which  fell  under  the  other  descriptions,  for 
existence  in  any  sphere  is  an  object  of  higher  order. 

I  think  that  it  matters  very  little  which  of  these  alter- 
natives we  adopt,  but  an  important  point  comes  next. 
When  we  apprehend  any  of  these  objects  we  have  no 
choice,  as  we  have  several  times  remarked,  as  to  what  we 
shall  apprehend.  We  can  decide  whether  or  not  we  shall 
see  anything — whether  we  shall  look  that  way.  But  once 
we  have  looked  we  have  no  choice  of  what  we  shall  see. 
When  we  have  asked  a  question  there  is  but  one  answer. 
We  speak  of  assigning  objects  to  this  sphere  or  to  that, 
but  neither  objects  nor  contents  wait  for  any  directions 
from  us.  Denying  a  proposition  is  a  very  different  matter 
from  denying  a  request.  When  we  deny  the  existence  of 
an  object  the  cognitive  part  of  the  process  consists  of 
nothing  more  than  the  apprehension  that  the  object  does 
not  exist.  To  believe  in  an  object  is  to  see  the  content 
show  forth  the  object's  position  in  its  universe,  and  not 
in  any  sense  to  put  it  there  or  even  to  consent  to  its 
being  there. 

Now  since  an  act,  in  any  sense  in  which  it  is  relevant 
for  our  distinctions,  must  be  capable  of  being  a  choice,  and 
since  in  these  matters  we  have  no  choice,  we  must  keep  to 
the  doctrine  we  have  held  throughout,  that  in  all  cognition 
the  act  is  of  the  same  sort,  consisting  simply  in  apprehend- 
ing ;  in  opening  our  eyes  on  a  particular  level  and  looking 
in  a  particular  direction  to  see  what  is  there.  Judgment 
is  marked  out  from  the  lower  and  simpler  kinds  of  appre- 
1  Tlwught  and  Things,  Vol.  11.,  pp.  21—23. 

10—2 


148  THE   MUTUAL   KELATIONS   OF 

hension  by  a  peculiarity  in  the  content  apprehended,  and 
by  a  consequent  peculiarity  in  the  act  of  sight,  but  in  no 
other  way. 

I  must  therefore  disagree  entirely  with  the  doctrine  of 
some  of  Meinong's  school,  that  "judgment  and  apprehen- 
sion differ  neither  in  object  nor  in  content,  but  in  act1." 
"  The  conviction  that  justice  exists  is  different  from  the 
imaginative  contemplation  of  a  righteous  world2."  Yes, 
for  the  content  of  our  apprehension  is  different ;  in  the 
first  case  we  see  our  justice  living  and  growing  in  the 
actual  course  of  events,  in  the  second  case  we  see  it  only 
in  a  non-actual  universe ;  or  perhaps  we  only  see  it  in- 
complete, disjoined  at  the  edges  from  any  universe. 
Besides  knowing  the  characteristics  of  justice,  we  know 
that  it  is  doubtful  whether  or  not  it  exists. 

Meinong's  own  method  is  to  distinguish  judgment  from 
mere  presentation  by  two  characteristics — the  presence  of 
belief,  and  determination  "  with  regard  to  yes  and  no3." 
For  my  account,  both  these  points  belong  to  content  and 
not  to  act.  To  believe  is  to  see  the  connection  between 
object  and  universe ;  and  to  affirm  or  deny,  so  far  as  it  is 
cognition  at  all,  is  to  apprehend  the  presence  or  absence 
of  objects.  This  latter  point  is  evident,  I  think,  when  we 
avoid  the  confusion  pointed  out  by  Mr  Russell,  between 
rejecting  P  and  apprehending  not-P4.  The  denial  of  a 
request  comes  under  the  first  head ;  it  is  the  opposite  of 
consenting  to  that  request,  and  differs  from  it  primarily  in 
act.  The  denial  of  a  proposition  is  the  opposite  of  affirming 
that  proposition,  and  differs  from  it  primarily  in  content. 

1  Witasek,  Psychologic,  p.  280.  2  Op.  cit.,  p.  78. 

3  E.g.  in  Uber  Annahmen. 

4  Mind,  1904,  p.  348.     Or  see  p.  46  of  the  present  essay. 


JUDGMENT,  APPREHENSION,  ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT       149 

Assumption  and  Judgment. 

The  foregoing  decisions  will  evidently  have  some 
bearing  on  the  position  of  assumption  in  the  whole  of 
knowledge. 

We  must  remind  ourselves  to  begin  with  that  the 
term  in  question  is  the  name  of  a  concrete  process  which 
includes  more  than  cognition.  When  we  assume,  we  create 
an  object  as  well  as  apprehend  it.  Hence  it  is  certain 
that  assumption  in  the  concrete  will  differ  "  in  act "  from 
judgment  and  from  the  rest  of  apprehension,  but  the  im- 
portant question  for  us  is  only,  "Does  the  cognitive 
element  in  an  assumption  differ  thus  in  act  from  the  rest 
of  cognition  ? "  My  answer  must  evidently  be  once  more 
that  it  differs  in  act  only  in  so  far  as  it  differs  in  the 
content  apprehended.  In  assumption  my  object  is  partly 
of  my  own  creation,  and  I  know  it.  I  need  not  always  have 
the  fact  in  mind ;  I  may  be  attending  to  internal  details 
so  intently  that  the  object's  relation  to  the  actual  world  is 
not  in  consciousness  at  all.  But  unless  confusion  and 
mistake  supervene  I  never  see  the  object  as  actual ;  where- 
as in  judgment  this  is  what  I  do  see.  That  means  that 
there  is  a  difference  in  what  I  have  in  mind,  in  the  content 
and  the  whole  object  of  consciousness. 

"  The  revolution  began  yesterday"  has  its  object  in  the 
actual  universe ;  "  Suppose  that  the  revolution  had  begun 
yesterday  "  has  it  definitely  not  there.  That  is,  though 
the  limited  part  of  our  object  expressed  by  the  term 
"  revolution "  may  be  the  same  in  assumption  and  in 
judgment,  the  whole  object  presented  to  us  is  not  the 
same.  Even  the  limited  part,  we  may  say,  is  made  in 
the  two  cases  of  two  different  materials. 


150  THE  MUTUAL  RELATIONS   OF 

If  the  objects  differ  in  this  way,  does  it  follow  that  it 
is  impossible  to  find  an  assumption  and  a  judgment  whose 
object  shall  be  the  same  ?  The  answer  is  determined  by 
that  peculiarity  of  assumption-creation  which  prevents  the 
creation  from  ever  taking  place  in  the  universe  to  which 
the  assumption  refers.  If  judgment  by  definition  has  to 
keep  its  object  always  in  the  actual  universe  it  is  impos- 
sible for  an  assumption-object  to  be  identical  with  it,  but 
if  we  allow  the  term  to  refer  to  other  universes  then  the 
identity  can  be  obtained  by  the  device  of  making  judg- 
ment and  assumption  refer  not  to  the  same  but  to 
neighbouring  worlds.  The  best  instances  will  be  supplied 
by  the  writing  and  reading  of  historical  novels.  The 
author  in  the  course  of  composition,  referring  to  a  his- 
torical personage,  makes  the  assumption  that  "  The  Em- 
peror expressed  himself  thus."  This  assumption  refers  to 
the  actual  world  but  makes  its  creation  in  the  novel's 
world.  The  reader,  thinking  and  judging  in  the  latter, 
says,  "  The  Emperor  uttered  the  following  words."  Here 
we  have  an  assumption  and  a  judgment  with  the  same 
content,  and  we  observe  that  all  the  difference  between 
them  has  disappeared. 

The  great  writer  who  has  been  the  first  to  see  the 
importance  for  logic  and  psychology  of  the  study  of  as- 
sumptions has  given  an  account  of  them  which  differs  in 
some  fundamental  points  from  mine.  Judgment,  according 
to  him,  differs  from  mere  presentation  in  two  characters 
both  of  which  belong  to  the  act,  namely  in  that  it  involves 
belief  and  in  that  it  affirms  or  denies.  Assumptions  keep 
the  affirmation  or  denial  but  drop  the  belief1.  They  are 

.  l  Uber  Annahmen,  p.  2. 


JUDGMENT,  APPREHENSION,  ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT       151 

much  nearer  to  judgment  than  to  presentation,  for  it  is 
quite  intelligible  to  speak  of  them  as  judgment  without 
belief,  but  unintelligible  to  say  that  they  are  presenta- 
tions determined  with  regard  to  yes  or  no1. 

Mere  presentation  ( Vorstellung)  makes  the  weak  point 
to  my  mind  in  all  parts  of  Meinong's  philosophy.  He 
himself  is  hindered  by  it ;  it  does  not  fit  in  with  his 
classifications,  and  is  apt  to  make  an  exception  to  all  his 
rules2.  I  suggest  that  the  whole  difficulty  comes  from 
attempting  to  distinguish  the  different  forms  of  cognition 
as  different  acts  instead  of  making  them  all  apprehensions 
with  various  contents.  For  me  the  yes-no  determination 
and  the  belief  are  both  a  matter  of  content.  Mere  presen- 
tation, if  we  wish,  may  be  harmlessly  defined  as  presenta- 
tion lacking  these  characters.  It  is  much  more  doubtful 
whether  they  can  still  be  counted  as  two  characters  and 
not  rather  as  one,  for  both  seem  to  consist  in  the  kind  of 
connection  which  is  seen  to  exist  between  our  central 
content  and  the  rest  of  reality.  I  have  therefore  worked 
throughout  with  a  different  definition,  keeping  closer  to 
ordinary  language,  and  have  made  the  differentia  of  as- 
sumption consist  in  the  fact  that  in  it  I  deliberately  create 
for  contemplation  a  non-actual  object.  Then  if  belief  is 
taken  in  Baldwin's  sense  to  mean  the  sight  of  the  object 
as  having  position  in  a  special  universe,  not  necessarily 
in  the  actual  universe,  we  must  grant  that  in  assumption 
belief  is  still  present  as  well  as  affirmation  and  negation. 
For  we  know  in  what  way  our  assumption-object  does  and 
does  not  exist. 

Witasek's  development  of  Meinong's  account  shows  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  277-8. 

2  See  e.g.  Uber  Annahmen,  passim. 


152  THE   MUTUAL  RELATIONS   OF 

danger  involved  in  describing  assumptions  as  judgments- 
without-conviction.  Assumptions,  according  to  Witasek, 
are  very  closely  related  to  judgments,  for  they  lack  nothing 
except  belief,  and  the  amount  of  belief  that  is  present  in 
a  judgment  may  vary  in  amount  to  any  extent1. — True, 
a  judgment  that  began  with  fall  conviction  may  lose  that 
conviction  bit  by  bit;  the  landscape  that  seemed  solid 
and  distinct  may  become  more  and  more  misty ;  what  we 
saw  clearly  may  fade  away  until  it  vanishes.  But  the  end 
of  this  scale  of  doubt  is  anything  but  an  assumption ;  the 
end  is  suspense  of  judgment,  absence  of  cognition.  "  It  is 
absolutely  certain  that  the  murder  took  place  thus  and 
here  "  may  be  weakened  through  "  It  is  probable  that  it 
happened  thus "  and  "  We  cannot  be  quite  sure  that  it 
happened  thus  "  into  "  It  is  quite  uncertain  whether  there 
ever  was  a  murder."  But  by  no  natural  process  of  cogni- 
tion does  this  become  "I  will  write  an  account  of  the 
murder  for  the  Daily  Mail." 

This  may  become  rather  more  evident  when  we  have 
examined  the  position  of  doubt  as  such. 

Doubt,  Judgment  and  Assumption. 

Not  only  assumption  and  judgment  but  doubt  and 
judgment  differ  in  their  content.  In  judgment  the  map 
is  complete ;  the  central  object  is  seen  in  position  within 
its  universe.  In  doubt  of  the  existential  sort  we  see  the 
central  object  but  it  is  not  clear  to  us  whether  it  has  a 
proper  connection  with  the  universe  or  not.  The  moun- 
tain stands  out  clearly  but  mist  encircles  it,  so  that  we 
cannot  be  sure  whether  it  is  a  real  part  of  the  landscape  or 

only  a  mirage. 

1  Psychologic,  p.  310. 


JUDGMENT,  APPREHENSION,  ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT       153 

Nevertheless  the  mountain  may  be  real ;  that  is,  belief 
in  it  and  doubt  as  to  it  may  have  the  same  object  in  spite 
of  their  difference  in  content.  An  assumed  mountain  on 
the  other  hand  can  never  be  thus  real,  nor,  except  by 
confusion,  can  it  ever  come  to  appear  so.  It  is  encircled 
by  no  line  of  mist ;  its  edges  stand  out  in  the  void  against 
the  background  of  that  actual  landscape  of  which  it 
can  never  become  a  part.  We  have  no  doubt  here ;  the 
object  is  non-actual  and  we  know  it. 

It  is  therefore  extremely  important  to  keep  clear  of 
any  confusion  of  assumption  with  doubt.  Doubt  may 
properly  become  belief  as  the  mist  clears  away.  Assump- 
tion never  can.  Even  if  we  assume  a  hypothesis  which 
turns  out  to  be  true,  the  belief  is  continuous  not  with  our 
assumption  but  with  our  doubt.  It  occurs  to  us  that  the 
object  half  hidden  in  mist  may  have  a  certain  shape ; — 
here  is  the  germ  of  belief.  For  the  sake  of  experiment 
we  sketch  that  shape ;  construct  it  to  stand  out  on  the 
mist.  Having  our  eye  thus  guided,  we  are  able  to  discern 
more  and  more  clearly  that  this  in  truth  is  the  shape  of 
the  mountain  behind.  But  though  the  appearance  of  the 
mountain  looms  up  and  fills  out  our  picture,  the  picture 
is  no  more  than  a  vision  and  a  help  to  the  eye.  When 
we  have  done  with  this  it  vanishes ;  it  never  becomes 
part  of  the  mountain,  for  its  material  is  not  granite  but 
empty  air. 

In  constructive  hypothesis  I  apprehend  an  object 
created  by  me,  and  thus  enable  myself  to  apprehend  an 
object  which  I  did  not  create ;  but  in  that  second  cogni- 
tion I  am  not  assuming.  The  real  object  appears  to  me, 
never  in  so  far  as  I  assume,  but  in  so  far  as  I  begin  to 
believe.  Of  course  there  may  be  all  kinds  of  mixtures 

10-5 


154      JUDGMENT,  APPREHENSION,  ASSUMPTION  AND  DOUBT 

and  confusions.  An  object  long  and  vividly  assumed  may 
through  self-suggestion  come  to  be  believed  in,  just  as  by 
the  same  process  a  fantasy-desire  or  fantasy-impulse  may 
burst  the  bounds  of  its  universe  and  blend  with  actual  will. 
In  a  fit  of  melodramatic  jealousy  or  resentment  a  man 
may  experience  all  these  possibilities.  But  in  so  far  as  our 
procedure  is  rational  our  will  grows  not  from  fantasy-desire 
but  from  actual  craving,  and  our  belief  develops  not  out  of 
assumption  but  out  of  "  opining." 


PART   IV 

CONCLUSION 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   PRESENTATION   OF  REALITY 

"!T  may  be,"  says  Professor  James,  "that  the  truest 
of  all  beliefs  shall  be  that  in  trans-subjective  realities.  It 
certainly  seems  the  truest,  for  no  rival  belief  is  as  volumi- 
nously satisfactory.... Anticipating  the  result  of  the  general 
truth-processes  of  mankind,  I  begin  with  the  abstract 
notion  of  an  objective  reality.  I  postulate  it...1." 

I  cannot  decide  whether  I  am  bolder  or  more  modest 
than  Professor  James  in  beginning  with  what  I  take  to 
be  not  the  postulate  but  the  certainty,  not  the  abstract 
notion  but  the  concrete  unavoidable  presence,  of  an  objec- 
tively real  world.  Is  it  that  I  attribute  to  our  experience 
more  than  he  feels  justified  in  attributing  to  it,  or  is  it 
that  he  demands  more  than  I  before  he  will  call  a  thing 
objective  and  real  ? 

All  that  I  demand  is  that  the  object's  being  shall  be 
independent  of  our  apprehension  in  the  sense  that  this 
act  of  apprehension  has  not  created  it.  This  condition  is 
satisfied  by  every  object  that  enters  our  consciousness,  for 
apprehension  can  create  nothing.  If  we  had  invented  the 

1  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  p.  243. 


158  THE    PRESENTATION    OF    REALITY 

universe  as  we  might  invent  a  novel,  I  should  still  call  it 
objective  and  real.  If  every  object  were  created  at  the 
moment  when  we  observed  it  and  annihilated  the  moment 
we  ceased  to  observe  it  I  should  still  use  the  same  terms. 
Since  we  really  have  experience,  it  is  in  my  usage  inevitable 
that  there  should  be  a  real  world.  Such  reality  has  been 
defined  as  the  limitation  of  activity1,  but  it  is  also  the 
tool  and  material  and  basis  of  activity ;  it  is  support  as 
well  as  resistance.  "What  we  must  take  account  of"  is 
"  what  we  can  count  on." 

If  there  is  any  presentation  there  must  be  a  real 
world.  But  now,  this  reality  being  granted,  the  world 
develops  before  us.  Some  of  it  we  do  invent,  but  for  the 
most  part  it  invents  itself.  Some  of  it  never  recurs,  but 
some  does.  That  is,  it  behaves  twice  in  the  same  way, 
and  therefore  ipso  facto  it  is  in  so  far  the  same  ;  I  have 
nothing  to  do  with  any  numerical  identity  which  is 
different  from  qualitative  or  working  identity.  Some  of 
it  is  ready  to  recur  whenever  we  choose ;  two  and  three 
make  five  whenever  we  like  to  add  them.  Some  of  it 
appears  with  the  same  behaviour  in  all  manner  of  different 
shapes,  arid  thus  we  find  the  laws  of  causation,  and  the 
relations  of  space,  and  the  operations  of  time.  An  immense 
and  indefinite  amount  is  added  to  what  we  have  to  reckon 
on  and  reckon  with,  in  that  we  apprehend  not  only  the 
behavings  of  the  world  but  these  ways  of  its  behaviour. 

Every  presented  object  has  such  reality  as  enables  it 
to  present  itself,  but  most  objects  have  far  more.  Not 
only  do  they  present  themselves  now  and  here,  but  if  we 
take  proper  steps  they  will  present  themselves  otherwise; 
and  not  only  do  they  present  themselves  to  us  but  they 
1  Baldwin,  quoting  Stout. 


THE   PRESENTATION   OF   REALITY  159 

affect  one  another — the  evidence  for  this  being  that  in 
sense  and  in  inference  we  see  them  do  so.  Parts  of  the 
universe  have  most  complex  and  interesting  ways  of 
behaviour,  and  these  parts  we  call  fellow-men.  We  know 
them  as  different  from  ordinary  things  partly  by  their 
resistance  and  incalculableness1,  but  still  more  because 
they  can  help  us  and  co-operate  with  us  much  better  than 
a  thing  will  do.  They  are  known  as  human  not  only 
because  they  overthrow  our  expectations  but  because  we 
can  expect  so  much  more  of  them.  Complex  as  their 
customs  are,  they  present  themselves  with  a  certain 
naturalness  and  intelligibility.  We  learn  readily  to  under- 
stand and  depend  upon  them.  Indeed  the  process  of 
early  development  consists  scarcely  so  much  in  learning 
to  expect  a  certain  behaviour  here  as  in  learning  not  to 
expect  it  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  Our  discoveries  con- 
sist less  in  finding  that  some  of  the  universe  is  personal 
than  in  finding  that  some  of  it  is  not  personal. 

Since  our  powers  of  apprehension  are  not  confined  to 
sense,  therefore  we  apprehend  in  the  personal  part  not  only 
bodies  but  minds.  In  all  cognition,  and  not  only  in  per- 
ception or  sensation,  or  uninferred  knowledge,  reality  is 
in  my  sense  directly  presented.  Hence  we  have  direct 
apprehension  of  other  men's  natures  and  of  other  men's 
experience.  We  find  that  their  experience  of  outer  objects 
is  to  a  very  large  extent  the  same  as  our  own  ;  that  is,  our 
external  world  is  for  the  most  part  qualitatively  identical, 
and,  as  before,  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  non-qualita- 
tive identity.  As  a  matter  of  history,  our  discoveries 
consist  rather  of  finding  that  some  of  the  universe  is  not 
common  than  of  finding  that  some  of  it  is ;  for,  owing  to 
1  Baldwin. 


160  THE   PRESENTATION   OF   REALITY 

the  nature  of  our  practical  life,  the  commonness  of  im- 
portant and  interesting  objects  is  forced  on  us  as  soon  as 
we  meet  with  the  object  at  all.  From  the  beginning  our 
sensory  experience,  for  instance,  is  supplemented  by  what 
in  thought  we  perceive  of  other  men's  sensory  experience. 
Further,  we  apprehend  not  only  the  experiences  which 
other  men  share  with  us,  but  their  private  experience  as 
well.  Their  feelings  and  thoughts  are  sometimes  harder 
to  perceive  than  the  motions  of  their  bodies,  but  often 
they  are  much  easier.  These  also  form  part  of  the 
universe  which  we  know. 

Finally,  in  these  matters  as  in  all  others  mistakes  are 
possible  and  often  actual.  Sometimes  what  has  presented 
itself  as  bread  reveals  itself  presently  as  a  stone.  Some- 
times what  has  presented  itself  as  a  man  reveals  itself  as 
a  lifeless  thing.  It  is  abstractly  conceivable,  though  not 
credible,  that  the  loaves  in  our  larder  are  all  stones,  that 
all  the  objects  we  have  believed  to  be  men  are  really  lifeless 
machines,  that  England  is  not  really  an  island,  and  that 
the  integral  calculus  is  founded  on  an  immense  mistake. 
If  all  this  were  found  to  be  so  the  world  would  greatly 
change  its  shape  for  us.  Nevertheless  the  world,  the 
real  world,  would  in  some  shape  remain.  Whilst  we  live  we 
cannot  escape  from  this  intimate  presence,  this  inevitable 
and  undeniable  pressure  of  objective  reality.  Whilst 
experience  exists  there  is  a  real  person  and  a  real 
universe. 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS   REFERRED   TO 


Ach,  N.,  Vber  die  Willenstdtigkeit  und  das  Denken  (1905),  40 
Alexander,  S.,  *'  Mental  Activity  in  Willing  and  in  Ideas"  (Aristotelian 

Society's  Proceedings,  1908-9),  91,  92, 101-2 ;  (Aristotelian  Society's 

Proceedings,  1909-10),  75,  116 
Ameseder,  R.,  "  Ueber  Vorstellungsproduktion,"  in  Gegenstandstheorie 

und  Psychologie  -(1904),  76 
Avenarius,  R.  (Article  in  Vierteljahrschrift  f.  wiss.  Ph.  18),  17 

Baldwin,  M.,  Thought  and  Things,  128-9,  146-7,  158-9 
Bosanquet,  B.,  Logic,  75,  131 

Bradley,  F.,  Appearance  and  Reality,  81-5;  Principles  of  Logic,  76,  84 
Biihler,  K.,  "Tatsachen  und  Probleme  zu  einer  Psychologie  der  Denk- 
vorgange "  (Arch.  f.  d.  gesamte  Psychologie,  1907-8),  39,  40,  41 

Dawes  Hicks,  "Sense-Presentation  and  Thought"  (Arist.  Soc.  Pro- 
ceedings, 1905-6),  64 

Green,  T.  H.,   Works,  75,  96 

Hoernle,  R.  F.  A.,  "  Image,  Idea,  and  Meaning  "  (Mind,  1907),  5,  16,  26, 

126,  128,  134,  135,  137 
Hofler,  A.,  Psychologie,  92 

James,  William,  "On  the  Function  of  Cognition"  (Mind,  O.S.  10),  4; 
"The  Philosophy  of  Bergson "  (Hibbert  Journal,  April  1909), 
78-85;  The.  Meaning  of  Truth,  74,  137,  157;  A  Pluralistic  Universe, 
74,  78-85 


162  INDEX   OF   AUTHORS   REFERRED   TO 

Lipps,  Theodor,  Bewusstsein  und  Gegenstande,  8,  16,  54,  112,  126,  140 ; 
Das  Wissen  vnnfremden  Ichen,  64;  Vom  Filhlen,  Wollen,  undDenken, 
54,  86-7 

Mally,  W.,  in  Gegenstandstheorie  und  Psychologie  (1904),  123,  144 

Marbe,  K.,  Experimentell-psychologische  Untersuchungen  Uber  das 
Urteil  (1901),  40,  41 

Meinong,  A.,  16,  23,  45,  128,  142;  "  Zur  erkenntnisstheoretischen  Wiir- 
digung  des  Gedachtnisses  "  (Viert.  f.  wiss.  Ph.  1886),  49,  50;  "Uber 
Gegenstande  hoherer  Ordnung"  (Z.  f.  Psych.  1899),  13,  18;  fiber 
Annahmen  (1902),  93,  136,  148,  150-1;  Untersuchungen  zur  Gegen- 
standstheorie und  Psychologie  (1904),  144;  Uber  die  Erfahrungs- 
grundlagen  unseres  Wissens  (1906),  49,  50;  Uber  die  Stellung  der 
Gegenstandstheorie  im  System  der  Wissenschaften  (1907),  126,  127, 
134,  144,  145 

Munsterberg,  H.,  Grundziige  der  Psychologie,  126 

Orth,  J.,  Gefiihl  und  Bewusstseinslage  (1903),  40 

Prichard,  H.  A.,  "The  Psychologists'  Treatment  of  Knowledge"  (Mind, 
1907),  4,  19,  20,  27 

Kickert,  Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntniss,  8,  76, 

Russell,  Bertrand,  "  Meinong's  Theory  of  Complexes  and  Assumptions  " 
(Mind,  1904),  46,  123,  124,  148;  "  On  Denoting"  (Mind,  1905),  139, 
141 ;  Review  of  Meinong's  "  Stellung  der  Gegenstandstheorie"  (Mind, 
1907),  145 

Stout,  G.  F.,  87;  Analytic  Psychology,  39,  52,  64;  Manual  of 
Psychology  (1901),  14,  57;  Groundwork  of  Psychology  (1903),  23,  58; 
"Things  and  Sensations"  (Proceedings  of  the  British  Academy,  1905), 
58;  "Error,"  in  Personal  Idealism,  117,  118;  "  Neo-Kantism  as 
represented  by  Dr  Dawes  Hicks"  (Arist.  Soc.  1905-6),  88;  "The 
Nature  of  Conation  and  Mental  Activity  "  (British  Journal  of  Psycho- 
logy, 1906),  61,  87;  Review  of  Schiller  (Mind,  1907),  111;  "Are 
Presentations  Mental  or  Physical?"  (Arist.  Soc.  1908-9),  68,  62, 
65,  66;  "Immediacy,  Mediacy,  and  Coherence"  (Mind,  1908),  49 

Titchener,  Experimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought-Processes  (1909), 
10,  41-4 


INDEX    OF   AUTHORS    REFERRED   TO  163 

Twardowski,  K.,  Zur  Lehre  vom  Inhalt  und  Gegenstand  (1894),  13,  16, 
17,  18,  19,  123,  142-3 

Urban,  Valuation,  87 
Venn,  Empirical  Logic,  139 

Ward,  James,  Article  on  Psychology  in  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  old 

volumes,  20,  61,  87,  93 
Witasek,  "Zur  psychologischen  Analyse  der  asthetischen  Einfiihlung  " 

(Z.    f.    Psych.    1901),    20,    93;    Psychologie    (1908),    17,    27,    120, 

148,  151-2 


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